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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays covering topics in the economics of education. Two
common threads connect these essays: first, a focus on the inputs and practices driving variation
in effectiveness across educational programs; and second, an interest in the relationships between
students' preferences, characteristics, and returns to human capital investment. In the first chapter,
I develop and estimate a structural model of school choice that links students' decisions to apply
to and attend charter schools in Boston, Massachusetts to their potential achievement test scores
in charter schools and public schools. This chapter is motivated by a growing literature that
uses randomized entrance lotteries to show that urban charter schools, including those in Boston,
substantially increase test scores and close racial achievement gaps among their applicants. A key
policy question is whether charter expansion is likely to produce similar effects on a larger scale.
To address this question, I use the structural model to predict the effects of charter expansion
for the citywide achievement distribution in Boston. Estimates of the model suggest that charter
applicants are negatively selected on achievement gains: low-income students and students with
low prior achievement gain the most from charter attendance, but are unlikely to apply to charter
schools. This form of selection implies that lottery-based estimates understate gains for broader
groups of students, and that charter schools will produce substantial gains for marginal applicants
drawn in by expansion. Simulations suggest that realistic expansions are likely to reduce the
gap in math scores between Boston and the rest of Massachusetts by up to 8 percent, and reduce
racial achievement gaps by roughly 5 percent. Nevertheless, the estimates also imply that perceived
application costs are high and that most students prefer traditional public schools to charter schools,
so large expansions may leave many charter seats empty. These results suggest that in the absence
of significant behavioral or institutional changes, the potential gains from charter expansion may
be limited as much by demand as by supply.
The second chapter, written jointly with Joshua Angrist and Parag Pathak, seeks to explain
differences in effectiveness across charter schools. Using a large sample of lotteried applicants
to charter schools throughout Massachusetts, we show that urban charter schools boost student
achievement, while charter schools in other settings do not. We then explore student-level and
school-level explanations for this difference. In an econometric framework that isolates sources of
charter effect heterogeneity, we show that urban charter schools boost achievement well beyond
that of urban public school students, while non-urban charters reduce achievement from a higher
baseline. Student demographics explain some of these gains since urban charters are most effective
for non-whites and low-baseline achievers. At the same time, non-urban charter schools are uni-
formly ineffective. Our estimates also reveal important school-level heterogeneity within the urban
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charter sample. A non-lottery analysis suggests that urban charters with binding, well-documented
admissions lotteries generate larger score gains than under-subscribed urban charter schools with
poor lottery records. Using a detailed survey of school practices and characteristics, we link charter
impacts to inputs such as instructional time, classroom techniques and school philosophy. The
relative effectiveness of urban lottery-sample charters is accounted for by these schools' embrace of
the No Excuses approach to urban education, a package of policies that includes strict discipline,
increased instructional time, selective teacher-hiring, and a focus on traditional skills.
In the third chapter, I use data from the Head Start Impact Study (HSIS), a nationwide ran-
domized trial of the Head Start program, to study the relationship between site-level treatment
effects and educational inputs within Head Start. Studies of small-scale, intensive early-childhood
programs, including the High/Scope Perry Preschool Project, show that such programs can have
transformative effects on human capital and economic outcomes. Evidence for larger-scale pro-
grams like Head Start is more mixed. I use the HSIS data to ask whether Head Start centers using
practices more similar to successful model programs produce larger short-run effects on cognitive
and non-cognitive skills. My results show that while there is significant variation in effectiveness
across Head Start centers, centers that are more similar to the Perry Preschool Project on ob-
served dimensions are not more effective. Specifically, Head Start centers using the High/Scope
curriculum, the centerpiece of the Perry experiment, do not produce larger gains relative to other
centers. Other inputs often cited as essential to the success of the Perry Project, including teacher
education, teacher certification, teacher/student ratios, instructional time, and frequency of home
visiting, are also unrelated to effectiveness in Head Start. These results suggest that replicating
the success of small-scale programs may be difficult, as the effectiveness of such programs may be
due to idiosyncratic, unmeasured inputs.
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Title: Ford Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
A Structural Model of Charter School
Choice and Academic Achievement
1.1 Introduction
Differences in test scores between racial and socioeconomic groups are a pervasive feature of the
American educational landscape. In 2008, 13-year-old black students scored more than 0.8 standard
deviations (o-) below their white counterparts on the National Assessment of Educational Progress
Long Term Trend (NAEP-LTT) math test. Similar achievement gaps appear in all subjects and
at all grade levels (Fryer and Levitt 2004, 2006; Vanneman et al., 2009). Moreover, after several
decades of convergence, the relative scores of black students stagnated in the late 1980s (Neal
1996). Achievement gaps between high- and low-income students have also grown in recent years
(Reardon 2011). Numerous policy interventions with the potential to affect achievement gaps
have been proposed, but few produce gains of the magnitude necessary to substantially reduce
these gaps (Fryer 2010).1 As a result, some analysts have argued that it is either impossible or
inordinately expensive to significantly reduce achievement gaps using educational policies alone,
especially policies that target adolescents (Rothstein 2004; Heckman 2011).
These pessimistic accounts notwithstanding, a growing body of evidence suggests that some
charter schools serving poor, minority populations in urban areas boost achievement sharply. Char-
'A few interventions have larger effects for blacks than for whites. Krueger and Whitmore (2001) use data from
the Tennessee STAR experiment to show that a 50% reduction in class size over three years raises the scores of
blacks and whites by 0.26o, and 0.13o, respectively. Similarly, Howell and Peterson (2002) estimate that providing
vouchers for private school boosts scores by 0.2c for black students and has little benefit for whites. Barnett (1992)
and Ferguson (1998) report that the Perry Preschool Project, an intensive early childhood intervention for at-risk
black students, increased achievement in adolescence by roughly 0.4o.
11
ter schools are publicly funded, non-selective schools that typically have more freedom than tradi-
tional public schools to set curricula and make staffing decisions. Studies based on entrance lotteries
show that attendance at charter schools in Boston and New York's Harlem Children's Zone raises
achievement by 0.25o- per year or more (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011; Dobbie and Fryer 2011a).
Angrist et al. (2011, 2012), Dobbie and Fryer (2011b), Gleason et al. (2010), Hoxby and Murarka
(2009), and Hoxby and Rockoff (2004) also report positive effects for urban charters. 2
These findings suggest that urban charter schools may have the potential to reduce achievement
gaps. Reflecting this hope, the Massachusetts legislature recently relaxed the state's charter school
cap with the explicit goal of reducing racial and socioeconomic disparities in academic performance
(Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2010). Twenty Massachusetts charter schools are approved to
open by Fall 2014, including 11 in Boston (Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education 2012b). State officials have announced plans to approve additional Boston charter schools
in the near future (Vaznis 2012).
Despite the substantial effects reported in lottery-based studies, however, some analysts argue
that charter expansion is unlikely to raise achievement on a larger scale. Charter applicants are a
small, self-selected subset of the student population; in Boston, only 17 percent of students apply
to a charter, and applicants are less disadvantaged and higher-achieving than non-applicants. 3
Students with the largest potential benefits may be most likely to sign up for charter lotteries.
In support of this view, Ravitch (2010, pp. 144-145) argues that "charter schools enroll the most
motivated students in poor communities, those whose parents push them to do better.. .as more
charter schools open, the dilemma of educating all students will grow sharper." Similarly, Rothstein
(2004, p. 82) writes of the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP), a high-performing urban charter
operator: "[T]hese exemplary schools.. .select from the top of the ability distribution those lower-
class children with innate intelligence, well-motivated parents, or their own personal drives, and
give these children educations they can use to succeed in life." In this view, lottery-based estimates
that identify effects for charter applicants overstate the effects of charter attendance for broader
groups of students, and charter expansion is unlikely to boost citywide achievement.
On the other hand, lottery-based estimates could also understate the potential effects of charter
attendance for non-applicants. The parents of low-achieving students may be unlikely to investigate
2Estimates for charter schools outside urban areas are mixed. Gleason et al. (2010) find that non-urban charters
are no more effective than traditional public schools, while Angrist et al. (2011) find negative effects for non-urban
charter middle schools in Massachusetts.
3The demographics of charter applicants are discussed in detail in Section 1.2.3.
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alternatives to traditional public school, despite evidence that urban charters are especially effective
for such students (Angrist et al. 2012). More generally, since applying to charter schools requires
parental action, the parents of charter applicants may be more motivated to invest in their children's
human capital than other parents. The inputs provided by charter schools may either complement or
substitute for these parental investments. The efficacy of charter expansion is therefore theoretically
unclear.
The aim of this chapter is to predict the consequences of charter school expansion in Boston,
with an emphasis on achievement gaps. To this end, I develop and estimate a structural model that
links students' charter application decisions to their potential achievement gains in a parametric
selection framework. The model is similar to the stochastic portfolio choice problem outlined by
Chade and Smith (2006): students submit charter applications to maximize expected utility, taking
account of admission probabilities and non-monetary application costs. To identify the model's
parameters, I combine instruments from entrance lotteries with a second set of instruments based
on proximity to charter schools. The approach taken here is similar in spirit to other recent studies
that use economic theory to extrapolate from experimental or quasi-experimental causal estimates
(see, e.g., Todd and Wolpin 2010, Card and Hyslop 2006, Attanasio et al. 2011, Duflo et al.
2012, and Hastings et al. 2009).4 The model accommodates heterogeneity in student preferences
and achievement gains on both observed and unobserved dimensions. In addition, it allows for
heterogeneous effects across charter schools, and permits charter admission probabilities to adjust
endogenously to changes in the set of available schools.
Estimates of the model imply that charter applicants are negatively selected on gains from
charter attendance. Specifically, higher-achieving, less-disadvantaged students have the strongest
preferences for charter schools, but charters are most effective for poor students and those with low
previous achievement. The structural estimates also imply that charter applicants are negatively
selected on unobserved dimensions of achievement gains. Surprisingly, these findings imply that
lottery-based estimates understate the achievement effects of charter schools for broader sets of
students. As a result, charter expansion has the potential to substantially raise achievement for
marginal applicants: simulations show that Boston's proposed expansion, which raises the share of
middle schoolers attending charters from 9 percent to 15 percent, is expected to reduce the gap in
4Angrist and Fernandez-Val (2011) and Hotz et al. (2005) describe approaches to extrapolation that emphasize
variation in treatment effects as a function of observed covariates. Heckman and Vytlacil (2001, 2005), Carneiro et
al. (2010), and Heckman (2010) discuss nonparametric estimation of marginal treatment effects (MTE), effects at
particular values of the unobserved propensity to receive treatment. The approach taken here includes elements of
both of these approaches.
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math scores between Boston and the rest of Massachusetts by 5 to 8 percent, and reduce citywide
racial achievement gaps by roughly 5 percent.
At the same time, estimates of the model also show that the effects of further expansions may
be limited by weak demand. Students act as if application costs are high, and most prefer to
attend traditional public schools despite the achievement gains they would receive from charters.
As a result, large expansions of the charter system are likely to leave many charter seats empty
without substantially increasing enrollment. In the long run, demand for charters may rise if
parents become more informed or measures are taken to boost application rates. Taken together,
however, the results reported here suggest that at present, parents in Boston are either unaware of,
or unresponsive to, the achievement gains produced by charter schools: The overall level of demand
for charters is low, and the students with the largest potential gains are relatively unlikely to apply.
These results contribute to a nascent literature assessing the possible consequences of charter
school expansion. Fryer (2011) examines the effects of introducting practices from successful charter
schools in nine low-performing traditional public schools in Houston, Texas. The results show clear
gains in math, suggesting that these practices are effective outside the charter context. Other related
studies include Mehta (2011) and Ferreyra and Kosenok (2011), who develop equilibrium models of
charter school entry and use them to conduct counterfactual analyses. Strategic entry models are
less appropriate for the Boston setting because entry is effectively determined by Massachusetts'
charter school cap legislation. The model estimated here focuses on the demand for charter schools,
with an emphasis on the relationship between preferences and the achievement effects of charter
attendance.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The next section gives background on charter
schools in Boston and describes the data. Section 1.3 benchmarks the effects of charter schools in
the sample of lottery applicants. Section 1.4 outlines the structural model, and Section 1.5 discusses
identification and estimation of the model. Section 1.6 reports the structural estimates. Section
1.7 uses these estimates to simulate the effects of charter expansion. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Setting and Data
1.2.1 Context: Charter Schools in Boston
Non-profit organizations, teachers, or other groups wishing to operate charter schools in Mas-
sachusetts submit applications to the state's Board of Education. If authorized, charter schools
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are granted freedom to organize instruction around a philosophy or curricular theme, as well as
budgetary autonomy. Charter employees are also typically exempt from local collective bargain-
ing agreements, giving charters more discretion over staffing than traditional public schools.5 The
Board of Education reviews each charter school's academic and organizational performance at five
year intervals, and decides whether charters should be renewed or revoked. Enrollment at Mas-
sachusetts charter schools is open to all students who live in the local school district; if a charter
school receives more applications than it has seats, it must accept students by random lottery.
Charters are funded primarily through per-pupil tuition payments from local districts. Charter
tuition is roughly equal to a district's per-pupil expenditure, though the state Department of Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education partially reimburses these payments (Massachusetts Department
of Elementary and Secondary Education 2011).6
The Boston Public Schools (BPS) district is the largest school district in Massachusetts, and it
also enrolls an unusually large share of charter students. In the 2010-2011 school year, 14 charter
schools operated in Boston, accounting for 9 percent of BPS enrollment. The analysis here focuses
on middle schools, defined as schools that accept students in fifth or sixth grade; 12 percent of
Boston middle schoolers attended charter schools in 2010-2011. Columns (1) through (3) of Table
1 list names, grade structures and years of operation for the ten Boston charter middle schools that
opened between 1997 and 2010. These schools are marked in black on the map in Figure 1.7
Many of Boston's charter schools adhere to a model known as "No Excuses," a set of practices
that includes extended instruction time, strict behavior standards, a focus on traditional reading
and math skills, selective teacher hiring, and teacher monitoring (Wilson 2008). A growing body
of evidence suggests that these practices boost student achievement (Angrist et al., 2011; Dobbie
and Fryer, 2011b; Fryer, 2011). Consistent with this evidence, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) use
entrance lotteries to show that Boston's charter schools substantially increase achievement among
their applicants. Their estimates imply that a year of charter middle school attendance raises test
scores by 0.4a- in math and 0.2o- in English Language Arts (ELA).
5 Massachusetts has two types of charter schools: Commonwealth charters, and Horace Mann charters. Common-
wealth charters are usually new schools authorized directly by the Board of Education, while Horace Mann charters
are often conversion schools and must be approved by the local school board and teachers' union prior to state autho-
rization. Horace Mann employees typically remain part of the collective bargaining unit. I focus on Commonwealth
charter schools. No Horace Mann middle schools operated in Boston during my data window, though three were
scheduled to open in 2010 or later.
6 1n the first year after an increase in charter enrollment, the state fully reimburses the local district for the
additional charter tuition payments. Subsequent reimbursement rates are 60 percent in the second year, 40 percent
in the third year, and zero thereafter.
7 Only nine locations are marked in Figure 1 because Boston Preparatory Charter School opened in the building
previously occupied by Frederick Douglass Charter School after the latter closed.
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These encouraging findings make Boston an appealing setting for studying the effects of charter
school expansion. The effects of expansion in Boston are also relevant to an ongoing policy debate.
In recent years, the growth of charters in Massachusetts has been slowed by the state's charter
cap, a law that limits expenditures on charter schools to 9 percent of the host district total. 8 The
Board of Education stopped accepting proposals for new Boston charters in 2008 when charter
expenditure hit the cap (Boston Municipal Research Bureau 2008).
In 2010, the Massachusetts legislature relaxed the charter cap for low-performing school districts.
Specifically, for districts with test scores in the lowest decile, the limit on charter expenditures is to
rise incrementally from 9 percent in 2010 to 18 percent in 2017 (Commonwealth of Massachusetts
2010). The new law gives priority to "proven providers" who have previously held leadership
positions at schools demonstrating academic success for similar student populations (Massachusetts
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 2012a). The law also requires schools to
specify recruitment plans aimed at attracting applicants who are demographically similar to the
local population, though all students are free to apply and admissions will continue to be determined
by lottery (Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 2012c).
Through 2011, the Board of Education received 51 charter applications under the new law.
Of these, 32 were selected as finalists, and 20 charters were granted, eleven to schools in Boston
(Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 2012). Table 2 lists the Boston
charter middle schools scheduled to open in the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years, as well as
existing schools operated by the same providers. Two opened in 2011-2012, while four opened in
2012-2013. Five new schools are linked to existing charters in Boston; the sixth, KIPP Academy
Boston, is part of the Knowledge is Power Program, the nation's largest charter management
organization. 9 The locations of the newly approved schools are marked in red in Figure 1. The
state Board of Education has announced that it will consider proposals for additional Boston charter
schools opening in 2013 and later (Vaznis 2012).
1.2.2 Data Sources and Sample Construction
The data used in my analysis comes from three sources. First, I obtain demographics, school
attendance, and test scores from an administrative database provided by the Massachusetts De-
8Legislation also limits the total number of Commonwealth charter schools to 72 and the number of Horace Mann
charters to 48, though these caps are not currently binding.
9 KIPP operates two charter schools in Lynn, a poor suburb of Boston. In a lottery-based evaluation of one of
these schools, Angrist et al. (2012) estimate effects similar to those of Boston's charter middle schools.
16
partment of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE). Second, I draw spatial location data
from student addresses provided by the BPS district. Finally, I obtain information on charter
school applications and offers from lottery records gathered from individual charter schools.
The DESE database covers all Massachusetts public school students from the 2001-2002 school
year through the 2010-2011 school year. Key variables include sex, race, subsidized lunch status,
limited English proficiency (LEP), special education status (SPED), town of residence, schools
attended, and scores on Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) math and ELA
achievement tests. I begin by selecting all white, black, and Hispanic students in the database who
attended a traditional BPS school in 4th grade between 2006 and 2009. I also require students to
have non-missing 4th grade demographics and test scores, as well as school attendance information
and test scores in 6th, 7th, or 8th grade. I use only the earliest test taken by a given student in a
particular subject and grade.
Next, I merge the student address database to the DESE administrative file using a crosswalk
between BPS and state student identifiers. The address database includes a record for every year
that a student attended a traditional BPS school between 1998 and 2011. I drop students in the
state database without BPS address data. This restriction eliminates less than 1 percent of Boston
4th graders. The address information is used to measure proximity to each Boston charter school.
I measure proximity using road distance in miles. 10
I then match the student data to records from lotteries held at seven charter middle schools
in Boston.'1 I focus on middle schools because applicant records were more consistently available
in middle school than in elementary or high school, and I restrict attention to applicant cohorts
attending 4th grade in 2006 and later because records for earlier cohorts were missing for several
schools. Column (4) of Table 1 summarizes the availability of lottery records for the ten charter
middle schools that operated between 1997 and 2010.12 Of the three schools without available
records, two closed prior to the 2009-2010 school year; the third declined to provide records. In
the analysis below, I treat these schools as equivalent to traditional public school. I matched the
available lottery records to the administrative data by name, grade, year, and (where available)
10 Road distance is obtained using the STATA traveltime command, which queries Google Maps to obtain travel
distance between any two locations. Versions of the model using other measures of proximity, such as direct "as the
crow flies" distance or driving time, produced very similar results.
"The lotteries used here are an expanded version of the middle school sample used by Abdulkadiroglu et al.
(2011), including two additional schools.
12I classify charter schools as middle schools if they accept applicants in 5th or 6th grade. Two Boston charter
schools accept students prior to 5th grade but serve grades 6 through 8. Since I restrict the analysis to students who
attended traditional BPS schools in 4th grade, no students in the sample attend these schools.
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date of birth. This process produced unique matches for 92 percent of lottery applicants.
After matching the lottery files to the student data, I constructed two subsamples for statistical
analysis. The first is used to estimate causal effects for lottery applicants. This sample excludes
students that did not apply to charter schools, as well as applicants who were not randomized. The
latter group includes siblings guaranteed admission, and late applicants, who are typically placed
on a waiting list. The lottery sample includes 1,822 applicants to charter middle schools. A second
sample is used to estimate the structural model. In addition to randomized applicants, this sample
includes students who did not apply to charter schools and applicants who were not randomized.
The structural sample includes 10,986 students who attended BPS schools in 4th grade between
2006 and 2009.
1.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Applicants to Boston charter schools differ from the general population of Boston students.
Specifically, charter applicants tend to have higher socioeconomic status, and to enter middle
school with higher prior achievement than non-applicants. This can be seen in Table 3, which
reports summary statistics for the structural sample in column (1) and the applicant sample in
column (2). Seventeen percent of students applied to at least one charter lottery, and ten percent
attended a charter school. Compared to the general student population, charter applicants are less
likely to be Hispanic, to be eligible for subsidized lunch, to have special education status, or to be
classified as limited English proficient. Charter applicants are more likely to be black, and also live
closer to charter schools on average (1.64 miles from the closest charter school, compared to 1.84
miles for the full population).
The last two rows of Table 3 display information about 4th grade MCAS scores. I standard-
ize MCAS scores to have mean zero and standard deviation one within each grade-year in Mas-
sachusetts. Boston 4th graders lag behind the state average by 0.54o- and 0.66- in math and ELA.
Students who apply to charter schools have substantially higher scores than the general Boston pop-
ulation: applicants' 4th grade scores exceed the Boston average by more than 0.2a- in both subjects.
Taken together, these summary statistics indicate that charter applicants are higher-achieving, less
economically disadvantaged, and less likely to have academic problems than students who do not
apply to charter schools.
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1.3 Effects on Lottery Applicants
1.3.1 Lottery Estimates
To motivate my analysis of the effects of charter expansion, I begin by benchmarking the
effects of charter attendance among the selected subset of students who apply to charter schools. I
interpret these effects in the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) notation described by Imbens
and Angrist (1994), which provides a formal framework for analyzing heterogeneity in causal effects
across individuals. Let Y(1) be applicant i's potential test score if she attends a charter school,
and let Y(0) be her test score if she attends a public school. Si indicates charter attendance (the
"treatment"), and Zi is a lottery offer dummy. Let Si(l) and Si(0) denote potential treatment
status as a function of Zi. The LATE framework is based on the following assumptions for the
lottery applicant sample:
Al Independence and Exclusion: (Y,(1), Y (0), Si(1), Si(0)) is independent of Zi.
A2 First Stage: 0 < Pr[Zi = 1] < 1 and Pr[Si(1) = 1] > Pr[Si(0) = 1].
A3 Monotonicity: Si(1) > Si(0) Vi.
The Independence and Exclusion assumption is motivated by the observation that offers are ran-
domly assigned among applicants, and are unlikely to affect test scores through any channel but
charter attendance. The First Stage assumption requires that winning the lottery makes applicants
more likely to attend charter school on average. Monotonicity requires that winning the lottery
does not discourage any applicant from attending charter school.
Under assumptions A1-A3, applicants can be partitioned into three groups: never takers, who
never attend charters (Si(1) = Si(O) = 0), always takers, who attend regardless of the offer (Si(1) =
Si(0) = 1), and compliers, who are induced to attend by receiving offers (Si(1) > Si(0)). Imbens and
Angrist (1994) show that conventional instrumental variables (IV) methods consistently estimate
LATE, the average treatment effect for compliers. We have
E[YjjZj = 1] - E[YjIZj = 01 = E[Y(1) - Y (0)|Si(1) > Si(0)] (1.1)
E[SI|Zj = 1] - E[YI|Sj = 0]
The Wald (1940) IV estimator is the empirical analogue of the left-hand side of equation (1.1).
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I estimate LATE using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure that combines observations
from multiple lotteries. Specifically, the estimating equation for the lottery analysis is
Y =0 + #Si + ei (1.2)
where Y is a test score for applicant i, Si is a dummy variable indicating charter school attendance,
and #' is a set of fixed effects capturing all combinations of charter lotteries entered by students
in the data. I code a student as attending charter school if she attends a charter at any time after
the lottery and prior to the test. The first stage equation is
Si = ,e + 7rZ, + ri (1.3)
The instrument Zi is one for students who receive any charter offer before the start of the school
year following the lottery.13 The 2SLS estimate of # can be interpreted as a weighted average of
within-lottery LATEs.14 To use all available test score information, the sample stacks test scores
in grades six through eight. Standard errors are clustered at the student level.
Consistent with the results reported by Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011), the 2SLS estimates show
that Boston's charter schools have dramatic effects on student achievement for lottery applicants.
As shown in column (1) of Table 4, receipt of a lottery offer increases the probability of charter
attendance by 0.65. The second-stage estimates, reported in columns (2) and (3), imply that
attending a charter school increases math scores by 0.50c- and boosts ELA scores by 0.31o-. These
effects are precisely estimated.
These pooled results mask substantial heterogeneity in the benefits of charter school attendance
across racial groups. The second row of Table 4 shows that the effects of charter schools are relatively
modest for white students: the math estimate for whites is a statistically insignificant 0.14o-, and
the ELA estimate is negative and insignificant. In contrast, the third and fourth rows reveal large,
significant effects for black and Hispanic students in both subjects. Charter attendance boosts scores
13 With random assignment of Zi, pre-lottery characteristics should be balanced across winners and losers. Ap-
pendix Table Al examines balance for observable student characteristics. There are few significant differences between
lottery winners and losers, and joint tests of balance never reject at conventional significance levels. Even with ran-
dom assignment, the validity of the instrument can be compromised by non-random attrition. Appendix Table A2
shows that the followup rate for the lottery sample is 84 percent, and followup rates for lottery winners and losers are
very similar. Column (1) of Appendix Table A2 shows that followup rates are similar in the lottery and structural
samples.
1 4 The 2SLS estimate is a weighted average of within-lottery Wald estimates, with weights proportional to the
variance of the first-stage fitted values (Angrist and Imbens 1995).
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for black students by 0.62a in math and 0.38a in ELA. The corresponding effects for Hispanics are
0.57a and 0.53o,. The last row of Table 4 reports p-values from Wald tests of the equality of charter
effects across races. The null hypothesis of equal effects is rejected at conventional significance
levels (p < 0.1) for both subjects. These results show that Boston's charter schools raise test scores
for non-white students much more than for whites.
1.3.2 Effects on Score Distributions by Race
As a final piece of motivation for the structural analysis to follow, I next use the lottery sample to
ask whether charter schools close racial achievement gaps among applicant compliers. To estimate
effects on black and white score distributions, I modify the methods described by Abadie (2002,
2003). Abadie notes that in addition to LATE, the marginal distributions of Y(1) and Y(0) are
separately identified for compliers in instrumental variables settings. Intuitively, the distribution
of Y for students with Si = Zi = 0 is a mixture of the distributions of Y(0) for compliers and
never takers. The distribution of Y(0) for never takers is directly observable among students
with Zi = 1 and Si = 0. The distribution of Y(0) for compliers can therefore be recovered by a
deconvolution procedure that uses these two observed distributions. A similar argument shows that
the distribution of Y(1) for compliers can be recovered using the distribution of Y for students with
Si = Zi = 1 together with the distribution for students with Si = 1 and Zi = 0. Abadie provides
simple methods for estimating CDFs of potential outcome distributions for compliers, and outlines
bootstrap procedures for testing hypotheses about these distributions. I extend these methods to
estimate potential outcome densities separately by race, and test for black-white equality among
applicant compliers who are randomly assigned to charter schools or public schools.
The estimating equations for the distributional analysis are of the form
Kh (Y - Yi) - Si = rfy + -Y(y) - Si + lhy, (1.4)
where Si is treated as an endogenous regressor and instrumented with lottery offers. Here Kh(t) =
kK (1), K(t) is a kernel function, and h is a bandwidth. Let f,(y) be the density of Y(s) for
lottery compliers. Appendix A shows that the probability limit of the 2SLS estimate of 'y(y) is
ff(y), the density function for treated compliers. fo(y) can be estimated by replacing Si with
(1 - Si) in equation (1.4). I use a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic to test distributional equality
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for blacks and whites. 15
Boston's charter schools cause math score distributions for black and white applicant compliers
to converge. This can be seen in Figure 2, which plots the estimated complier densities of Y(0)
and Y(1) for math, separately by race and year since application. The densities are estimated
using a triangle kernel with bandwidth 1-. 16 Black vertical lines indicate the pooled mean of Y(0)
in each figure, while red lines mark the mean of Y(1) in plots for treated students. At baseline
(prior to treatment), distributions for treated and non-treated compliers are similar, and black
students lag behind whites throughout the distribution. The KS test rejects baseline distributional
equality at conventional significance levels (p = 0.01 for the untreated, p = 0.09 for the treated).
In post-treatment years, the black distribution moves towards the white distribution for treated
compliers, and in 7th and 8th grade the null hypothesis of distributional equality cannot be rejected
for treated students (p > 0.54).
In contrast with the results for treated compliers, no convergence occurs for untreated compliers.
The left-hand panels of Figure 2 show that black compliers who attend public schools lag behind
their white counterparts in every year, with little relative change in the distributions after baseline.
The null hypothesis of distributional equality between untreated black and white compliers is always
rejected at the 10-percent level or lower. These results suggest that Boston's charter schools close
otherwise persistent achievement gaps between black and white compliers in math. As shown in
Figure 3, black-white convergence is less pronounced for ELA than for math, though large shifts in
mean ELA scores are evident in the plots for 7th and 8th grade.
1.4 Modeling Charter School Attendance
1.4.1 Setup
The lottery estimates in Section 1.3 show that Boston's charter schools have dramatic effects on
average test scores and racial achievement gaps for applicant compliers. At the same time, effects for
15 The KS statistic is proportional to the maximum difference in complier CDFs between racial groups. I estimate
these CDFs by replacing Kh (y - Y1) with 1{Y < y} in equation (1.4). Inference is based on a stratified bootstrap
procedure. For each of 200 bootstrap replications, I draw observations with replacement within lotteries to obtain a
new sample with the same lottery-specific sample sizes as the original sample. I then randomly assign observations
in each lottery to racial groups in the same proportions as in the original sample, and recalculate the KS statistic.
The results provide the sampling distribution of the KS statistic under the null hypothesis of distributional equality
for black and white compliers.
16Imbens and Rubin (1997) point out that instrumental variables estimates of potential outcome densities are not
guaranteed to be positive. I follow their suggestion and set the estimated densities to zero in a small number of cases
where the 2SLS estimate is negative.
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non-applicants may differ systematically from those for applicants, so these results need not provide
an accurate guide to the likely consequences of charter expansion. To extrapolate from the lottery-
based estimates, I use a structural model of charter application, attendance, and achievement. As
in Chade and Smith (2006) and Ajayi (2011), the charter school application decision is modeled
as a random utility portfolio choice problem: students choose a set of applications to maximize
expected utility, taking into account admission probabilities and application costs. The model also
allows for heterogeneous effects across charter schools.
Figure 4 explains the sequence of events described by the model. First, students decide whether
to apply to each of K charter schools, indexed by k E {1...K}. The dummy variable Aik E {0, 11
indicates that student i applies to school k. Second, charter schools randomize offers to applicants.
The dummy variable Zik E {0, 1} indicates an offer for student i at school k, and 1rk denotes the
admission probability for applicants to school k. In the third stage, students choose schools denoted
Si, where Si = 0 indicates public school attendance. Any student can attend public school, but
student i can attend charter school k only if Zik = 1. Finally, students take achievement tests in
grades six through eight. Yijg denotes student i's score in grade g on math and ELA tests, indexed
by j E {m, e}.
1.4.2 Student Choice Problem
Preferences
Students' preferences for schools depend on demographic characteristics, spatial proximity, ap-
plication costs, and unobserved heterogeneity. Specifically, the utility of attending charter school
k is
X .j j (1.5)Uik = 7ko + X;7" + y - Dik + Oi+ Vik -g |i 15
where Xi is a vector of characteristics for student i including sex, race, subsidized lunch status,
special education status, limited English proficiency, and 4th grade math and ELA scores. Dik
measures distance to school k. The utility of public school attendance is
U -o = vio - -a -|AjI.
The quantity 7a. AiI represents the utility cost of applying to IAi| charter schools.17 Application
'
7Variables without k subscripts refer to vectors, so that Ai = (Ail ...AiK)' and so on.
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costs include the disutility of filling out application forms and the opportunity cost of time spent
attending lotteries. These costs may also capture frictions associated with learning about charter
schools. Charter schools are not included in the standard BPS school choice system, and are not
typically listed in informational resources provided to parents by the district.1 8 Parents who wish
to learn about charter schools must undertake additional efforts, such as visiting individual school
websites or attending information nights. Applicants pay these costs whether or not they attend a
charter.
The variables 6i and vik represent unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. O6, which characterizes
student i's preference for charter schools relative to traditional public school, is the key unobservable
governing selection into the charter sector. This variable includes any latent factors that influence
students to opt out of traditional public school in favor of charter schools, such as the perceived
achievement gain from attending charter schools, proximity to the relevant public school, and
parental motivation. 19 In the language of the random-coefficients logit model (see, e.g., Hausman
and Wise 1978, Berry et al. 1995, and Nevo 2000), 6i is the random coefficient on a charter school
indicator. The presence of O6 implies that charter schools are closer substitutes for each other than
for traditional public schools. I assume that 6i follows a normal distribution with mean zero and
variance o,.
The Vik capture idiosyncratic preferences for particular schools, which are further decomposed
as
Vik = Tik + 'ik-
Students know rik and O before applying to charter schools, and learn (ik after applying. The post-
application preference shock explains why some applicants decline charter school offers. To generate
multinomial logit choice probabilities, -rik and 4ik are assumed to follow independent extreme value
type I distributions with variances o and 7r2 /6. 20
18For example, the "What Are My Schools?" tool located at https://externalweb.mybps.org provides a list of the
BPS schools to which children are eligible to apply, but does not list charter schools.
19Proximity to public school is treated as an unobservable because Boston has a citywide choice plan, so students
have a large number of traditional public schools to choose from.
20That is, cik follows a standard Gumbel distribution, which provides the scale normalization for the model.
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School Lotteries
In the second stage of the model, schools hold independent lotteries. School k admits applicants
with probability irk. The probability mass function for the offer vector Zi conditional on Ai is
f(ZiIAi; 7r) = l [Aik - (7rkZik + (1 - 7fk)(1 - Zik)) + (1 - Aik) - (1 - Zik)]. (1.6)
k
Initially, admission probabilities are treated as parameters to be estimated. However, admission
rates are likely to change as the system of charter schools expands. In the simulations to follow,
the 7rk adjust so that schools fill their seats in equilibrium. Section 1.7.2 and Appendix D discuss
the determination of endogenous admission probabilities.
Application and Attendance Decisions
I derive students' optimal application and attendance rules by backward induction. A student
is faced with a unique attendance decision after each possible combination of charter school offers,
because the set of offers in hand determines the available school choices. Consider the decision facing
a student at stage 3 in Figure 4. At this point, the student knows her charter offers, application
costs are sunk, and there is no uncertainty about preferences. Student i can attend public school
or any charter school that offers a seat. Her choice set is
C(Zi) = {O} U {k : Zik = 1}.
Define
Uik(0i,rk) -0 + ±X' +-yd -*Dik+O±+rik
with Uo(0i, -rio) = rio. Student i's optimal school choice is
S,=arg max Uik(Gi,rik)+ ikkeC(Zi)
and the probability that student i chooses school k is given by
exp (Usk(4, rik))
Pr[Si = k|Xi, Di, Z,, 9i, -r ] =
EEC(zi) exp ai(0i, ri)
SPi A Zi, O , TO )
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The expected utility associated with this decision (before the realization of (;) is
Wi(Zi, O, -ri) E[maxkEc(zi) Uik(9i, TiO) + ik|Xi, Di, Zi, 64, 7i]
=v + log E ex p ( Cik (0i, -rik)
kEC(Zi)
where v is Euler's constant.
Students choose charter applications to maximize expected utility, anticipating offer probabili-
ties and their own attendance choices. Consider the application decision facing a student at stage
1 in Figure 4. The student knows Oi and ri, but does not know (i, and her choice of Ai induces a
lottery over values of Zi at a cost of -y - |Ail. The expected utility from choosing Ai = a is given
by
Vi(a, 6i, r) = [f(zla; r) -Wi(z, O6, r)] - 7- al.
zE{O,1}K
The optimal application rule is therefore
Ai = arg max Vi(a, i, -ri)
aE{O,1}K
A* (XiI DiI 6, -ri).
1.4.3 Achievement
Students are tested after application and attendance decisions have been made. Potential
achievement for student i at charter school k in subject j and grade g is given by
Yig(k-) = aqk + aq c + Xiafge +  a ± - i + Cijgk (1.7)
while potential traditional public school achievement is
Yig(0) = a9 g+ Xa-g, + a4gg - + Eijgo. (1.8)
The subscripts c and p in these equations refer to charter school and public school. The causal
effect of attending charter school k relative to traditional public school for student i in subject j
and grade g is Yijg(k) - Yijg(0). Observed scores for student i are the potential scores associated
with her optimal school choice: Yig = Yig(Si).
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The unobserved determinants of academic achievement may be correlated both over time and
across subjects. To capture this possibility, I allow Eijgk to follow the first-order autoregressive
process
Cijgk = Pjk * Eij(g-1)k + (ijgk, (1.9)
where the (ijgk are serially independent and the vector (Cimgk, Ciegk)' has a bivariate normal distri-
bution with covariance matrix EIk. I assume that Pjk and Ek are the same across charter schools,
though they may differ between charter schools and traditional public schools.
1.4.4 Comments on Modeling Choices
Equations (1.5) through (1.9) provide a complete description of charter demand and potential
academic achievement. This section provides intuition for some of the key modeling choices implicit
in these equations.
First, the model emphasizes differences between charter and traditional public schools, while
limiting differences between charter schools. Heterogeneity in preferences and achievement across
students with different observed characteristics is governed by the vectors fyX and og for £ E {c, p}.
This specification allows observed characteristics to affect the choice of charter schools relative to
traditional public schools, and to interact differently with achievement in charter and public schools,
but requires that these characteristics affect preferences and achievement the same way at every
charter. Similarly, equation (1.7) implies that the relationship between the unobserved taste Oi
and student achievement is the same at every charter school. Heterogeneity in preferences and
achievement across charter schools is captured by the school-specific intercepts 1 and o k. These
restrictions allow me to limit the number of parameters to be estimated while also parsimoniously
summarizing heterogeneity in preferences and achievement gains across both students and schools.
Moreover, this emphasis on differences between charters and traditional public schools mirrors the
approach to identification described in Section 1.5.3, which emphasizes selection into the charter
sector rather than across charter schools.
A second notable feature of the model is that potential achievement does not enter directly
in students' utility functions. Instead, achievement and preferences are linked through the charter
taste O6, which appears in equations (1.7) and (1.8). Appendix C formally shows that this specifica-
tion nests a standard model of Roy (1951) selection in which students seek to maximize achievement
and have private information about their potential scores in charter and public schools. The model
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described here is more flexible than this Roy model, in the sense that it allows students' preferences
to depend on unobserved factors besides achievement. For example, students may be more likely
to choose charter schools if they expect to receive large achievement gains, but they may also be
more likely to choose charters if they have more motivated parents, and parental motivation may
be positively or negatively correlated with achievement gains. Equations (1.7) and (1.8) admit
either possibility by allowing for a flexible relationship between the unobserved charter taste O6
and potential achievement. The next section formally discusses my strategy for identifying this
relationship and outlines my estimation procedure.
1.5 Identification and Estimation
1.5.1 Exclusion Restriction
The central challenge in extrapolating from lottery-based estimates of charter effects is that
lottery applicants are self-selected. This leads potential achievement distributions for applicants
to differ from the corresponding population distributions. The model described here accounts for
this self-selection while placing structure on the selection process for the purposes of identification.
Specifically, identification of the parameters of equations (1.7) and (1.8) is based on the following
exclusion restriction:
E[(ijgk Xi,i, Zi, Di, Ti, (i] = 0. (1.10)
Equation (1.10) embeds three identifying assumptions. First, the lottery offer vector Zi is
excluded from equations (1.7) and (1.8). The offer choice Ai is a deterministic function of Xj,
Di, Oi, and ri, and lottery offers are randomly assigned conditional on Ai. The exclusion of Zi
is therefore equivalent to assuming that offers have no direct effect on student achievement, a
standard assumption in the charter lottery literature. Second, assumption (1.10) requires that
distance to charter schools is unrelated to the idiosyncratic component of potential achievement,
(ijgk. Finally, the school-specific preference shocks ri and (j are also taken to be unrelated to
potential achievement. I next discuss the latter two assumptions in detail and provide suggestive
evidence in support of them.
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1.5.2 Exclusion of Distance
If distance to charter schools is unrelated to (ijgk and affects students' charter attendance
decisions, it is a valid instrument for charter school attendance. The use of this instrument parallels
the use of proximity-based instruments in research on higher education (see, e.g., Card 1993).
The exclusion of distance seems plausible in the model described here, since Xi includes detailed
student characteristics and baseline achievement. The exclusion restriction requires that distance
to charter schools is effectively random conditional on these variables. Together, the lottery and
distance instruments identify the taste coefficients og in equations (1.7) and (1.8). For example,
if lottery applicants who are willing to travel long distances to attend charters benefit more than
students who live nearby, this suggests that unobserved tastes for charters are positively related
to achievement gains from charter attendance. Appendix B demonstrates how the combination of
lotteries and distance identifies the taste coefficients in a simplified model with one charter school.
Table 5 explores the validity of the distance instrument and compares IV estimates based on
lotteries and distance. Columns (1) and (2) report coefficients from ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions of 4th grade test scores on distance to the closest charter middle school, measured in
miles. The estimates in the first row show that students who live further from charter middle
schools have significantly higher 4th grade test scores, suggesting that charter schools tend to lo-
cate in low-achieving areas of Boston. The second row shows that adding controls for observed
characteristics shrinks these imbalances considerably and renders the coefficients statistically in-
significant. This suggests that observable student characteristics capture the relationship between
location and academic achievement, and lends plausibility to the use of distance as an instrument
in models that control for these characteristics.
Columns (3) through (5) of Table 5 compare 2SLS estimates using lottery offers and distance
as instruments for charter attendance. Models using the lottery instrument control for lottery fixed
effects and limit the sample to applicants, while models using the distance instrument control for
demographics and 4th grade test scores, and include the full sample. Column (3) shows that both
instruments have strong, statistically significant first stage effects on charter attendance: winning
a lottery increases the probability of charter attendance among applicants by 0.65, while a one-
mile increase in distance decreases the probability of charter attendance by 2.2 percentage points.
Columns (4) and (5) show that the two instruments produce similar estimates of the effects of
charter attendance, though the distance estimates are much less precise. The lottery instrument
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produces estimates of 0.50or and 0.31a for math and ELA tests, while the distance instrument
generates estimates of 0.54o and 0.19a. The structural estimates reported below efficiently combine
information from both sources of variation in charter attendance.21
1.5.3 Exclusion of School-specific Preferences
The exclusion of school-specific tastes from equations (1.7) and (1.8) implies that selection
on unobservables has a "single-index" form: the relationship between potential achievement and
unobserved preferences is driven only by the average charter school taste O6. This allows selection
on unobservables to be parsimoniously characterized by the set of coefficients oqg,. The single-index
restriction requires that students view charter schools as a homogeneous treatment, implemented
at multiple sites throughout Boston. Students may know about cross-site heterogeneity in average
effects (captured by o9) and about their own suitability for the charter treatment (captured by
6i), but the model requires that students do not make choices based on their own idiosyncratic
treatment gains across sites.
The exclusion of school-specific preferences is more plausible if the charter treatment is in fact
homogeneous across schools. Table 6 lists responses to a survey on school practices for the seven
charter middle schools included in the sample.22 For comparison, column (8) reports average re-
sponses for other charter middle schools in Massachusetts. The survey results show that practices
are highly uniform across Boston's charter middle schools, and differ markedly from schools else-
where in the state. Boston middle schools have more instructional time than other charter schools;
five of seven have longer school years than the non-Boston average, and six of seven have longer
school days. The seven Boston middle schools all strongly identify with the No Excuses educational
approach, choosing at least 4 on a 5-point scale measuring adherence to No Excuses, whereas other
charter schools are less likely to identify with No Excuses. Boston's schools uniformly emphasize
traditional reading and math skills, discipline and comportment, and measurable results, while
other charters place less emphasize on these ideas. With a few exceptions, Boston middle schools
ask parents and students to sign commitment contracts, require students to wear uniforms, and
utilize formal merit/demerit systems to reward and punish student behavior. In the classroom,
cold-calling and drills for math and reading are commonly used by Boston's charters, and less
21The lottery and distance instruments need not produce similar estimates even if both instruments are valid,
because they identify effects for different sets of compliers. The close correspondence between the lottery and distance
estimates in Table 5 suggests that average effects for lottery and distance compliers are similar, though I cannot reject
relatively large differences due to the imprecision of the distance estimates.
22Schools are randomly ordered to avoid divulging information about individual schools.
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likely to be used by charters elsewhere. The pattern in Table 6 shows that educational practices
are similar across charter middle schools in Boston, lending support to the assumption that stu-
dents are unlikely to make choices based on private information about school-specific achievement
gains.
To further motivate the exclusion of ri and (i from equations (1.7) and (1.8), Table 7 summa-
rizes the relationship between distance to charter schools and the choice of schools among charter
applicants. In the model outlined above, the decision to choose one charter school over another
is determined by the combination of distance and school-specific tastes. If application portfolio
choices are dominated by distance, then there is little scope for selection on school-specific tastes.
The results in Table 7 show that the choice of school conditional on applying is determined
mostly by distance. Thirty-nine percent of applicants apply to the closest school, and these students
travel an average of 1.63 miles to their chosen schools. An additional twenty-two percent apply
to the second closest charter, traveling an average of 1.17 miles beyond the closest school, and
12 percent choose the third closest, on average traveling 1.82 miles further than necessary. Only
14 percent of applicants apply to the fifth, sixth, or seventh closest school. These facts show that
although students are free to apply to distant schools, few do so; conditional on choosing to apply to
a charter, most students apply to one close by, leaving little potential for matching on school-specific
achievement gains.
1.5.4 Estimation
I estimate the parameters of the model by maximum simulated likelihood (MSL). Let 0 denote
the parameters of equations (1.5) through (1.9). The likelihood contribution of a student with
endogenous variables (Ai, Zi, Si, Y) is given by
i(G A = J 1{A*(Xi, Di, 0, T) = Ai} f (Zi IAi; 7r) - Pis(i)(Zi, 0, T)
x 4 (fi (0)) dF(6, r| Xj, Di, 0) (.1
where
Pigg(6) = Yijg -- aj(i) - ags(i) - X 3gs(i) -9
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and #m(-) is the multivariate normal density function of the igqk implied by equation (1.9). The
subscript s(i) denotes the school attended by student i.23
I evaluate the integral in equation (1.11) by simulation. The indicator function in the integrand
creates practical difficulties: for some values of 0 there may be no simulations where the observed
value of Ai is chosen, leading to a zero value for the likelihood (note that there are 27 = 128 possible
values of Ai). I therefore approximate the indicator function with a logit kernel smoother. For A
close to zero, we have
exp Vi (a, Oi, r)
1{A*(Xi, Di, O6, Ir) = a} ~ , . (1.12)
exp Vi(aOiTi)
a'E{10,1}K
The kernel smoothing approach, suggested by McFadden (1989) and discussed in detail by Train
(2003), is equivalent to estimation without smoothing in the limit as A approaches zero, and it
produces an objective function with better computational properties. In the empirical work to
follow, I set A = 0.1, the smallest value of A for which the exponential functions in equation (1.12)
did not evaluate to infinity during the estimation procedure.24
Let Or and r[ be draws of 0 and -r for individual i in simulation r. Define
exp(VW(A i,9r,'rf)
fi exp ( a,ir-rD) f(ZiIAi; 7r) - Pis(i)(Zi, o, Tr) -0m ( ))
Ea ex V A~9~
The simulated likelihood for observation i is
R
r=1
where R is the number of draws. The MSL estimator is defined by
N
QMSL = arg max log (Q)
i=1
2 3 Here s(i) is used to refer both to the specific school chosen by student i, as in the school-specific intercept a9,
and to the type of school chosen by student i (charter or public), as in the demographic coefficient vector am
24 Values of A between 0.1 and 0.3 produced very similar results. An alternative to smoothing is to view the right-
hand side of equation (1.12) as the true choice probability and treat A as an additional parameter to be estimated
(see, e.g., Berkovec and Stern 1991). Walker et al. (2004) note that estimating the smoothing parameter typically
results in an objective function that is flat at the optimum, with poor numerical performance. Assuming the existence
of tastes specific to combinations of charter applications also seems economically unattractive. For these reasons, I
use the kernel smoothing approach.
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If R rises faster than VN, the MSL estimator is VNI-consistent and has the same asymptotic
distribution as the conventional maximum likelihood estimator (Train 2003).
1.6 Estimates of the Structural Model
1.6.1 Preference Parameters
The MSL estimates were produced using 200 draws of Oi and ri for each student. The results
were not sensitive to increasing the number of draws. To code Si, I assigned a student to the charter
school where she attended the most days in grades five through eight; students who spent no time
in charter schools were assigned to public school.
Table 8 reports MSL estimates of the parameters governing preferences for charter schools. 2 5
Estimates of the vector yx are consistent with the demographic patterns reported in Table 2.
Subsidized lunch status, special education, and limited English proficiency are associated with
weak demand for charter schools, while black students and students with higher baseline math and
ELA scores have stronger preferences for charters. The intercept of charter utility -yO, which is the
average of -y, across schools, is negative and significant. This implies that most students in the
omitted demographic category would prefer traditional public schools to charter schools even in
the absence of application and distance costs.2 6 Column (3) of Table 8 shows average marginal
effects of observed characteristics on the probability of applying to at least one charter school.2 7
Poverty has the largest marginal effect on application behavior: Holding other variables constant,
subsidized lunch status reduces the probability of submitting a charter application by 7 percentage
points.
The bottom half of Table 8 reports estimates of the parameters governing preferences for dis-
tance, application costs, and heterogeneity in tastes. Increased distance significantly reduces the
251 calculate standard errors using the average outer product of the gradient of the simulated likelihood. Define
1 Vn log 4i ($MsL) Vn log i (CMSL
Then /-1 is a consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance of VN (AMSL - Q0), where Qo is the true parameter
vector.
2 6 Fourth grade scores are de-meaned in the estimation sample, so the omitted category is white males without
subsidized lunch, limited English proficiency, or special education status with average 4th grade scores.
2 7 Marginal effects for discrete variables are computed by simulating the model first with the relevant characteristic
set to zero for each student and then with it set to one, and computing the average difference in application probabil-
ities across these simulations. Marginal effects for continuous variables are average simulated numerical derivatives
of the application probability.
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utility of charter school attendance. The marginal effect in column (3) shows that a one-mile in-
crease in driving time to a charter school reduces the probability of applying to that school by
roughly one percentage point.28 The application cost -y is positive, large, and statistically sig-
nificant. Its magnitude suggests that applying to a charter school involves a utility cost roughly
equivalent to a 2.3 mile increase in driving distance. The estimates capturing unobserved hetero-
geneity in preferences for charter schools are statistically significant and economically important:
in utility terms, a one-standard-deviation increase in O is roughly equivalent to a 10-mile increase
in distance to all charter schools. The corresponding effect for ri is about three miles. The last row
of Table 8 shows that the average lottery admission probability is 0.64.29
The MSL estimates imply that charter applicants are a highly selected subset of the student
population. Define
P i XWyX + O
Pi indexes student i's preference for charter schools relative to public school as a function of
observed characteristics and unobserved tastes. Panel A of Figure 5 plots kernel densities of Pi
for applicants and all students in standard deviation units. The mean of the applicant preference
distribution is more than a full standard deviation above the population mean, and the variance
of preferences is also lower among applicants. This figure highlights the intuition for identification:
the model uses variation in preferences among lottery applicants driven by the distance instrument
to extrapolate beyond effects for applicants and predict the distribution of achievement effects for
the full population.
1.6.2 Achievement Parameters
The structural estimates reveal important heterogeneity in the achievement effects of charter
schools on both observed and unobserved dimensions. This can be seen in Table 9, which reports
estimates of the parameters of the math potential outcome equations. Estimates for 6th, 7th,
and 8th grade are shown in panels A, B, and C, respectively. In each panel, column (1) shows
estimates for charter schools, column (3) shows estimates for public schools, and column (5) shows
the difference, the causal effect of charter school attendance. Columns (2), (4), and (6) report
2 8The reported marginal effect for distance is obtained by first computing the marginal effect of a one-mile increase
in distance to each school on the probability of applying to that school, and then averaging these effects across schools.
291 allow admission probabilities to differ across schools and cohorts, and set them equal to one for students
with siblings at charter schools (siblings are guaranteed admission). The reported estimate is the average admission
probability for randomized applicants across schools and cohorts.
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standard errors.
The estimates in Table 9 show that charter schools have larger effects on math scores for more
disadvantaged students. The constant term reported in column (5) implies that charter attendance
raises math scores for students in the omitted demographic category by 0.37a in 6th grade, 0.25o
in 7th grade, and 0.390- in 8th grade. 30 Subsidized lunch students receive further benefits of around
0.15or in every grade, while black and Hispanic students also experience larger gains. A one standard
deviation improvement in baseline math scores decreases the effect of charter attendance by between
0.11o and 0.16o, and these baseline interactions are statistically significant. As shown in columns
(1) and (3), blacks, Hispanics, and subsidized lunch students lag behind other students in public
school, but these characteristics are not predictive of scores in charter schools conditional on the
other included covariates. In this sense, the structural estimates imply that charter schools close
math achievement gaps between racial and socioeconomic groups.
The last row of each panel shows the relationship between unobserved charter preferences and
math scores. The estimates in column (1) suggest that tastes for charter schools are not systemati-
cally related to achievement in charter schools. On the other hand, column (3) shows that students
with stronger unobserved preferences for charters do better in public school in every grade. A one
standard deviation increase in charter school tastes is associated with an increase of between 0.03a
and 0.07o, in public school math achievement. Together, these estimates imply that stronger tastes
for charter schools are associated with slightly smaller math gains, a fact documented in column
(5).
Table 10 shows that the pattern of estimates for ELA is broadly similar to the corresponding
results for math.' Column (5) shows that charter schools have substantial effects on the ELA
scores of students in the omitted demographic category (0.41o and 0.39o in 7th and 8th grade),
with significantly larger effects for subsidized lunch students and students with low baseline math
scores. As in math, race and subsidized lunch status are not predictive of ELA scores in charter
schools. Furthermore, the pattern of negative selection on unobservables is more pronounced in
ELA than in math: a one standard deviation increase in tastes for charter schools reduces the effect
of charter attendance by 0.06a and 0.10a in 6th and 8th grade, though the estimate for 7th grade
is not significant.
Taken together, the estimates reported in tables 9 and 10 reveal two important patterns. First,
30The constant reported for charter schools is an average of school-specific estimates.
3 1Estimates of the model's covariance parameters are reported in Appendix Table A3.
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charter schools reduce differences in achievement between racial and socioeconomic groups. Race
and subsidized lunch status are highly predictive of test scores in public school, but not predictive
of charter school scores conditional on other characteristics. Baseline achievement is also less
predictive of scores in charter schools than public schools, especially in math. Broadly speaking,
charter schools raise scores the most for the students who lag furthest behind their peers, reducing
achievement gaps relative to the public school counterfactual.
Second, when combined with the utility parameters in Table 8, the achievement parameters
show a consistent pattern of negative selection on gains from charter attendance. Students with
subsidized lunch status and those with low baseline math scores receive large achievement gains
from charter schools, but have atypically weak preferences for charter attendance. Students with
stronger unobserved tastes for charter schools also experience smaller gains, especially in reading.
Black students are an exception to this pattern, as they have stronger-than-average preferences
for charters and receive larger-than-average gains. As shown in panel B of Figure 5, however,
the full set of preference and achievement coefficients implies a decreasing relationship between
preferences for charter schools and achievement gains. To summarize the relationship between
gains and preferences, this figure plots the causal effect of charter attendance conditional on the
charter preference Pi, averaged across K schools and 3 grades. Define
,3j (p) =_E [w~ 1 g= E8 E (Yjg (k) - Yjg (0)) jPi =p
Figure 5 plots the #j(p) functions implied by the MSL estimates.32  For both math and ELA,
#j(p) is downward sloping, reflecting the fact that students with stronger preferences for charter
schools benefit less from charter attendance. This pattern is somewhat surprising; one might have
expected the students with the largest potential benefits to be the most likely to seek out charter
schools. Instead, the findings reported here suggest that disadvantaged students struggle the most
in traditional public schools, but are unlikely to investigate the charter alternative.
1.6.3 School Effects
Table 11 reports estimates of the model's school-specific parameters, including the average util-
ity '0, the admission probability 7rk, and the test score effects (ac - %6) for j E {m, e} (the
omitted grade effect in equation (1.7) is 6th grade, so the school-specific intercepts measure ef-
3 2 There is no closed-form expression for #j(p). The plots are constructed from simulated data using local linear
regressions with a triangle kernel and a bandwidth of 0.5 standard deviations.
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fects in grade six). The utility estimates in column (1) show that some charters are more popular
than others, but all of the estimates are negative, indicating that on average students prefer tradi-
tional public school to charter attendance. The admission probabilities, which are averages across
applicant cohorts, range from 0.39 to 0.87.
The achievement effects reported in Table 11 suggest that the math effects of Boston's charters
are not driven by any particular school; all seven charter middle schools increase student achieve-
ment relative to traditional public school for students in the omitted demographic category. The
estimated math effects range from 0.23a to 0.64a, and all of them are statistically significant. The
ELA effects reported in column (4) vary more across schools, and only two are positive and statisti-
cally significant. Interestingly, the two most effective schools, School 6 and School 7, are relatively
unpopular as measured by the average utility parameters in column (1). This mirrors the negative
selection with respect to student characteristics documented in tables 8 through 10: Students with
the most to gain are less likely to apply to charter schools, and students who apply to charters are
less likely to choose the most effective schools.
1.6.4 Model Fit
The model estimated here matches observed charter application and attendance behavior well.
This can be seen in Table 12, which shows empirical choice probabilities, together with the cor-
responding model-based predictions. 33 The model slightly under-predicts the fraction of students
applying to charter schools (16.6 percent in the data compared to 14.4 percent from the model) and
the fraction of students attending charters (10.0 percent compared to 9.3 percent). It also under-
predicts the fraction of applicants that submit multiple applications: 26.7 percent of applicants
choose more than one charter, while the model predicts a rate of 18.1 percent. The remaining rows
of Table 11 show that the model generally matches the relative popularity of particular charter
schools among charter applicants and attenders.
Table 13 shows that predicted math and ELA score distributions closely match the correspond-
ing empirical distributions. For both math and ELA and in every grade, the model-predicted mean
scores for charter and public school students are within 0.03o- of the corresponding empirical means.
Predicted standard deviations are also very close to their empirical counterparts for all tests and
grades in both charters and public schools.
3 3 The predictions are produced by simulating the model 100 times for each observation in the data set, and
averaging across simulations and then observations.
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1.7 Predicting Expansion Effects
1.7.1 Description of Expansions
The model estimated in this chapter allows for a parsimonious description of charter demand
that can be used to make out-of-sample predictions about student choices and achievement test
scores in counterfactual environments. I use the model to investigate the effects of changing Boston's
charter school network on the distribution of middle school test scores for the cohort of students
attending 4th grade in 2009. I begin with a look at the effects of closing all of Boston's charter
schools. This simulation shows how the existence of the charter sector has affected test scores. I
then simulate the effects of Boston's planned expansion, which adds six new charter middle schools
to the existing set of seven. This is followed by an analysis of progressively larger expansions that
add schools one by one until the number of charter schools reaches 30. Finally, I simulate the effects
of forcing all Boston middle school students to attend charter schools. While unrealistic, this last
scenario allows me to compare the population average treatment effect (ATE) to other treatment
parameters and put upper bounds on the possible effects of charter expansion.
1.7.2 Additional Assumptions
Expansions are defined by sets of charter schools, with each school characterized by a location,
an average utility 0 math and ELA intercepts ac and akd and an admission probability .rk
Choosing these characteristics for new schools requires additional assumptions. I next describe
these assumptions in detail and outline the procedures I use to acquire the parameters for each new
school.
School Locations
To choose charter locations for Boston's planned expansion, I use the addresses of the new
schools scheduled to open through 2013. Larger expansions require that I specify where additional
schools are located. Charter schools in Boston usually locate in vacant buildings, such as empty
churches (Roy 2010). To manage the computational complexity of the model, I do not model charter
locations as strategic choices, and instead assign them randomly. Specifically, I draw addresses at
random from a grid of half-mile by half-mile blocks covering Boston; if a drawn block does not
already contain a charter school, I add the next school in this location. Other models of location
choice might produce slightly different predictions of the effects of charter expansion. As shown in
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Section 1.7.3, however, my estimates imply that the market for charter schools will be saturated
by the time 30 schools have been added: at this point, almost all students live in close proximity
to a charter offering guaranteed admission. For expansions at this scale, other models of location
choice are therefore likely to produce results similar to those reported below. Figure 6 shows the
locations used for the counterfactual simulations. 34
Utility and Test Score Parameters
I assign utility and test score effects for Boston's planned expansion using the MSL estimates
for the linked schools listed in Table 2. For larger expansions, I randomly assign each new school
a draw of the vector (y, 0 k, aek)' from the estimated distribution of school effects. This approach
requires two assumptions. First, I assume that new charter schools are drawn from the same
distribution that generated the existing set of schools, which implies that new charter entrants can
successfully replicate the education production function used by existing schools. This assumption
seems plausible for Boston's planned expansion, which involves the expansion of existing charter
schools to a small number of satellite campuses located elsewhere in the city. For larger expansions,
replicating the production function may become increasingly difficult, as teachers, principals, or
other inputs used by charter schools could become scarce. As with all out-of-sample simulation
exercises, therefore, my quantitative predictions for larger expansions should be viewed as more
uncertain.
Second, I assume that the school-specific parameters of the utility and achievement equations
remain constant as students' application and attendance decisions change in counterfactual scenar-
ios. Importantly, this assumption implies that there are no peer effects on student achievement,
so that students' own potential test scores are'not affected by changes in their classmates' char-
acteristics. I abstract from peer effects because differences in peer quality are unlikely to be the
primary mechanism driving the effects of charter schools. As shown in Table 3, charter applicants'
baseline test scores are about 0.25a above the Boston average. For this difference in peer quality
to explain the effects reported in Table 4, peer effects would have to be roughly 2u and l per
standard deviation of baseline peer quality in math and ELA. In a summary of the peer effects
literature, Sacerdote (2011) reports a wide range of estimates, almost all of which are substantially
3 4 For the scenario in which all students are forced to attend charter schools, I randomly assign students to charters,
so spatial locations are not relevant.
3 5 KIPP Academy Boston is not linked to an existing Boston charter. I assign this school the mean utility and test
score effects.
39
less than these magnitudes. This suggests that charter schools produce achievement gains mostly
through channels other than peer effects, so ignoring peer effects is unlikely to cause important
errors in predictions of charter expansion effects.3 6
Admission Probabilities
To predict admission probabilities in the counterfactual simulations, I assume that schools set
their admission probabilities to maximize their own enrollments, accounting for optimal student
behavior and admission probabilities at other schools. Specifically, I look for a Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium in which students correctly anticipate irk and apply optimally, and schools op-
timally choose irk given students' application decisions and other schools' admission probabilities.
Appendix D formally outlines the structure of the game, shows that an equilibrium exists, and gives
conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. I numerically solve for the equilibrium admission
probabilities in each counterfactual simulation.
1.7.3 Simulation Results
Figures 7, 8, and 9 summarize the simulated effects of charter expansion on school choices,
charter oversubscription, and test scores. In each panel, a vertical black line indicates the existing
number of charter schools, and a red line indicates the size of Boston's planned charter expansion.
Panel A of Figure 7 shows how application and attendance rates change as the number of charter
schools rises, while panel B shows the effects of expansion on admission probabilities and the share
of charter seats filled. Figure 8 shows effects on average math and ELA scores, and Figure 9 shows
effects on white-black achievement gaps. Tables 14, 15, and 16 show numerical results for choice
behavior, math scores, and ELA scores, respectively.
The simulations imply that charter schools have had a substantial impact on the distribution
of test scores in Boston. This can be seen in the second row of Tables 15 and 16, which show the
effects of closing all charter schools. Without charter schools, average middle school math scores in
Boston would fall by between 5 and 11 percent relative to the state average, and ELA scores would
fall by up to 8 percent. Closing Boston's charters is also predicted to increase citywide white-black
3 6 To directly explore the relevance of peer effects in my sample, I followed the approach of Abdulkadiroglu et
al. (2011) and estimated 2SLS regressions in the lottery sample that interact charter attendance with average peer
baseline scores for students in the same lottery, instrumenting this interaction term with the interaction of peer
quality and the lottery offer. The coefficients on the interaction terms were small and statistically insignificant for
both math and ELA, suggesting that the effects of charter attendance are not larger for applicants who experience
larger increases in peer quality when they attend charter schools.
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achievement gaps by roughly 5 percent; the largest increase in the gap, 7 percent, occurs for 8th
grade math and ELA.
The charter expansions scheduled to take place through 2013 are likely to produce further
increases in average test scores and reductions in the achievement gap. Specifically, these expansions
are predicted to raise charter application and attendance rates to 22 and 15 percent, raise average
scores by 5 to 8 percent in math and 1 to 6 percent in ELA, and further reduce achievement gaps by
4 to 6 percent in math and 2 to 3 percent in reading. Columns (3), (6), and (9) of Tables 15 and 16
show the effect of treatment on the treated (TOT), the average effect of charter attendance for the
students who attend charters in each counterfactual. The TOTs associated with Boston's planned
expansion are all larger than the TOT for the existing system. This reflects the pattern of selection
discussed in Section 1.6: at the margin, charter expansion draws in students with weaker tastes
for charter schools, who receive larger achievement gains. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 14 show
that the availability of additional charter seats reduces oversubscription. The average admission
probability increases from 0.63 to 0.80, and only 85 percent of charter seats are filled, reflecting the
fact that 6 of 13 schools are undersubscribed (see column (2) of Table A4).
Figure 7 through 9 display the effects of opening additional charter schools one by one. Opening
more charters smoothly raises application and attendance rates, increases test scores, and reduces
achievement gaps. However, panel B of Figure 7 shows that charters are increasingly undersub-
scribed as more are added, and the share of charter seats filled falls sharply as the number of schools
increases. With 30 schools, 24 percent of students attend a charter, average 8th grade scores rise
by 20 percent and 5 percent in math and ELA, and 8th grade achievement gaps in these subjects
fall by 14 and 11 percent. However, only 60 percent of charter seats are filled.
The counterfactual simulations highlight two important insights implied by the structural es-
timates. First, since there is negative selection on achievement gains, the achievement effects of
charter schools are increasing in the share of students who attend charters. This can be seen most
clearly in the last rows of tables 15 and 16, which report the effects of a hypothetical expansion that
forces all students to attend charter schools. When all students attend charters, the TOT is equal
to the population average treatment effect (ATE). In both subjects and for all grades, the ATE
is larger than the TOT for today's charter students. This result implies that effects for current
charter applicants are smaller than potential effects for typical students in Boston.
Second, the simulation results imply that despite their large potential achievement effects,
additional demand for charter schools in Boston is limited. In the 30-school expansion, few schools
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are oversubscribed, so almost all students live in close proximity to a charter offering guaranteed
admission. Nevertheless, only one-third of students apply to a charter, and 40 percent of charter
seats are left unfilled. This result is due to the large application cost reported in Table 8 together
with the negative average utilities reported in Table 11, which are in turn driven by the fact that
charter application rates in Boston are low despite reasonably high admission probabilities. Only
students in the upper tail of the taste distribution are interested in attending charter schools,
and these students are spread increasingly thin as the charter system expands. Since the model
also predicts that charters would have substantial impacts on the test scores of the remaining non-
applicants, this lack of demand implies that preferences for charter schools are dominated by factors
other than achievement gains. This finding suggests that large-scale charter expansions may be
ineffective without concomitant efforts to boost charter application rates.
1.8 Conclusion
Estimates based on admission lotteries show that Boston's charter middle schools have substan-
tial positive effects on test scores and quickly close racial achievement gaps among their applicants.
At the same time, the implications of these findings for charter school expansion are unclear;
applicants are a small, non-random subset of the student population, so such gains may be atypi-
cal. This chapter develops a structural model of charter applications, school choice, and academic
achievement that links the decision to apply to charter schools to achievement gains from charter
attendance. To identify the parameters of the model, I combine two sets of instruments based on
random lotteries and proximity to charter schools. I then use estimates of the model to predict out-
of-sample effects for non-applicants and simulate the effects of charter expansion on the citywide
test score distribution.
Estimates of the model reveal that tastes for charter schools are inversely related to achievement
gains. Specifically, low-achievers and poor students gain the most from charter attendance, but are
unlikely to apply to charters. Consistent with this finding, counterfactual simulations show that the
average effect of charter schools is increasing in the size of the charter sector, as larger expansions
draw in students with weaker preferences who receive larger gains. This pattern is surprising - the
standard Roy model of selection suggests that students with larger potential gains should be more
likely to apply. However, the "reverse Roy" pattern described here is consistent with results from
other contexts, such as the long-term care insurance market described by Finkelstein and McGarry
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(2006). Finkelstein and McGarry note that the decision to purchase long-term care insurance is
driven by both risk aversions and health risk; since more risk-averse people also tend to have lower
health risks, they find that those who purchase more insurance are not higher risk on average. More
generally, in settings where participation decisions are driven by multiple factors, selection on one
dimension can lead to apparent negative selection on gains on another dimension. In the charter
school context, application decisions are driven by socioeconomic status and baseline achievement,
which are negatively correlated with achievement gains from charter attendance.
Despite the large effects of charter schools for marginal applicants, however, the structural
estimates also imply that charter demand in Boston is limited. Most students prefer traditional
public school attendance to charter schools, and act as if applying to charter schools is costly. As
a result, when the charter market share reaches 24 percent, most schools are undersubscribed and
40 percent of charter seats are left empty. This finding suggests that skeptical views of large-scale
charter school expansion, such as those expressed by Ravitch (2010) and Rothstein (2004), may
reach the right conclusion, but for the wrong reason. Charter schools do not attract students who
receive atypically large benefits, but the effects of charter expansion may nevertheless be attenuated
by weak demand.
These findings raise the further question of whether parents who forgo large potential achieve-
ment gains are truly uninterested in achievement, or simply unaware of differences in effectiveness
across schools. The model estimated in this chapter does not distinguish between these two pos-
sibilities. In the former case, the simulation results reported here reflect the long-run demand
for charter schools in Boston, and the potential achievement gains from charter expansion are
ultimately limited. On the other hand, if the lack of demand for charter schools reflects a lack
of parental information, the demand for charters may rise in the long run as parents become
more informed, and the simulation results correspond to a short-run equilibrium. In related work,
Hastings and Weinstein (2008) show that providing test score information leads parents to choose
higher-performing schools, which suggests that informational frictions may play a role. Changes
in recruitment practices may also change the pattern of selection into charter schools; the recent
legislation authorizing charter expansion in Massachusetts requires schools to take efforts to recruit
applicants who are demographically similar to students in the local district. In future work, I
plan to use data from Boston's planned expansion to validate the model estimated here, and study
changes in the demand for charter schools as the city's charter network expands.
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1.9 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Charter Middle Schools in Boston
Notes: Black stars mark the locations of charter middle schools operating between 1995-1996 and 2010-2011. Red
stars mark the locations of charter middle schools scheduled to open in 2011-2012 or later.
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Figure 2: Math Score Distributions for Black and White Compliers
Untreated Compliers, Baseline
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -5 0 5 1 1.5 2Test score
White a Black
p -value for distributional equality = 0.02
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2Test score
- White - Black
p -value for distributional equality = 0.09
Untreated Compilers, Grade 6
Z
oC14
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 5 0 5 1 1.5 2
Test score
- White - Black]
Treated Compilers, Grade 5
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 - 5 1 1.5 2
Test score
- White - Black
p -value for distributional equality = 0.04
Untreated Compliers. Grade 7
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 Tt5 0 .5 1 1.5 2Test score
- Witli - Black
p -value for distributional equality = 0.01
Treated Compliers, Grade 7
II\
-3 2.5 -2 -1. -1 -. 0 5 1 .
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -.'5 0 1 I15sTest score
1 - White - Black
p -value for distributional equality =0.06
Untreated Compilers, Grade 8
='t.
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2
Test score
White Black
p -value for distributional equality = 0.54
Treated Compilers. Grade 8
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2Test score
===--nr=White - Black
-value for distribtoa yuat = 0.70
45
-- 5.
Notes: This figure plots kernel densities of math test scores for black and white lottery compliers. Black vertical lines show mean scores for untreated compliers, while red vertical
lines in the treated plots show means for treated compliers. The treated densities are estimated from 2SLS regressions of a kernel smoother interacted with a charter dummy on the
charter dummy and lottery fixed effects. The charter dummy is instrumented with an indicator for winning the lottery. All densities use a triangle kernel with a bandwidth of 1.25
standard deviations. Untreated densities are estimated using analogous regressions that replace the charter dummy with a non-charter dummy. P -values are from Kolmogorov-
Smimov tests of distributional equality.
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Figure 3: ELA Score Distributions for Black and White Compliers
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Notes: This figure plots kernel densities of ELA test scores for black and white lottery compliers. The treated densities are estimated from 2SLS regressions of a kernel
smoother interacted with a charter dummy on the charter dummy and lottery fixed effects. The charter dummy is instrumented with an indicator for winning the lottery. All
densities use a triangle kernel with a bandwidth of one standard deviation. Untreated densities are estimated using analogous regressions that replace the charter dummy with
a non-charter dummy. P -values are from Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of distributional equality.
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Figure 5: Charter Tastes and Achievement Effects
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Notes: This figure describes the relationship between tastes for charter school attendance and the achievement effects of charter schools relative to traditional
public school. Panel A plots the distribution of preferences for charter schools among charter applicants and all students as a function of observed and unobserved
characteristics. Panel B plots the average causal effect of charter school attendance at each value of charter tastes for math and ELA. The vertical dashed lines
indicates the mean preferences among applicants. The plots are produced from simulating the model using the MSL estimates and the empirical distribution of
observed student characteristics. The graphs show kernel densities (panel A) or local linear regressions (panel B) estimated in the simulated data with a triangle
kernel and a bandwidth of 0.5 standard deviations.
Figure 6: Charter School Expansions
Notes: Black stars mark the locations of the charter middle schools used to estimate the structural model. Red stars
mark the locations of schools scheduled to open in 2011-2012 and 2012-2013. Yellow stars mark the locations of
schools opened in a hypothetical expansion that raises the number of charters to 30.
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Figure 7: Simulated Effects of Charter School Expansion -- Choice Behavior
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Notes: This figure displays simulated effects of charter school expansio on application and attendance behavior. The black dashed line in
each panel corresponds to the existing number of charter schools, while the red dashed line corresponds to Boston's planned expansion.
Panel A shows the fraction of students who apply to and attend charter schools. Panel B shows the average admission probability for
applicants and the fraction of charter seats that are filled. The figures are produced by simulating the model 100 times for each of the
2,485 students in the 2009 cohort of the structural sample.
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Figure 8: Simulated Effects of Charter School Expansion -- Average Citywide Test Scores
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Notes: This figure displays simulated effects of charter school expansion on average test scores in Boston.The black dashed line in each
panel corresponds to the existing number of charter schools, while the red dashed line corresponds to Boston's planned expansion. Panel A
shows math scores, while Panel B shows ELA scores. The figures are produced by simulating the model 100 times for each of the 2,485
students in the 2009 cohort of the structural sample.
US
0
0o0.*~*~0~g0 * 000
0
..... 0 .0
30
.... .. . .....  
Figure 9: Simulated Effects of Charter School Expansion -- Citywide Achievement Gaps
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Notes: This figure displays simulated effects of charter school expansion on white/black achievement gaps in Boston. The black dashed
line in each panel corresponds to the existing number of charter schools, while the red dashed line corresponds to Boston's planned
expansion. Panel A shows the gap in math, while Panel B shows the ELA gap. The figures are produced by simulating the model 100
times for each of the 2,485 students in the 2009 cohort of the structural sample.
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Table 1: Boston Charter Middle Schools
Lotteries
School name Grade coverage Years open available
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Academy of the Pacific Rim 5-12 1997-present Yes
Boston Collegiate 5-12 1998-present Yes
Boston Preparatory 6-12 2004-present Yes
Edward Brooke K-8 (with 5th entry) 2002-present Yes
Excel Academy 5-8 2003-present Yes
Frederick Douglass 6-10 2000-2005 No
MATCH Middle School 6-8 2008-present Yes
Smith Leadership Academy 6-8 2003-present No
Roxbury Preparatory 6-8 1999-present Yes
Uphams Corner 5-8 2002-2009 No
Notes: This table lists charter middle schools serving traditional student populations in Boston,
Massachusetts from 1997-1998 through 2010-2011. Schools are included if they accept students in
5th or 6th grade. Column (3) lists the calendar years of operation for each school through 2010.
Column (4) indicates whether lottery records were available for cohorts of applicants attending 4th
grade between 2006 and 2009.
Table 2: Boston Charter Middle School Expansions
School name Grade coverage Year opening Linked schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dorchester Preparatory 5-12 2012-2013 Roxbury Preparatory
Edward Brooke II K-8 (with 5th entry) 2011-2012 Edward Brooke
Edward Brooke 1I K-8 (with 5th entry) 2012-2013 Edward Brooke
Excel Academy II 5-12 2012-2013 Excel Academy
Grove Hall Preparatory 5-12 2011-2012 Roxbury Preparatory
KIPP Academy Boston 5-8 2012-2013 KIPP Academy Lynn (Lynn, MA)
Notes: This table lists Boston charter middle schools opening in 2011-2012 and 2012-2013. Schools are included if
they planned to serve traditional student populations and accept students in 5th or 6th grade. Column (2) lists the
planned grade coverage for each school. Column (3) shows the academic year in which the school opened. Column
(4) lists Massachusetts charter middle schools operated by the same organization.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
All students Charter applicants
(1) (2)
Applied to charter school 0.166 1.00
Attended charter school 0.100 0.571
Female 0.481 0.483
Black 0.461 0.520
Hispanic 0.390 0.306
Subsidized lunch 0.817 0.715
Special education 0.231 0.178
Limited English proficiency 0.206 0.130
Miles to closest charter school 1.84 1.64
4th grade math score -0.544 -0.326
4th grade ELA score -0.657 -0.418
N 10986 1822
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for students attending 4th grade
at traditional public schools in Boston between 2006 and 2009. The sample
excludes students with missing middle school test scores.
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Table 4: Lottery-based Estimates of Charter Effects
Race
All
N
White
N
Black
N
Hispanic
N
p -value for
racial equality
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of
attendance at Boston charter schools on test scores for lottery
applicants. The sample stacks test scores in grades 6 through 8.
The treatment variable is a dummy for attending any charter
school after the lottery and prior to the test. The instrument is a
dummy for receiving an offer from any charter school. Column
(1) reports coefficients from regressions of charter attendance on
the offer variable. Columns (2) and (3) report second stage
estimates for math and ELA scores. All models control for lottery
fixed effects. P -values are from Wald tests of the hypothesis that
the 2SLS coefficients are the same across races. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the student
level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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First stage
(1)
0.652***
(0.024)
0.599***
(0.052)
0.674***
(0.027)
0.634***
(0.038)
Math effect
(2)
0.502***
(0.087)
3792
0.139
(0.169)
638
0.615***
(0.113)
1989
0.569***
(0.145)
1165
0.053
ELA effect
(3)
0.306***
(0.090)
-0.156
(0.183)
0.377***
(0.117)
0.534***
(0.148)
0.010
Table 5: The Distance Instrument
Balance check: 4th grade scores 2SLS comparison
Math ELA First stage Math ELA
Controls (1) (2) Instrument (3) (4) (5)
None 0.031*** 0.042*** Lottery 0.652*** 0.502*** 0.306***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.024) (0.087) (0.090)
10986 3792
Student -0.003 0.011 Distance -0.022*** 0.540** 0.190
characteristics (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.251) (0.240)
10986 23638
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show regressions of 4th grade test scores on miles to the closest charter middle
school. The first row includes no controls, while the second controls for student characteristics, including
sex, race, free lunch status, special education status, limited English proficiency, and 4th grade score in the
other subject. Columns (3) through (5) show 2SLS results for middle school test scores using the lottery
and distance instruments. The lottery 2SLS models control for lottery fixed effects, while the distance
models control for demographics and 4th grade test scores. Standard errors for the 2SLS models are
clustered at the student level.
-~1
Table 6: School Practices
School 1 School 2 School 3 School 4 School 5 School 6 School 7 Other MA
Practice (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Instruction time
Days per year 190 190 190 180 185 193 190 185
Length of school day (hours:minutes) 8:25 7:00 8:30 7:56 9:00 7:33 7:14 7:17
School philosophy (5pt. scale)
No Excuses 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 2.76
Emphasize traditional reading and math 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3.86
Emphasize discipline/comportment 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3.33
Emphasize measurable results 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3.62
School practices (1 or Ofor yes/no)
Parent and student contracts 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.67
Uniforms 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.74
Merit/demerit system 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.30
Classroom techniques (5 pt. scale)
Cold calling 3 5 5 5 5 3 5 2.48
Math drills 2 4 5 5 5 5 5 3.33
Reading aloud 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 3.14
Notes: This table shows school practices at Boston charter middle schools, measured from a survey of school administrators. Columns
(1)-(7) show practices for the 7 schools used to estimate the structural model, while column (8) shows an average for other charter
middle schools in Massachusetts.
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Table 7: Charter School Choices Among Applicants
Fraction Mean distance Extra distance
Fraction of applicants choosing: (1) (2) (3)
Closest charter 0.394 1.63 0.00
2nd closest 0.219 2.61 1.17
3rd closest 0.119 3.51 1.82
4th closest 0.115 4.98 3.22
5th closest 0.072 6.04 4.26
6th closest 0.066 7.66 5.89
7th closest 0.005 10.58 8.73
Notes: This table shows the fractions of applicants in the structural sample applying to charter
schools by distance. Column (1) shows fractions of students making each choice. Column (2) shows
mean distance to applicants' chosen schools. Column (3) shows extra distance relative to the closest
charter school. If an applicant applied to multiple charters, the closest one is used in these
calculations.
Table 8: Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimates of Utility Parameters
Estimate Standard error Marginal effect
Parameter Description (1) (2) (3)
70 Constant -2.10*** 0.153 -
7 Female 0.086 0.069 0.007
Black 0.411*** 0.115 0.031
Hispanic 0.042 0.118 0.004
Subsidized lunch -0.769*** 0.095 -0.068
Special education -0.162* 0.088 -0.011
Limited English proficiency -0.513*** 0.101 -0.041
Baseline math score 0.203*** 0.050 0.017
Baseline ELA score 0.108** 0.050 0.008
7 Distance (miles) -0.238*** 0.010 -0.007
Ya Application cost 0.543*** 0.006 -
ao Standard deviation of charter school tastes 2.45*** 0.101 -
or Standard deviation of school-specific tastes 0.773*** 0.031 -
R Acceptance probability 0.640*** 0.046 -
N Sample size 10986
Notes: This table reports maximum simulated likelihood estimates of the parameters of the structural school
choice model. Column (1) reports parameter estimates, while column (2) reports standard errors. The constant
is the average of school-specific intercepts, and its standard error is computed using the delta method. The
reported acceptance probability is an average across schools and cohorts. Column (3) reports average marginal
effects of observed characteristics on the probability of applying to at least one charter school. The marginal
effect for distance is the effect of a one-mile increase in road distance to a school on the probability of
applying to that school, averaged across schools.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 9: Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimates of Math Achievement Parameters
Charter school Traditional public school Charter effect
Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error
Parameter Description (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 6th grade
a0 m6e Constant 0.119 0.079 -0.249*** 0.025 0.368*** 0.083
6mt Female 0.007 0.038 -0.006 0.014 0.013 0.040
Black -0.068 0.063 -0.199*** 0.022 0.131** 0.067
Hispanic 0.078 0.067 -0.091*** 0.023 0.169** 0.071
Subsidized lunch 0.016 0.045 -0.131*** 0.020 0.147*** 0.049
Special education -0.355*** 0.044 -0.337*** 0.016 -0.018 0.047
Limited English proficiency -0.097* 0.053 0.042** 0.018 -0.139** 0.056
Baseline math score 0.400*** 0.026 0.564*** 0.010 -0.164*** 0.028
Baseline ELA score 0.159*** 0.025 0.105*** 0.009 0.054** 0.026
aema ae Taste for charter schools (std. dv. units) -0.039** 0.017 0.027*** 0.005 -0.066*** 0.018
Panel B: 7th grade
a, mn Constant 0.110 0.095 -0.140*** 0.028 0.249** 0.099
a'm7e Female 0.095** 0.044 0.002 0.015 0.093** 0.046
Black 0.041 0.074 -0.199*** 0.025 0.240*** 0.078
Hispanic 0.136* 0.080 -0.086*** 0.026 0.223*** 0.085
Subsidized lunch 0.010 0.051 -0.147*** 0.023 0.157*** 0.056
Special education -0.360*** 0.059 -0.361*** 0.018 0.001 0.061
Limited English proficiency 0.018 0.063 0.080*** 0.020 -0.061 0.066
Baseline math score 0.372*** 0.031 0.480*** 0.011 -0.108*** 0.032
Baseline ELA score 0.100*** 0.031 0.106*** 0.010 -0.005 0.033
a0* (O Taste for charter schools (std. dv. units) 0.021 0.019 0.057*** 0.006 -0.037* 0.020
Panel C: 8th grade
a
1
mu, Constant 0.230* 0.126 -0.164*** 0.035 0.394*** 0.130
d'm8e Female -0.007 0.057 -0.029 0.019 0.023 0.060
Black 0.048 0.082 -0.218*** 0.031 0.266*** 0.088
Hispanic 0.156* 0.093 -0.107*** 0.032 0.262*** 0.098
Subsidized lunch 0.043 0.068 -0.088*** 0.028 0.131* 0.074
Special education -0.386*** 0.070 -0.387*** 0.022 0.001 0.073
Limited English proficiency 0.003 0.080 0.083*** 0.024 -0.080 0.084
Baseline math score 0.347*** 0.041 0.487*** 0.013 -0.140*** 0.042
Baseline ELA score 0.026 0.040 0.066*** 0.012 -0.039 0.041
aamsf- 0 Taste for charter schools (std. dv. units) -0.016 0.026 0.019*** 0.006 -0.035 0.027
Notes: This table reports maximum simulated likelihood estimates of the parameters of the math achievement distribution. The constant in the charter school equation is the
sum of the average of the school-specific effects and the relevant grade effect. Its standard error is computed using the delta method.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 10: Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimates of ELA Achievement Parameters
Charter school Traditional public school Charter effect
Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error
Parameter Description (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 6th grade
-0.194** 0.090
a, e~st Female
Black
Hispanic
Subsidized lunch
Special education
Limited English proficiency
Baseline math score
Baseline ELA score
a e6- a Taste for charter schools (std. dv. units)
a"7, Constant
a,7e Female
Black
Hispanic
Subsidized lunch
Special education
Limited English proficiency
Baseline math score
Baseline ELA score
ae7, -a Taste for charter schools (std. dv. units)
ae&e Constant
a'se Female
Black
Hispanic
Subsidized lunch
Special education
Limited English proficiency
Baseline math score
Baseline ELA score
Taste for charter schools (std. dv. units)
0.094**
0.028
0.024
-0.049
-0.319***
-0.036
0.096***
0.492***
0.027
0.005
0. 145***
0.027
0.136
0.033
-0.425***
-0.067
0.094***
0.352***
0.019
0.043
0.146**
-0.016
0.129
0.064
-0.419***
0.001
0.080*
0.272***
-0.018
0.042
0.066
0.069
0.049
0.050
0.064
0.028
0.028
0.021
Panel B: 7th grade
0.113
0.050
0.079
0.087
0.059
0.067
0.072
0.035
0.035
0.025
Panel C: 8th grade
0.143
0.067
0.097
0.110
0.079
0.085
0.107
0.049
0.046
0.031
a,6t Constant -0.289***
0.166***
-0.144***
-0.088***
-0.142***
-0.331**
-0.051*
0.176***
0.462***
0.086***
-0.407***
0.211***
-0.098***
-0.009
-0. 138***
-0.400***
-0.014
0.189***
0.361***
0.045***
-0.344***
0.202***
-0.101***
-0.009
-0.119***
-0.395***
0.012
0.169***
0.349***
0.085***
0.0950.026
0.015
0.024
0.025
0.022
0.016
0.019
0.010
0.009
0.006
0.030
0.017
0.027
0.028
0.025
0.019
0.021
0.010
0.010
0.006
0.387***
-0.055
0.085
0.137
0.183**
-0.024
-0.011
-0.089*
-0.077
-0.104***
0.094
0.045
0.070
0.073
0.053
0.053
0.066
0.030
0.029
0.022
0.117
0.053
0.083
0.091
0.064
0.069
0.075
0.036
0.036
0.025
0.148
0.071
0.102
0.116
0.085
0.089
0.110
0.050
0.048
0.032
-0.072
0.172**
0.112
0.093*
0.011
0.015
-0.080***
0.030
-0.059***
0.411***
-0.065
0.125
0.146
0.171***
-0.025
-0.054
-0.095***
-0.009
-0.026
0.038
0.021
0.034
0.036
0.031
0.024
0.026
0.013
0.013
0.0074w0-CFO
Notes: This table reports maximum simulated likelihood estimates of the parameters of the ELA achievement distribution. The constant in the charter school equation is the
sum of the average of the school-specific effects and the relevant grade effect. Its standard error is computed using the delta method.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 11: Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimates of School-specific Parameters
Average utility Admission probability Math effect ELA effect
(70k) (Rk) (a0 m 6o) ( 0 c-L 0 o)
School (1) (2) (3) (4)
Charter school 1 -1.812*** 0.544*** 0.291*** -0.047
(0.153) (0.059) (0.089) (0.095)
Charter school 2 -1.603*** 0.389*** 0.275*** -0.004
(0.153) (0.052) (0.082) (0.096)
Charter school 3 -2.071*** 0.642*** 0.233** -0.039
(0.157) (0.036) (0.093) (0.104)
Charter school 4 -2.554*** 0.724*** 0.346*** 0.064
(0.159) (0.047) (0.092) (0.107)
Charter school 5 -0.880*** 0.431*** 0.329*** -0.178*
(0.150) (0.037) (0.092) (0.100)
Charter school 6 -3.308*** 0.829*** 0.467*** 0.409***
(0.172) (0.049) (0.102) (0.118)
Charter school 7 -2.498*** 0.871*** 0.637*** 0.461***
(0.168) (0.036) (0.116) (0.115)
Notes: This table reports maximum simulated likelihood estimates of the school-specific parameters from the
structural model. The admission probabilities in column (2) are averages for 2006-2009. The school effects in
column (3) correspond to 6th grade, as the 6th grade intercept is omitted from the model for charter achievement.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 12: Model Fit -- Choice Probabilities
Application Attendance
Data Model Data Model
Choice (1) (2) (3) (4)
Apply/attend any charter 0.166 0.144 0.100 0.093
Among applicants/attenders:
More than one charter 0.267 0.181 - -
Charter school 1 0.179 0.145 0.154 0.115
Charter school 2 0.215 0.188 0.168 0.146
Charter school 3 0.283 0.225 0.170 0.204
Charter school 4 0.208 0.212 0.222 0.181
Charter school 5 0.282 0.240 0.128 0.191
Charter school 6 0.098 0.083 0.084 0.076
Charter school 7 0.093 0.089 0.076 0.087
Notes: This table compares empirical choice probabilities to simulated probabilities using the MSL
estimates. Model statistics are produced by simulating the model 100 times for each observation in
the sample, and then averaging over simulations and observations.
Table 13: Model fit -- Achievement Distributions
Traditional public schools Charter schools
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Subject Grade (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Math 6th -0.56 -0.56 1.04 1.03 0.28 0.29 0.83 0.85
7th -0.50 -0.49 0.98 0.97 0.34 0.33 0.75 0.78
8th -0.46 -0.45 0.97 0.95 0.42 0.39 0.71 0.73
ELA 6th -0.57 -0.56 1.07 1.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.92 0.94
7th -0.54 -0.56 0.99 0.99 0.10 0.07 0.83 0.86
8th -0.52 -0.53 0.98 0.97 0.17 0.12 0.79 0.81
Notes: This table compares empirical test score distributions to simulated distributions using the MSL estimates.
Model statistics are produced by simulating the model 100 times for each observation in the sample, and then averaging
over simulations and observations.
Table 14: Simulated Effects of Policy Changes -- Choice Behavior
Avg. admission Fraction of
Fraction applying Fraction attending probability seats filled
Policy change (1) (2) (3) (4)
None (7 charter schools) 0.147 0.087 0.632 1.000
Boston's planned expansion 0.223 0.148 0.799 0.854
(expand to 13 schools) (51.4%) (69.5%) (26.4%) (-14.6%)
Expand to 30 schools 0.331 0.239 0.912 0.598
(125.0%) (173.9%) (44.3%) (-40.2%)
Notes: This table reports simulated effects of expanding Boston's charter school network on charter application
and attendance behavior. Numbers in parentheses are percentage changes relative to the existing policy
environment. The predictions are produced by simulating the model 100 times for each of the 2,485 students in
the 2009 cohort of the structural sample.
Table 15: Simulated Effects of Policy Changes -- Math Scores
6th grade 7th grade 8th grade
Boston White-black Boston White- Boston White-black
average gap TOT average black gap TOT average gap TOT
Policy change (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
None (7 charter schools) -0.507 0.651 0.327 -0.395 0.593 0.438 -0.403 0.565 0.537
All charter schools close -0.534 0.671 - -0.432 0.621 - -0.448 0.602 -
(-5.3%) (3.1%) (-9.5%) (4.7%) (-11.2%) (6.7%)
Boston's planned expansion -0.482 0.628 0.360 -0.367 0.560 0.458 -0.371 0.535 0.559
(expand to 13 schools) (4.9%) (-3.6%) (10.0%) (7.2%) (-5.6%) (4.6%) (7.9%) (-5.2%) (4.0%)
Expand to 30 schools -0.450 0.610 0.397 -0.329 0.522 0.482 -0.321 0.488 0.583
(11.3%) (-6.3%) (21.6%) (16.8%) (-12.0%) (9.9%) (20.2%) (-13.6%) (8.5%)
All students forced to attend 0.060 0.415 0.591 0.175 0.244 0.604 0.267 0.165 0.714
charter schools (111.7%) (-36.3%) (81.0%) (144.2%) (-58.8%) (37.7%) (166.4%) (-70.8%) (32.8%)
Notes: This table reports simulated effects of modifying Boston's charter school network on the citywide math score distribution. Numbers in parentheses
are percentage changes relative to the existing policy environment. Predictions are produced by simulating the model 100 times for each of the 2,485
students in the 2009 cohort of the sample, and then averaging over the simulations.
Table 16: Simulated Effects of Policy Changes -- ELA Scores
6th grade 7th grade 8th grade
Boston White-black Boston White- Boston White-black
average gap TOT average black gap TOT average gap TOT
Policy change (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
None (7 charter schools) -0.465 0.562 0.132 -0.485 0.454 0.581 -0.435 0.428 0.257
All charter schools close -0.466 0.584 - -0.523 0.476 - -0.446 0.457 -
(-0.2%) (3.8%) (-7.8%) (4.7%) (-2.4%) (6.8%)
Boston's planned expansion -0.462 0.547 0.160 -0.457 0.440 0.598 -0.425 0.420 0.311
(expand to 13 schools) (0.7%) (-2.7%) (21.4%) (5.6%) (-3.2%) (2.9%) (2.4%) (-1.9%) (20.8%)
Expand to 30 schools -0.473 0.528 0.193 -0.430 0.407 0.616 -0.412 0.382 0.371
(-1.7%) (-6.2%) (47.1%) (11.3%) (-10.4%) (6.0%) (5.4%) (-10.8%) (44.4%)
All students forced to attend -0.204 0.347 0.362 0.092 0.222 0.714 0.139 0.190 0.684
charter schools (56.2%) (-38.3%) (175.2%) (119.1%) (-51.0%) (22.8%) (132.0%) (-55.6%) (166.0%)
Notes: This table reports simulated effects of modifying Boston's charter school network on the citywide ELA score distribution. Numbers in parentheses
are percentage changes relative to the existing policy environment. Predictions are produced by simulating the model 100 times for each of the 2,485
students in the 2009 cohort of the structural sample, and then averaging over the simulations.
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1.10 Appendix A: Complier Densities
This appendix shows that 2SLS estimation of equation (1.4) produces consistent estimates
of potential outcome densities for lottery compliers. This result is an extension of the methods
developed in Abadie (2002). Abadie's Lemma 2.1 implies that the 2SLS estimate of -(y) is a
consistent estimator of the expectation of Kh(y - Y(1)) for compliers as N -+ oo. I show that
as h -+ 0 and Nh -+ oo, this estimator converges in probability to the complier density function.
Imbens and Rubin (1997) outline an alternative method for estimating complier densities based
on linear combinations of empirical densities for the four possible combinations of Zi and Si. The
approach taken here allows these densities to be estimated in a simple one-step IV procedure.
Let fC(y), fzt(y), and ff"t(y) be the density functions of Y(s) for compliers, always takers, and
never takers, respectively, with s E {0, 1}. Define Kh(u) = }K (Q), where K(.) is a function that
satisfies f K(u)du = 1, f uK(u)du = 0, f u2 K(u)du < oo, and f K 2 (u)du < oo. Consider the
equation
Kh(y - Yi) - 1{Si = s} = Os(Y) + Ys(Y) .1{Si = S} + 6jsy
for s E {0, 1}. If Zi is used as an instrument for l{Si = s} in this equation, the resulting IV
estimator is
N E [Kh(y - Y) - 1{Si = s}Z = 1] - EN[Kh(Y - Yi) - 1{Si = s}|Z = 01 (1.13)
EN[1{Si = s}|Zi = 1] - EN[1{Si = s}1Zi = 01
where EN[-] is the empirical expectation operator. The following theorem shows that this estimator
is consistent for f.,(y).
Theorem: Suppose that assumptions A1-A3 hold, and that the density functions fC(y), fat(y),
and font(y) exist and are twice differentiable at y. Then
plim is(Y) = fC(y)
h-+O,Nh-+oo
Proof: I demonstrate the result for s = 1. The proof for s = 0 is analogous. I begin by considering
the expectation and variance of the each term in the numerator of (1.13). Define
Ez(y) = EN[Kh(y - Y) - 1{Si = 1}|Zi = z]
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Ez is a sample average, so it is unbiased for the corresponding population moment. For z = 1, we
have
E 1(y) = E[Kh(y - Y) - 1{Sj = 1}Z = 1]
= E[Kh(y - Y(1))|Sj(1) > Si(O)] -Pr[Si(1) > Si(O)]
+ E[Kh(y - Y (1))|Sj(1) = Si(0) = 1] - Pr[Si(1) = Si(0) = 1]
which can be written
E [i(y) = Kh (Y -- t) (#c f 1c(t) + #a t fat)) dt
where #c and #at are the fractions of compliers and always takers, respectively. Using the change
of variables u = Y and taking a second-order Taylor expansion around h = 0 yields
E E1(y)] = 4cfc(y) + #at fat(y) + ± 2Y at flat (y)) ± K(u)u2du + o(h2)
which implies
lim E[E (y)] = #cfc(y) + at fa t (y).
A similar argument shows that
lim E[Eo(y)] = #a tflat (y).
h-+O
Next, consider the variance of E1 (y). We have
Var (E1(y)) = 1 E[K (y - Y) - 1{S = }IZj = 1] - LE[E 1(y)]2
where N1 is the number of observations with Zi = 1. The argument above shows that E[E1(y)] is
bounded as h -+ 0, so as N1 -+ oc (which is implied by N -+ oo together with (A2)) the second
term is negligible. The first term is
jE[Kh(y - Y) - 1{Sj = 1}|Zj = 1] = f K2(y - t) . (#cfc(t) + at fa t (t))dt
-
- (#cfc(y) ± qa t fa t (y)) - K 2 (u)du + o (N).
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Therefore, we have
lim Var (E1(y) = 0.
h-+O,Nh-+oo \ /
A similar calculation shows that the variance of Eo(y) also converges to zero.
The arguments so far imply that as h -+ 0 and Nh -+ oo, E1(y) and Eo(y) converge in mean
square, and therefore in probability, to (#Cfff(y) + #atflat(y)) and #atflat(y), respectively. When
s = 1, the probability limit of the denominator of (1.13) as N - oo is #'. Then by the continuous
mapping theorem we have
i fff(y) + #af at (y) - #affa t (y)phim y1 (y) =1
h-+O,Nh-+oo #c
= ff(y).
This completes the proof.
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1.11 Appendix B: Identification of Preference Coefficients
This appendix uses a simplified version of the structural model to show analytically that the
combination of lottery and distance instruments identifies the coefficients on the charter preference
6h in equations (1.7) and (1.8). Suppose there is a single charter school, and the utilities of charter
and public school attendance are given by
Usi = -Y0 + -Yd -Di + 63 + vi - Yo - Ai
UiO = -,.a - Ai
where Di is distance to the charter school, Ai indicates charter application, 6i ~ N(O, o) is observed
prior to the application decision, and vi ~ N(O, 1) is observed after the application decision.3 7 The
charter school holds a lottery for applicants with acceptance probability 7r.
The expected utility of applying to the charter school is
7r - E[max{yo + Yd - DA + O + vi, 0}|0i] - ya
while not applying yields utility of zero with certainty. It is optimal to apply if
/7r
where 0(t) = <b(t) - (t + (t)). It is straightforward to show that 0(.) is strictly increasing, so the
application rule can be written
Ai = 1{0 > 6*(Di)}
where
6*(D) = 0-~ -r 0 - d - D.
Note that with yd < 0, we have d > 0: students who live further from the charter school must
have stronger tastes for charter attendance to justify incurring the application cost.
Let Si(z) indicate charter attendance as a function of Zi. Rejected applicants cannot attend,
"I use a normal distribution rather than an extreme value distribution for vi because it allows me to obtain
analytic formulas in the calculations to follow.
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so Si(O) = 0 Vi. Attendance for admitted applicants is given by
S,(1) = I1{7 + _Y -Di +i+ vi > 0}.
Lottery applicant compliers choose to apply and have Si(1) = 1. Compliers are therefore charac-
terized by
Ai = 1 n (Si(1) > Si(0)) <==> 6; > max{O*(Dj), -7O - - Di - vi}
The model for potential outcomes in charter and public school is
Yi(1) = ao + aO 6 + eil
Yi(0) = a' + a- 6 + Eso
with E[ciel6i, Dj] = 0 for t E {0, 1}. It is straightforward to show that average potential outcomes
for compliers who live a distance D from charter schools are given by
E[Y(t)|IA = 1, Si(1) > S (0), Di = D] = a + a- p' (D)
where
pc(D) =go (-' ( -)). A (*(D))
+ O-o (1 -- )) - fA (- -y$__,-D-j )dF (vilvi < -@~-.
Here A(t) = (1_ is the inverse Mills ratio.
The inverse Mills ratio is an increasing function, so p4(D) is increasing in D. Applicant com-
pliers who apply to charter from further away therefore have stronger preferences for charters, and
comparisons of potential outcomes for lottery compliers who live different distances from charter
schools identify the relationship between preferences and achievement. Specifically, for D1 # Do,
we have
E[Y(e)|Aj = 1, Si(1) > Si(o), Di = D1 ] - E[Y(f)IAj = 1, Si(1) > Si(o), Di = Do] - ao
pc (D1) - pzc(Do)
for f E {0, 1}. The numerator of the left-hand side of this equation can be computed using the
methods described in Abadie (2002) for estimating marginal mean counterfactuals for compliers.
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The denominator is non-zero because complier preferences vary with distance; it can be calculated
with knowledge of the parameters of the student utility function, which are identified from charter
application and attendance behavior. The selection parameters ot are therefore identified.
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1.12 Appendix C: Relationship to Roy Model
This appendix shows that equations (1.5), (1.7), and (1.8) nest a Roy model of selection in
which students seek to maximize achievement and have private information about their test scores
in charter and public schools. For simplicity, I omit application costs and preferences for distance,
and focus on scores in a single subject and grade. Achievement for student i at charter school k is
given by
Yi(k) = ao + Xia' + nic +vik
while public school achievement is
Yi(0) = a + Xia" + i,+vio
where E[vikI Xi, nic,nip] = 0. Assume that students know the parameters of these equations, their
own characteristics Xi, and private signals of their achievement in charter and public schools ric
and Tip. Also assume that (7ic, ?7ip)' follows a bivariate normal distribution with E[ijIXi] = 0,
Var(nij) = o,, and Cov(ic, ni,) = -c,. The vik represent random fluctuations in test scores
unknown to the student.
Suppose that students choose schools to maximize expected achievement. Then student utility
can be written
Uik = ak + Xac + ic
uso = ao + Xiax + nio
Subtracting uio from Uik, student preferences can be equivalently represented by the utility functions
Uik = Yk + Xi 1  + Gi
where
0k = ak - ao
x x
Oi = nic - nio
and Uio = 0. These preferences are a special case of equation (1.5) with yd = ,a = 0 and
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Var(vik) = 0.
Returning to the test score equation, we have
[Yi (k) IXi, 9Oj ao ± x X +c ±o
"E[Yi (0)1Xi, 9il ac + ±ia 0 .O
where
T2o _C c ~acp
c 0r2 + 
-2-,C o, - 2o,
G' 2
= o + o 2 - 2acp
This implies that potential test scores are given by
Y (k) = a0 + X'axj + ao Oi + Cik
Y (0) = ±o Xfrax + c4Oi + eo
where E[EikI Xi, Oi] = 0, which is the specification for achievement in equations (1.7) and (1.8).
Finally, note that the Roy framework implies that ai > 0, ao < 0, and ao - ao = 1. If students
choose schools to maximize academic achievement, then charter preferences will be positively related
to scores in charter schools, negatively related to scores in public schools, and the causal effect of
charter attendance will be increasing in charter preferences.
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1.13 Appendix D: Equilibrium Admission Probabilities
Description of the Game
This appendix describes the determination of equilibrium admission probabilities in counter-
factual simulations. These probabilities are determined in a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SPE) in which students make utility-maximizing choices as described in Section 1.4, and schools
set admission probabilities to maximize enrollment subject to capacity constraints. Enrollment at
school k is given by
ek = E [1{Si = k}] .
Qk denotes school k's capacity, which is its maximum potential enrollment. In the simulations,
I set capacities for existing schools equal to their average enrollment in years when they were
oversubscribed. Capacity for new schools is set equal to average capacity for existing schools.
The timing of the game follows Figure 4. Strategies in each stage of the game are as follows:
1. Students first choose application vectors.
2. Schools observe students' application choices, and choose their admission probabilities.
3. Offers are randomly assigned among applicants.
4. Students observe their offers and make school choices.
To simplify the game, note that the distribution of students is atomless, so schools do not
change their admission probabilities in the second stage in response to the application decisions of
individual students in the first stage. Students therefore act as "price takers" in the first stage,
in the sense that they do not expect schools to react to their application choices. Without loss of
generality, therefore, the game can be analyzed as if applications and admission probabilities are
chosen simultaneously. I analyze the static Nash equilibria of this simultaneous-move game, which
are equivalent to Subgame Perfect equilibria of the dynamic game described above.
Definition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium of the game requires an application vector A' for each student, a vector of ad-
mission probabilities lr*, and a rule for assigning school choices that satisfy the following conditions:
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1. Student application choices are given by A = A*(Xi, Di, Oi, Ti; 7r*), where A* is defined as
in Section 1.4.2 and now explicitly depends on the vector of admission probabilities students
expect to face in each lottery.
2. For each k, 7i is chosen to maximize ek subject to school k's capacity constraint, taking
student application decisions as given and assuming that other schools choose r*k, which
denotes the elements of 7r* excluding the k-th.
3. After receiving the offer vector z, student i chooses school k with probability Pik(z, Gi, -ri) as
in Section 1.4.2.
School Best Response Functions
I begin by deriving a school's optimal admissions probability as a function of students' expected
admission probabilities and the actions of other schools. Suppose that students anticipate the
admission probability vector 7r' when making application decisions in the first stage of the model.
Their application decisions are given by A*(Xi, Di, 6;, Ti; 7re). In addition, suppose that schools
other than k admit students with probability lrk. If school k admits students with probability Irk
in the second stage, its enrollment is given by
ek(Irk, l_ k, -r) = E f (zA*(Xi, Di, 94, ri; ire); Irk, I-k)Pik(z, 6i, rO
zE{0,1}K
School k chooses 7rk to solve
max ek(rk, r-k, re) s.t. ek(7rk, r-k, 7re) . Qk (1.14)
7rk E[0,1]
The best response function 7r R(R-, re) is the solution to problem (1.14). The optimal admis-
sion probability sets school k's enrollment equal to its capacity. The following equation implicitly
defines 7rBR at interior solutions:
E f (z|A*(Xi, D, 9., )e( iBR 7i i = Qk
ze{0,1}K
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This equation can be rewritten
E f-_k(z_-k|A*k(Xi, Di,6i, ri ;7re);7r-k) -fk (1|A*(Xi, DiI , ,rT; 7re B ,pkz- = k
,.z-k)- i ( ,Z- ) Q
where the sum is over all values of z-k in {O, 1 }K-1. Here Pik(zk, z-k) is Pik(z) with the k-th element
of z set to Zk and the remaining elements set to z-k, and I have used the fact that Fik(0, z-k) = 0
since school k is not in student i's choice set if she does not receive an offer. Substituting in fA
yields
[ f-k (Z- k IA* k (XiI Di, Oi -ri 7re); 7-k) -A* (Xi, Di, 0j, -ri 7re) . 7r3R - Pik(1 Z-k)1 Q
which can be solved for 7r BR:
7rBR Qkk E[A* (Xi, Di, 0j, ri; 7re) - k f-k (z-kIA*k (Xi, Di, O6, ri; ire) ; 7r-k) Pik (1, Z-k)1
If the denominator of rk is sufficiently small, it may exceed one, in which case school k cannot
fill its capacity. In this case, the optimal action is to set 7rk = 1 and fill as many seats as possible.
Furthermore, note that the denominator of Fk is zero when the measure of students applying to
school k is zero, in which case this function is undefined. If no students apply, school k's enrollment
does not depend on its own admission probability, so every point in the unit interval is a best
response. These arguments imply that the best response function is given by
BR e min(1k (i-k, 7re) , 1}, E [A* (Xi, Di, 60, ri; re)] > 0
rk (ir-k,7r ) =
[0, 1), E[A* (Xi, Di, 6j, -ri; 7re)] = 0
Existence of Equilibrium
Define 7rBR(ir) (7r BR RiT, r), 7r' (ir-K, 7r))'. A vector ir* supports a Nash equilibrium if
and only if it is a fixed point of 7rBR(7r):
r* E rBR (7r*) (1.15)
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A Nash equilibrium always exists, though it is not unique. Existence can be proved constructively
by noting that the vector OK always supports an equilibrium. If students expect not to be admit-
ted to any school, none will apply, and it is a best response for each school to set lrk = 0. This
equilibrium is an artifact of the assumption that the distribution of students is atomless. If an indi-
vidual students had positive mass, she could deviate and apply to a charter school, and the school
would strictly prefer to raise its admission probability and admit her, breaking the equilibrium.
The no-admission equilibrium is not economically interesting, and other equilibria with positive
admission probabilities generally exist. In the counterfactual simulations, I compute equilibria by
numerically solving the system of nonlinear equations implied by (1.15), restricting the irk to be
strictly positive. 38 I never found more than one equilibrium in any simulation. Table A4 lists the
equilibrium admission probabilities used to simulate the effects of charter expansion.
Uniqueness of Non-trivial Equilibrium
As noted above, the equilibrium of this game is not unique, as there are many trivial equilibria.
For example, 7r = OK is always an equilibrium, there are K equilibia where 7rk > 0 and irk = OK-1
and there are typically other similar equilibria where admission probabilities are zero for one or
more schools. However, I ignore all equilibria with irk = 0 for any k, and there may exist a unique
equilibrium where each school has a positive measure of applicants. Define the function
OPk(ir) Irk -Fk(1r-k, 7r)
Let O(ir) = ('1(7r),...,OK(7r))'. A vector ir* E (0, 1)K is a non-trivial, interior equilibrium if
,b(7r*) = 0. Moreover, 7r* is the only such equilibrium if the Jacobean of 0(.) is a positive dominant
diagonal matrix. This requires the following two conditions:
1. > 0 Vk
&rk
2. > Vk
rk 3.jk j
These conditions provide intuition for when a unique equilibrium is more likely. The first
38For expansions involving many charter schools, the student choice set becomes very large and solving this system
becomes infeasible. For example, with 30 schools, there are 230 = 1,073, 741,824 possible application choices. To
limit the number of choices, I assume that no student would apply to more than two charter schools when computing
the equilibrium probabilities and simulating counterfactuals. Less than 1 percent of students applied to more than
two schools in the data.
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condition requires that O < 1. This is always satisfied: I'k is decreasing in irk. As students'
expected admission probability at school k rises, more choose to apply, and it is optimal for school
k to lower 7r to maintain enrollment at capacity. The second condition requires the effect of w, on
'k to dominate the effects of admission probabilities at other schools. This condition is more likely
to hold when there is little substitution across charter schools. For example, if the pools of potential
applicants at each charter school are disjoint sets, then =3L& 0 for k / j and the second condition is
satisfied. More generally, this condition is likely to be satisfied when few students apply to multiple
charter schools, which is more likely when charter schools are more geographically disbursed, or
preferences for spatial proximity are stronger.
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1.14 Appendix E: Additional Figures and Tables
Variablc
Black
Hispanic
Female
Free/reduced lunch
Special education
Table Al: Covariate Balance for the Lottery Sample
All White Black
(1) (2) (3)
0008R - -
Limited English proficiency
Baseline math score
Baseline ELA score
(0.029)
0.015
(0.027)
-0.042
(0.031)
0.015
(0.027)
0.005
(0.024)
-0.001
(0.020)
-0.066
(0.061)
-0.010
(0.063)
0.020
(0.077)
0.032
(0.068)
-0.011
(0.060)
0.025
(0.021)
-0.104
(0.105)
-0.033
(0.110)
-0.109**
(0.043)
0.043
(0.035)
0.022
(0.034)
0.040*
(0.022)
-0.074
(0.091)
-0.073
(0.091)
p -value from joint test 0.755
N 1822
0.945
317
0.117
948
0.567
557
Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions of baseline student characteristics
on an offer dummy and lottery fixed effects. P -values are from joint tests of the hypothesis
that the offer variable has a zero coefficient in all regressions. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
00
t1'.D
Hispanic
(4)
0.039
(0.058)
-0.053
(0.047)
-0.011
(0.045)
-0.093 *
(0.050)
0.076
(0.112)
0.169
(0.120)
Table A2:
All students
Follow-up rate
(1)
0.863
N 27881
0.853
N 4067
0.865
N 13020
0.864
Attrition
Lottery applicants
Follow-up rate Differential
(2) (3)
0.839 -0.002
(0.020)
4579
0.845
774
0.830
2431
0.853
0.020
(0.052)
-0.006
(0.027)
0.000
(0.038)
N 10794 1374
Notes: This table reports the fraction of follow-up test scores that are
observed for students attending 4th grade in Boston between 2006 and
2009. Column (1) shows the follow-up rate for the full sample.
Column (2) shows the follow-up rate for lottery applicants, while
column (3) shows the difference in follow-up rates for lottery winners
and losers. This differential is computed from a regression that
controls for lottery fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the student level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Race
All
White
Black
Hispanic
Table A3: Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimates of Covariance Parameters
Charter school Traditional public school Charter effect
Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error
Parameter Description (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P., Serial correlation of math scores 0.589*** 0.016 0.679*** 0.005 -0.089*** 0.017
pe Serial correlation of ELA scores 0.468*** 0.021 0.589*** 0.006 -0.121*** 0.022
Var ((i)1/2 Standard deviation of math shocks 0.568*** 0.009 0.658*** 0.004 -0.090*** 0.010
Var ((iegk)/2 Standard deviation of ELA shocks 0.628*** 0.009 0.681*** 0.004 -0.053*** 0.010
Corr ((jgk,C,4gk) Correlation between math and ELA shocks 0.386*** 0.018 0.435*** 0.006 -0.049*** 0.019
Notes: This table reports maximum simulated likelihood estimates of the covariance parameters of the math and ELA achievement distributions.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
00
Table A4: Equilibrium Admission Probabilities
Planned
No change expansion 30 schools
(1) (2) (3)
School 1 0.584 0.813 1.000
School 2 0.450 0.604 0.847
School 3 0.548 0.740 1.000
School 4 0.759 1.000 1.000
School 5 0.383 0.505 0.703
School 6 0.907 1.000 1.000
School 7 0.793 1.000 1.000
School 8 - 1.000 1.000
School 9 - 0.367 0.537
School 10 - 1.000 1.000
School 11 - 0.390 0.560
School 12 - 1.000 1.000
School 13 - 0.969 1.000
School 14 - - 1.000
School 15 - - 1.000
School 16 - - 1.000
School 17 - - 1.000
School 18 - - 1.000
School 19 - - 0.574
School 20 - - 1.000
School 21 - - 1.000
School22 - - 1.000
School 23 - - 0.820
School 24 - - 0.692
School25 - - 1.000
School 26 - - 0.645
School 27 - - 1.000
School 28 - - 1.000
School29 - - 1.000
School 30 - - 0.986
Notes: This table shows equilibrium admission probabilities for the
counterfactual simulations. The procedure for determining these
probabilities is described in Appendix B.
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Chapter 2
Explaining Charter School
Effectiveness
(Joint work with Joshua D. Angrist and Parag A. Pathak')
2.1 Introduction
A growing body of evidence suggests that urban charter schools have the potential to generate
impressive achievement gains, especially for minority students living in high-poverty areas. In
a series of studies using admissions lotteries to identify causal effects, we looked at the impact
of charter attendance in Boston and at a Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) school in Lynn,
Massachusetts (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2009, 2011; Angrist et al., 2010, 2012). Boston and Lynn
charter middle schools increase student achievement by about 0.4 standard deviations (a) per year
in math and about 0.2o, per year in English Language Arts (ELA). Among high school students,
attendance at a Boston charter school increases student achievement by about 0.3a per year in math
and 0.2o per year in ELA. Lottery studies of charter schools in the Harlem Children's Zone (Dobbie
and Fryer, 2011a) and a Washington DC charter boarding school (Curto and Fryer, 2011) document
1 A version of this chapter is forthcoming in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. Special thanks
go to Carrie Conaway, Sarah Cohodes, Jon Fullerton, Harvard's Center for Education Policy Research, and the
Massachusetts Department of Education for assistance and data, and to our charter team collaborators, Sue Dynarski
and Tom Kane for their valuable input. Seminar participants at Boston College, Columbia, Harvard, HEC Montreal,
Miami Ohio, The University of Trento, The University of Virginia, Wharton, and the August 2011 Impact Evaluation
Network meeting in Buenos Aires provided extensive helpful comments. This work was funded by the Institute for
Education Sciences award number R305A120269. We also thank the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education for financial support. Pathak also gratefully acknowledges support from the NSF. The views
expressed here are those of the authors alone.
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similarly large gains. Studies of Chicago and New York charter schools also report positive effects
(Hoxby and Rockoff, 2004; Hoxby, Murarka and Kang, 2009; Dobbie and Fryer, 2011b).
While these results are encouraging, they come from schools operating in traditional (for char-
ters) urban settings. Interest in charter schools is growing rapidly in school districts outside central
cities (see, e.g., the discussion of New York area charters in Hu, 2011), but results for more di-
verse sets of charter schools are also more mixed. In a recent report evaluating roughly two dozen
Massachusetts charter schools from around the state, we find little evidence of achievement gains
at schools outside of high-poverty urban areas (Angrist et al., 2011). Some of the estimates for
non-urban Massachusetts charters show significant negative effects. These results echo findings
from a multi-state study of 36 charter middle schools using admissions lotteries (Gleason et al.,
2010).2 Here too, charter schools outside of urban areas seem to do little for achievement, though,
as in our earlier work, urban schools with high-minority, high-poverty enrollment generate some
gains. 3
This chapter documents the magnitude of treatment effect heterogeneity in a large sample of
Massachusetts charter schools and develops a framework for interpreting this heterogeneity using
both student- and school-level explanatory variables. We begin with a semiparametric investigation
of potential outcomes that assigns a role to variation in no-treatment counterfactuals and to charter
applicants' demographic characteristics and baseline achievement. This investigation includes a
Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition of the urban charter advantage. The resulting estimates show
that students at urban charters are typical of the urban student population, and that urban charter
attendance boosts achievement well beyond ambient non-charter levels. Student demographics and
baseline scores play a role in this - urban schools work best for minority students and students
with low baseline scores - but non-urban charters appear to be ineffective for most subgroups.
We then investigate school-level factors that might explain differences in charter school effec-
tiveness. This investigation is built on a set of non-lottery estimates that rely on statistical controls
to eliminate selection bias. The observational analysis suggests that the sample of urban schools for
which a lottery-based analysis is feasible, that is, over-subscribed schools with good lottery records,
2Other studies documenting heterogeneity in the effects of charter schools include Hoxby (2004), Zimmer et al.
(2009), and Imberman (2011). The Imberman study reports that urban charters born as charters have large effects
on discipline and attendance, while converted schools do not.
3A focus on differences between urban and non-urban schools also appears in research on Catholic schools. Evans
and Schwab (1995) and Neal (1997) show that Catholic school attendance leads to increases in high school graduation
and college attendance for cohorts graduating in the early 1980s. Both studies find larger benefits for black students
and for students in urban settings. Grogger et al. (2000) and Altonji et al. (2005) report similar findings for more
recent cohorts.
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boost scores more than other urban charter schools. We show that urban and lottery-sample char-
ter effectiveness can be explained by adherence to a No Excuses approach to urban education
that emphasizes discipline and comportment, traditional reading and math skills, instruction time,
and selective teacher hiring. Using a detailed survey of school practices and characteristics, we
document the specific practices most commonly used by No Excuses schools. Relative to other
Massachusetts charter schools, No Excuses schools are more likely to use strict discipline, uniforms,
and cold-calling, to employ alumni of the Teach for America (TFA) program, and to videotape
lessons for teacher feedback. Conditional on No Excuses status, traditional inputs such as time in
school and per-pupil expenditure are not predictive of charter effectiveness.
The results reported here contribute to a growing body of evidence documenting the effective-
ness of No Excuses practices in various contexts. Dobbie and Fryer (2011b) show that an index
measuring teacher feedback, data-driven instruction, tutoring, increased instruction time, and high
expectations is a significant predictor of effectiveness in a sample of New York charter schools.
These practices are typically understood to be central elements of the No Excuses model (Thern-
strom and Thernstrom, 2003; Carter, 2000), and are highly correlated with No Excuses status in
our sample. Similarly, Fryer (2011) reports on an experiment implementing No Excuses strategies
in nine low-performing traditional public schools in Houston. This intervention appears to have
produced substantial gains, suggesting that the No Excuses model may be effective beyond the
charter context.
The following section details school participation, describes the data, and outlines our empirical
strategy for the lottery analysis. Section 2.3 presents the findings that motivate our investigation of
charter effect heterogeneity. Section 2.4 outlines the econometric framework used to investigate this
heterogeneity and reports the results of this investigation. Section 2.5 discusses our observational
analysis of the connection between charter effectiveness and school practices.
2.2 Lottery Analysis: Data and Empirical Strategy
2.2.1 Lottery and Survey Data
We attempted to collect lottery data for the set of Massachusetts charter schools serving middle
and high school grades and meeting a set of pre-specified eligibility criteria. The school-selection
process is detailed in Table 1. Schools eligible for our study accept students in the relevant entry
grades (4th-7th grade for middle school and 9th grade for high school). Excluded are closed schools,
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schools that opened after the 2009-2010 school year, and alternative schools serving non-traditional
populations (usually students at risk of dropping out). The resulting set of eligible schools includes
28 of the 34 charters with middle school entry grades and eight of 16 schools with high school entry
grades. 4 Eligible schools that are not included in the lottery analysis were either under-subscribed
or failed to keep sufficient lottery records. The final sample of over-subscribed schools with usable
records includes 17 middle schools and six high schools. These schools are listed in Appendix Table
Al. The lottery sample includes nine urban middle schools, eight non-urban middle schools, four
urban high schools, and two non-urban high schools. 5
In an effort to document differences in school practice, we surveyed the full set of eligible
charter schools, regardless of the quality of their lottery records. Twenty-four school administrators
completed this survey.6 The survey is described in detail in the Survey Appendix. As shown in
Panel A of Table 2, the survey revealed important differences between urban and non-urban charter
schools. Urban schools are younger than non-urban schools; in Spring 2010, the average urban
school had been open for 8.6 years, while the average non-urban school had been open for 12.4
years. Urban charter schools also run a longer school day and year than do non-urban schools. The
average urban charter year lasts 189 days and has a school day of 471 minutes, compared to 183
days and 440 minutes at non-urban schools. The extra time appears to go to increased math and
reading instruction; urban schools spend 27 extra minutes per day on math and 39 extra minutes
per day on reading. In addition, 19 percent of urban charter schools have Saturday school, while
no non-urban charter reported having Saturday school.
Urban and non-urban schools also differ with respect to school philosophy. The survey results
reveal a particularly sharp division between urban and non-urban charters with respect to the No
Excuses approach to education. As discussed by Thernstrom and Thernstrom (2003) and Carter
(2000), No Excuses principles include a strict disciplinary environment, an emphasis on student
behavior and comportment, extended time in school, an intensive focus on traditional reading and
math skills, and teacher quality. Two-thirds of urban charter administrators identify somewhat
or fully with No Excuses, while no non-urban charter identifies with this approach. We provide
further details on differences in school practice in Section 2.5.
4 Three eligible schools serve both middle and high school grades, so there are 33 eligible campuses. Schools are
classified as both middle and high if they have entrance lotteries at both levels, or if lottery records at the middle
school level were available early enough for participants to be observed in high school.
5 Urban areas are those in which the local district superintendent participates in the Massachusetts Urban Su-
perintendents Network. This distinction is essentially identical to splits based on high poverty or high minority
enrollment.6 This generates data for 27 schools since two surveyed campuses admit in both middle and high school.
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Panel B of Table 2 compares the inputs and resources used by urban charters, non-urban
charters, and traditional public schools.7 All urban charters qualify for Federal Title I funds. Urban
charters spend about as much as traditional public schools, while non-urban charter schools spend
less ($13,668 compared to $11,091). Compared to non-urban charters and public schools, urban
charters have substantially younger teachers. Probably due to these age differences, urban charter
teachers are less likely to be licensed than traditional public school teachers. Student/teacher ratios
at charter schools are generally smaller than staff ratios at traditional public schools; non-urban
charter schools have the smallest classes.
2.2.2 Student Data
The student-level data used here come from administrative records covering all Massachusetts'
public schools. 8 Our sample covers the 2001-2002 school year through the 2010-2011 school year.
The administrative records include information on demographics and school(s) of attendance, as
well as Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) scores. The MCAS is a set of
high-stakes standardized tests given to students in grades 3-8 and grade 10. The primary outcomes
analyzed in our study are math and English Language Arts (ELA) scores. The Data Appendix
provides details on the availability of outcomes for each applicant cohort. Raw MCAS scores were
standardized by subject, grade level, and year.
The lottery analysis sample matches applicant records to administrative data using appli-
cants' name, year, and grade. Where available, information on date of birth, town of residence,
race/ethnicity, and gender was used to break ties. Ninety-two percent of applicants were matched.
Applicants were excluded from the lottery analysis if they were disqualified from the lottery they en-
tered (this mostly affected applicants to the wrong grade level). We also dropped siblings of current
students, late applicants, and some out-of-area applicants. 9 Students missing baseline demographic
information in the state database were dropped as well.
7Characteristics of traditional public schools were gathered from http://profiles.doe.mass.edu and refer to the
2010-2011 school year. Our survey measures are unavailable for traditional public schools.
8Records are from the Student Information Management System, or SIMS. See the Data Appendix for details.
9Charter schools typically give priority to sibling applicants, as well as to students in the local school district or
region. Our applicant risk sets (discussed in the next section) distinguish between in-area and out-of-area applicants
for schools that take substantial numbers of both. Out-of-area applicants were dropped at schools with fewer than
five out-of-area applicants.
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2.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
We begin with a statistical picture of the Massachusetts student population in traditional public
and charter schools, presented in Table 3 separately for urban and non-urban areas. Traditional
schools are defined as those that are not charters, alternative programs for older students, exclu-
sively special education, exam, or magnet schools. The table shows average demographic charac-
teristics, participation rates in limited English proficiency (LEP) and special education (SPED)
programs, and average baseline test scores. Baseline (pre-charter enrollment) scores are from 4th
grade for middle school and 8th grade for high school.
Traditional urban students are unlike traditional students in the rest of the state. Specifically,
urban students are more likely to be black or Hispanic, to participate in LEP or SPED programs,
and to receive a subsidized lunch. Urban students also have much lower baseline test scores than
other public school students, with scores 0.43a and 0.47o below the state average in math and ELA
at the middle school level, and 0.42o and 0.39a below the average for high school. In contrast,
non-urban students score 0.21o and 0.23o above the middle school average; the corresponding
non-urban advantages in high school are 0.27o and 0.28c.
Eligible charter school students who live in urban and non-urban areas are more similar to their
peers in regular public schools than to one another. On the other hand, we see important differences
by charter status as well. Urban charter schools serve a higher proportion of black students than
do urban public schools. Urban charter students are also less likely to participate in LEP or SPED
programs, or to qualify for a subsidized lunch. Charter school students in both urban and non-urban
areas have slightly higher baseline test scores than their public school counterparts. Applicants to
charter schools for whom we have lottery data are similar to the population of enrolled charter
students in both urban and non-urban areas.
2.2.4 Empirical Strategy
The lottery-based identification strategy captures causal effects for applicants to over-subscribed
charters with high-quality lottery records. The second-stage equation for the lottery analysis is
yigt = a2t + 02g + ( jdij + X 0 + Trsigt + igt, (2.1)
where yigt is a test score for student i in grade g in year t, a2t and 3 2g are year and grade effects,
Xi is a vector of pre-lottery demographic characteristics (race, special education, limited English
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proficiency, subsidized lunch status, and a female-minority interaction), and eigt is an error term.
The set of dij includes a separate dummy variable for every combination of charter school lotteries
(indexed by j) seen in the lottery sample. In what follows, we refer to these combinations as
"risk sets." We control for risk sets because lottery offers are randomly assigned within risk sets,
analogous to strata in a randomized controlled trial. The variable of interest, sigt, measures years
spent in charter schools between application and test dates. 10 The parameter r captures the causal
effect of charter school attendance.
OLS estimates of equation (2.1) fail to capture causal effects if the decision to apply to or
attend a charter school is correlated with unmeasured ability, motivation, or family background.
We therefore use a dummy variable, Zi, indicating lottery offers as an instrumental variable for
time spent in charter school. The first stage for this 2SLS procedure is
Sigt - ait±+IOig±Z/'ijdij +±X'jt±7rZi ±iligt, (2.2)
where 7r is the effect of a lottery offer on charter attendance. As in the second stage equation, the
first stage includes risk set controls and baseline demographic characteristics, as well as year and
grade effects. Estimates for high school use 10th grade MCAS scores only, with standard errors
clustered by school/grade/year. Estimates for middle school use all non-repeat post-lottery test
scores through 8th grade and add a second layer of clustering at the student level.
Randomly assigned lottery offers are likely to be independent of student ability, motivation, or
family background (within risk sets). The appendix presents evidence in support of the lottery-
based identification strategy. Specifically, Table A2 shows that conditional on risk set, winning
the lottery is uncorrelated with student characteristics. Appendix Table A3 shows that MCAS
outcomes scores are available for roughly 90 percent of middle school applicants and 75 percent
of high school applicants. Score availability is two points higher for lottery winners than losers in
the middle school sample, but this small imbalance is unlikely to be important for the estimates
discussed below.'1
'Students who transfer public schools are assigned to the school attended longest in a given year. Students with
any charter attendance are coding as having been in charter for the year. Students attending multiple charters in a
given year are coded as having been a student at the charter school attended longest. The variable si 9t counts years
spent at any charter school, including those without lottery records.
"Since our analysis focuses on differences between urban and non-urban schools, differences in lottery balance and
attrition between these schools are also of interest. Table A2 shows that lottery offers are uncorrelated with student
characteristics in both urban and non-urban areas. Columns (3) and (5) of Table A3 show that follow-up rates are
similar for urban and non-urban charters: Follow-up rates are somewhat higher for urban schools in middle school
and for non-urban schools in high school. Differences in follow-up rates between winners and losers are slightly higher
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Differences in effectiveness between urban and non-urban charter schools are a primary focus
of our analysis. Area-specific 2SLS estimates were constructed using equations of the form
Yigt = a2t + 02g + Ejdij + X 0 + 7us!gt + rnsgt + cigt, (2.3)
where sg and s ' are years in urban and non-urban charter schools. The first stage for urban
attendance can be written
Tt= Celt ±+/31g + S jcdij + X,'1 + 7ruZ!' + 7nZ' ± 'ligt, (2.4)
where Zju and Zi indicate offers from urban and non-urban charters, with a similar specification
for non-urban attendance.
2.3 Lottery Estimates
The first stage estimates reported in column (1) of Table 4 show that, among applicants to
charter middle schools, students who won a charter school lottery spent about 1 year more in a
charter before being tested than did students who were not offered a seat. Applicants who won
high school entrance lotteries spent about half a year longer in a charter school between application
and testing than applicants who lost. These first stage estimates are similar to those reported in
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) for a smaller sample of charter schools in Boston.
Second stage estimates for the full sample of lottery schools appear in column (2) of Table 4.
These imply that a year of attendance at a lottery sample charter middle school increases math
scores by 0.21or and ELA scores by 0.08a. The high school 2SLS estimates reveal larger causal
effects, with score gains on the order of 0.27or per year for math and 0.21cr per year for ELA.1 2
Estimates for the full state sample mask considerable heterogeneity by urban status, a pattern
documented in columns (3) through (6) of Table 4. Although first stages at urban and non-
urban middle schools are similar, the corresponding second stage estimates differ markedly. 2SLS
estimates for urban middle schools, reported in column (4) of Table 4, suggest these schools generate
gains of 0.32or in math and 0.15a in ELA per year enrolled. In contrast, estimates for non-urban
charter middle schools are negative. In particular, as can be seen in column (6), charter students
for non-urban schools at both levels.
12 Our earlier working paper shows results for writing scores similar to those for ELA (Angrist et al. 2011).
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at non-urban middle schools appear to lose ground relative to their public school peers at a rate of
0.12- per year in math and 0.14o- per year in ELA. Not surprisingly, high school lottery results for
urban schools are similar to the statewide results (since only two of the high schools in the state
sample are non-urban), showing large gains in math and ELA. 13 On the other hand, 2SLS estimates
for non-urban charter high schools are small, negative, and not significantly different from zero. 14
Variation in charter effects across demographic subgroups is documented in Table 5, separately
for urban and non-urban schools. Urban charter schools boost scores for most subgroups, though
not uniformly. Girls realize slightly larger gains in math, while boys see slightly larger ELA gains.
Black and Hispanic students benefit considerably from urban charter attendance in middle school,
but the estimated math gains for whites are smaller, with no increase in whites' ELA scores. Urban
charter middle schools appear to produce especially large achievement gains for students eligible
for a subsidized lunch and for those with low baseline scores. Attendance at urban charter high
schools increases math scores in every group and raises reading scores for everyone except whites,
though estimates for small groups are imprecise.
Non-urban charter attendance fails to raise scores for most of the subgroups examined in Table
5, and appears to reduce achievement for girls, whites, and students with low baseline scores in
middle school. Estimates for non-urban black and Hispanic students are negative in middle school,
though not significantly different from zero. Most of the estimates for non-urban charter high
schools are close to zero, though effects here are less precise than those for non-urban middle school
(high school estimates for blacks and Hispanics are omitted due to the small size of these non-urban
groups).15
13 We also looked at the effects of charter attendance on high school graduation rates. Table A4 shows 2SLS
estimates of equations (2.1) and (2.3) for graduation, with the endogenous variable coded as a dummy for attending a
charter in the year after the lottery. This analysis suggests that attending a charter has little effect on the probability
of graduating in both urban and non-urban areas.
4 As shown in columns (3) and (5) of Table 4, the first stage for urban high schools is smaller than the first stage
for non-urban high schools. This difference reflects the fact that a larger proportion of the non-urban high school
sample comes from entrance lotteries in middle grades, generating more potential years of charter exposure by the
time applicants were tested in high school.
'
5 Clustering the non-urban high school standard errors by school-grade-year as in Table 4 produced standard
errors that were much smaller than classical homoskedastic 2SLS standard errors, suggesting a problem of finite-
sample bias due to clustering. To avoid this bias, we report p-values from 1,000 replications of the wild cluster
bootstrap percentile-t procedure described by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008).
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2.4 Differences in Students
We investigate student- and school-level explanations for the striking difference in achievement
effects at urban and non-urban charter schools. The student-level analysis is cast in a semipara-
metric framework with heterogeneous potential outcomes, indexed against a Bernoulli treatment,
Di E {0, 1}, to indicate charter attendance. The Bernoulli setup focuses on heterogeneity while
abstracting from nonlinearities that seem second-order in this context (since the first stage effects
of lottery offers are similar in the two settings for middle school, while the corresponding second
stage estimates differ dramatically). Let Yi and Yoi denote potential test scores for student i in
and out of charter schools. The observed outcome for student i is
Y = Yoj + (Y1i - Yoi )Di .
In other words, we observe Yoi for applicants who don't go to charter school and Y1i for those who
do.
Our empirical work uses data from many school- and cohort-specific admissions lotteries, but
the analysis of heterogeneity is explained with reference to a single lottery. Offers in this lottery are
indicated by Zi, as before. Potential treatment assignments, denoted Dli and Doi, tell us whether
student i attends a charter school if he wins or loses the lottery. Offers are randomly assigned
and assumed to affect test scores only through charter attendance, so the potential outcome vector
(Yi, Yoi, Dii, Doi) is independent of Zi. We also assume that winning an entrance lottery can only
make charter attendance more likely, so that D1 > Doi Vi, with strict inequality for some students.
Under these assumptions, instrumental variables estimation using Zi as an instrument for Di
in the sample of lottery applicants produces a local average treatment effect (LATE; Imbens and
Angrist, 1994). Here, LATE is the effect of charter attendance for students induced to enroll in
a charter school by winning an admissions lottery (the compliers, who have Dli > Doi). When
computed separately for urban and non-urban students, IV estimates identify
Ej [YIZi = 1] - E [YijZI = 0]
Ee[Di|Zi = 1] - Ej[DilZi = 0]
= E[Yi - YoIDii > Doi], i E {u, n};
where indexes location, Et denotes an expectation over students in location f, and u a'nd n indicate
urban and non-urban locations, respectively. This is LATE in each setting.
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We pinpoint two sources of student-level heterogeneity that might contribute to the difference
between Tu and -r. The first is variation in Yoi across charter and non-charter students within
each area (urban and non-urban). This investigation tells us whether charter applicants and/or
charter lottery compliers are unusual in either setting as measured by their public school achieve-
ment. Second, we use a Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition to separate the difference in charter
effectiveness across areas into a component due to differences in student populations and a com-
ponent due to differences in effectiveness conditional on student characteristics. This analysis tells
us whether the urban charter advantage is due to serving demographic groups that tend to benefit
more from charter attendance.
2.4.1 Non-treated Gaps in Urban and Non-urban Areas
The LATE in each area (urban or non-urban) can be split into two parts, the first capturing
differences in potential outcomes in the treated state (differences in Y1i) and the second capturing
differences in potential outcomes in the non-treated state (differences in Yoi). Specifically, we
benchmark achievement in each area using the local non-charter mean. This tells us whether the
urban charter advantage is driven by unusually low no-treatment outcomes for urban compliers, or
whether compliers are, in fact, typical of their milieu. Figure 1 illustrates the alternative scenarios
we have in mind: the left panel describes a situation in which the achievement of untreated urban
students is comparable to ambient non-charter achievement, while the right panel describes a
situation in which the urban fallback is unusually low.
The econometric analysis of within-area counterfactuals begins with a decomposition of the
urban and non-urban LATE as follows:
re= Et[Yij|Dii > Doi] - Et[YoiIDi = 0] (2.5)
- (Ej[YoilDi > Doi] - Ej[YoiIDi =0]), 1 E {u,fn}.
X0
The term At is the difference in average Yo0 between lottery compliers and the general population
of non-charter students in the relevant area. The term At is the difference between the treated
outcomes of compliers and ambient non-charter achievement. For example, large Au and small Au
mean that urban charters push their students beyond typical non-charter achievement in cities.
Abadie (2002) shows that marginal mean counterfactuals for compliers can be obtained by the
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formula
= Ej[Yi - (1 - Dj)jZi = 1] - Ee[Yi - (1 - Di)|Zi = 0]Ez[Yo4lDie > Dog]=.(26 E[1 - DilZi = 1] - Ee[1 - DilZi = 0]
We estimate A by constructing the empirical analogue of equation (2.6) for lottery applicants in
the relevant location, and subtracting the mean score for all non-charter students including non-
applicants. A is estimated using an analogous procedure that replaces (1 - Di) with Di in equation
(2.6).16
Estimates of A8 and A appear in Table 6. Columns (1) through (4) show results for urban
schools. Column (2) reports the average Yoi for non-charter students, while column (3) shows A",
the difference in average non-treated outcomes between urban compliers and non-charter students.
Estimates of A', the difference between the treated outcomes of urban compliers and the ambient
level of urban achievement, appear in column (4).17 The estimates of A" suggest that urban lottery
compliers are positively selected from the urban middle school population, but the estimated gaps
are small, and marginally significant only for middle school ELA. Because urban charter compliers
have non-charter achievement levels that are fairly typical of students in urban areas, the large
score gains generated by urban charter schools can be attributed to high scores in the treated state,
a fact reflected by the large, significant estimates of A' in column (4).
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 6 report estimates of A' and A' for students at non-urban charter
schools. As in urban areas, the non-charter achievement level of non-urban middle school compliers
is slightly higher than that of students in the surrounding public schools. The ELA scores of non-
urban middle school compliers in public schools exceed the ambient non-urban achievement level by
a statistically significant 0.10-, while the estimate of A' for ELA is a precisely estimated -0.09a-.
This implies that non-urban charter middle schools move their students from atypically high ELA
achievement levels to levels below those of non-urban public school students. Non-charter math
achievement of non-urban middle school compliers is statistically indistinguishable from the ambient
non-charter level, while non-urban charter attendance pulls compliers 0.14- below the non-charter
mean. The results for non-urban high school students show more positive selection (high A') than
in middle school. As can be seen by comparing columns (7) and (8) in Panel B, charter attendance
leaves non-urban high school students essentially unchanged from this higher starting point.
"The simple Wald formula given here is valid for a single lottery. To use data from multiple lotteries, we estimate
marginal complier means via a 2SLS procedure with risk set fixed effects. This produces a weighted average of
within-risk-set Wald estimates, with weights inversely proportional to the variance of first stage fitted values (Angrist
and Imbens 1995).
1 7Middle school scores are from the year after the lottery for applicants and 6th grade for non-applicants; high
school scores are from 10th grade, as always.
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These results paint a consistent picture of the urban charter advantage. Urban middle school
charters push the scores of their students from a typically low level up to a level much closer to
the achievement seen among non-urban students (the scenario sketched in the left panel of Figure
1).18 Non-urban charter middle schools reduce the scores of their students, in some cases markedly
so. The corresponding results for high schools are like those for middle schools in that urban
charter high schools push their students beyond the level of achievement typical of urban public
high schools. Non-urban charter high schools leave scores unchanged from a higher non-charter
counterfactual baseline.
2.4.2 Accounting for Student Demographics
The role student demographics play in generating the urban charter advantage is explored with
the help of a decomposition in the spirit of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). For example,
poor, minority students may benefit the most from charter attendance, and urban charters may be
more effective than non-urban charters in part because they serve larger shares of such students.
The Blinder-Oaxaca framework allows us to quantify the contribution of differences in student
composition to the urban charter advantage.
The first step of our Blinder-Oaxaca analysis uses the methods of Abadie (2003) to identify a
linear local average response function for lottery compliers conditional on a vector of observable
demographic variables, Xi. Specifically, we have
Et[YiDii > Doi, Di, Xi, di) = XjO0 + weDi + DiX/pt + 6jdij, 1 E {u, n}. (2.7)
This equation has a causal interpretation because conditional on being a complier, treatment status
(charter enrollment) is ignorable. The coefficient vector pe captures heterogeneity in treatment
effects across demographic groups in location f. Abadie (2003) shows that 2SLS using Bernoulli
instruments for a Bernoulli treatment consistently estimates this sort of linear model for local
average causal response.
Equation (2.7) generates the following parameterization of the urban/non-urban difference in
charter school attendance effects:
Tu - In = (Wu -Wn) + X( pupn)(X -X )pu, (2.8)
18Our earlier working paper compares marginal mean counterfactuals for urban and non-urban compliers in more
detail (Angrist et al. 2011).
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where
Xt = Ej[Xi|D1j > Doi].
The last term in equation (2.8) captures the part of the urban charter advantage explained by
differences in demographics. In particular, this term tells us how much urban charter effects
are boosted by the observable characteristics of urban compliers. The first two terms capture the
component of the urban advantage attributable to differences in effects within demographic groups.
Here, as always, Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions can be presented in two ways. In this case, the
urban/non-urban difference in charter school impact can be decomposed with differences in means
weighted by non-urban charter effects instead of urban. Specifically, we can write
ru - Tn = (Wu -Wn) + XU(Pu -Pn) +(Xu,§-X)Pn. (2.9)
Like equation (2.8), this expression includes components associated with differences in demographics
and differences in effectiveness conditional on demographics. The last term measures how much
more effective non-urban charter schools would be if their students were demographically similar
to the urban charter population.
We construct these decompositions by estimating
Y = X161+wtDi + DiXjpj + 6jdij +ei
by 2SLS, separately for urban and non-urban applicants, with first stage
Di = Xz1 + irZi + ZXzC'e + ( njdig + l (2.10)
for Di and similar first stages for interaction terms involving Di. The covariate vector, Xi, in-
cludes sex, race (white or non-white), special education status, free lunch status, and dummies for
performance at the advanced, proficient, or needs improvement level on baseline math and ELA
tests. Complier means for each component of Xi are estimated using the kappa-weighting procedure
described in Abadie (2003).
Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions suggest that favorable demographics enhance urban charter
effectiveness, but differences in student populations do not fully account for the urban charter ad-
vantage. This can be seen in Table 7, which shows the components of equations (2.8) and (2.9) for
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middle schools. (The non-urban high school samples are too small to admit meaningful investiga-
tions of effect heterogeneity using this approach.) Column (1) shows the difference in charter middle
school treatment effects by urban status. 19 Columns (2) and (3) report the components of decompo-
sition (2.8), which multiplies the urban/non-urban difference in demographics by treatment effects
for urban schools. Column (2) shows how urban effectiveness might change if urban schools were
to serve the non-urban population. These results suggest that 51 percent of the urban advantage in
math (0.32/0.63) can be explained by the level of urban demographics. The corresponding estimate
for ELA is 47 percent. Urban schools are especially effective for poor and minority students, and
they serve more of these students than do non-urban schools. On the other hand, column (3) shows
that even with the same student mix as non-urban charter schools, urban charters would be more
effective than non-urban charters. The urban charter advantage can therefore be attributed to a
combination of student demographics and larger treatment effects within demographic groups. As
shown in columns (4) and (5), decomposition (2.9) produces qualitatively similar results, though
the standard errors for this decomposition are much larger due to the relative imprecision of the
estimated pn.
2.5 Differences in Schools
2.5.1 Observational Estimates
Our exploration of school-level heterogeneity in achievement effects builds on observational
estimates, since this provides a larger sample of schools with more variation in characteristics and
practices and allows us to compare effects for eligible charter schools with and without lottery
records. The observational estimates use a combination of matching and regression to control for
observed differences between students attending different types of schools. Specifically, students
attending lottery-eligible charters are matched to a control sample with the same baseline school,
baseline year, sex, and race. Charter students are matched if they fall into a baseline school-year-
sex-race cell that includes at least one regular public school student; likewise, regular public school
students are matched if they fall into in a cell that includes at least one student in an eligible
charter school. Every charter student in the matched sample is therefore compared to at least one
demographically similar student from the same cohort and sending school. This procedure yields
'
9 These differences differ slightly from those reported in Table 6 because equation (2.10) imposes first stage
coefficients that are constant across risk sets, while the earlier estimates allow the first stage coefficients to vary.
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matches for 92 percent of students in eligible charter schools.
The observational analysis is based on the the following estimating equation for student i from
matching cell c, observed in grade g in year t:
igtc o't + 9 + tc + Xj' + S gT + Eigtc. (2.11)
Here, Sigt is a vector measuring years spent in each eligible charter school for student i from baseline
through year t, while Xi is a vector of additional student characteristics including limited English
proficiency, special education status, subsidized lunch status, and baseline math and ELA scores. 20
To validate the observational research design, we compared lottery-based and observational results
for schools where both are available. This comparison was encouraging, as the two designs produced
qualitatively similar estimates for most schools. The results of this validation exercise appear in
Appendix Table A5.21
We link charter school effectiveness to school practices using the following school-level regression:
1s = #o + #1Us + #2Ls + # 3Hs + P'#4 + us, (2.12)
where f. is an observational estimate of the effect of charter school s from equation (2.11), Us is
an urban dummy, L, is a lottery sample dummy, H, is a high school dummy, and P, is a vector
of practices and characteristics. Observations in this regression are weighted by the reciprocal of
the variance of the estimated treatment effect. Standard errors are clustered at the school level
to account for the fact that some schools contribute both middle and high-school estimates to the
sample. 22
Consistent with the findings reported in Table 4, estimates of equation (2.12) reveal substantially
larger treatment effects at urban charter schools. As shown in columns (1) and (5) of Table 8, the
urban advantage is roughly 0.21o- in math and 0.12o- in ELA. Interestingly, oversubscribed schools
with high-quality lottery records also seem to be more effective than non-lottery schools: lottery-
20The observational regressions also control for years spent in ineligible charters and alternative schools.2 1The observational estimates for the validation exercise come from a version of equation (2.11) that includes
years spent in eligible lottery and non-lottery charter schools in Sigt. Observational estimates for schools in the
urban lottery sample are strikingly similar to the lottery results. The match between lottery and observational
results for non-urban schools is not as good, with more positive observational estimates than those generated by
lottery methods. This seems unlikely to affect the main conclusions from the observational analysis, however.2 2 The sample for equation (2.12) includes all eigible charter schools with data on at least one element of P. Some
schools left survey questions blank; we code these responses as zeros, and include dummies indicating missing values
for each survey question. The sample used to estimated equation (2.12) is larger than the sample of surveyed schools
in Table 2 because some non-surveyed schools had available data for the traditional inputs included in P,.
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sample schools generate gains that are 0.15a- and 0.110- larger than the effects of non-lottery schools.
This is further evidence of the importance of school-level heterogeneity in charter effects.
We next ask whether school approach or philosophy explains charter-effect heterogeneity. Specif-
ically, we ask whether identification with the No Excuses instructional approach accounts for the
urban charter advantage. Our focus on No Excuses is motivated by strong results for the schools
in our study of Boston charters (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011), most of which embrace No Excuses
pedagogy, and by our results for a KIPP school in Lynn, MA (Angrist et al. 2010, 2012). KIPP
is a rapidly growing charter management organization (CMO) whose schools are often seen as em-
blematic of the No Excuses approach. Moreover, in 2010 the Massachusetts legislature passed a law
relaxing the state's charter cap for districts in the lowest decile of MCAS performance, and many
of the No Excuses schools from our earlier study (including KIPP, MATCH, Excel Academy, Ed-
ward Brooke, and Roxbury Preparatory) have responded to this with proposals for new campuses
(Candal 2010).
No Excuses identification explains the relative effectiveness of urban charter schools in our
sample. This can be seen in columns (2) and (6) of Table 8, which add a dummy for No Excuses
to equation (2.12).23 No Excuses charter schools generate math and ELA gains that are 0.21a- and
0.150- larger than the effects of other charters. Moreover, conditional on No Excuses status, the
estimated urban coefficients are small and insignificant, while still precisely estimated. Since no
non-urban charters identify with No Excuses, this implies that urban schools that do not identify
with No Excuses practices are no more effective than non-urban charters. The inclusion of No
Excuses also dramatically reduces the lottery coefficients, and renders lottery status statistically
insignificant in math, though it remains marginally significant in ELA.
Figure 2 summarizes the relationship between No Excuses practice and charter impacts esti-
mated using both observational and lottery-based methods. The lottery estimates come from a
2SLS regression that instruments time spent in each lottery-sample charter with school-specific
offers. 24 The figure plots school-specific math coefficients against the corresponding ELA coeffi-
cients, labeling points by school type and location. The No Excuses advantage is striking: With
few exceptions, estimates for urban No Excuses charters are large and positive in both subjects,
23The No Excuses dummy is constructed from responses to this question: Do you see your school as adhering to a
particular approach or philosophy, such as No Excuses? We retained this measure from the less-detailed survey used
in our earlier working paper (Angrist et al. 2011) because of the potential for schools to strategically answer the No
Excuses question in our new survey in response to our earlier results.
24We also used these lottery estimates to estimate a version of equation (2.12). The results were qualitatively
similar to the observational estimates reported in Table 8, but the lottery-based analysis was much less precise because
of the relative imprecision of school-specific lottery estimates.
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while the estimates for non-urban schools as well as urban schools not associated with No Excuses
are small or negative.
2.5.2 Inside the No Excuses Black Box
The results reported here suggest that the relative effectiveness of urban lottery charter schools
is driven by these schools' embrace of the No Excuses instructional approach. Next, we use our
survey results to get inside the "black box" of No Excuses effectiveness and ask which elements
of the No Excuses model are most closely tied to charter impacts. Table 9 lists the full set of
practices measured by the survey. As described in the Survey Appendix, many survey questions ask
respondents to report answers on a four- or five-point scale; we convert these to binary indicators
equal to one for schools that answer the maximum. Column (1) reports means of the survey
variables, while columns (2), (4) and (6) report coefficients from regressions of No Excuses status,
math observational estimates, and ELA estimates on each variable and a high school dummy.
Columns (3), (5), and (7) report t-statistics from these regressions.
No Excuses schools are more likely than other Massachusetts charters to emphasize discipline
and comportment, college preparation, and traditional reading and math skills. This can be seen in
columns (1) and (2) of Panel A in Table 9, which show the relationship between No Excuses status
and measures of school philosophy. In addition, No Excuses schools are unlikely to emphasize social
and physical well-being or cultural awareness. Panel B reports corresponding results for specific
school practices. No Excuses schools are likely to use uniforms, to cold-call in the classroom, to use
drills and extended instructional time in math, and to use formal reward systems to shape student
behavior; they are unlikely to use group projects. As shown in Panel C, No Excuses charters also
tend to hire TFA alumni and to videotape lessons to provide teachers with feedback. Moreover,
columns (4) through (7) of Table 9 show that school characteristics highly correlated with No
Excuses status also tend to be highly correlated with charter effectiveness in math and ELA.
These survey results paint a clear picture of the education production function at No Excuses
schools. Our findings here are consistent with results for effective New York charters reported by
Dobbie and Fryer (2011b). Dobbie and Fryer identify five practices that explain charter effective-
ness: high expectations, frequent teacher feedback, high-dosage tutoring, increased instructional
time, and data-driven instruction. These practices tend to be positively correlated with both No
Excuses status and charter effectiveness in our sample. Our measure of discipline and comportment,
one of the strongest correlates of No Excuses, is closely related to Dobbie and Fryer's measure of
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high expectations. 25 In addition, Table 9 shows that No Excuses charters are more likely than
other charters to observe teachers and use video for feedback, to have tutoring programs for all
students, and to have long days and extended school years. They also tend to use tests to gauge
understanding, suggesting a data-driven approach. The close correspondence between results for
Massachusetts and New York charters suggests that No Excuses practices are effective in a variety
of contexts.
To ask which practices best explain the effectiveness of No Excuses charters, we next add to
equation (2.12) the five variables most correlated with No Excuses status as measured by their
t-statistics: emphasis on discipline, school uniforms, cold-calling, strict adherence to school-wide
standards, and the use of TFA alumni. Columns (3) and (7) of Table 8 show that the variables
measuring discipline and school uniforms are most predictive of charter impacts. Schools that
emphasize discipline and comportment raise achievement in math and ELA by 0.29r and 0.11cr
more than schools that do not. The use of uniforms is associated with increased effectiveness of 0.07a
and 0.05cr, and these coefficients are statistically significant at the 10-percent level or lower. With
the inclusion of these survey variables, the No Excuses coefficient becomes small and statistically
insignificant in both subjects. We hesitate to ascribe meaning to this coefficient, as it is difficult
to interpret after controlling for key elements of the No Excuses model. Moreover, the coefficients
associated with individual practices should not be interpreted as causal; No Excuses practices are
typically implemented as a package rather than in isolation, and the five practices included in
Table 8 are likely correlated with other unmeasured features of No Excuses. For example, it seems
unlikely that the use of uniforms alone raises test scores. Instead, we view the results in Table
8 as suggestive evidence that schools embracing key elements of No Excuses, in particular strict
discipline, uniforms, and cold-calling, are especially effective.
Finally, we ask whether more traditional school inputs - including instruction time, which is
correlated with No Excuses status (see Panel B of Table 9) - play any role in the No Excuses
advantage. Columns (4) and (8) in Table 8 show the results of adding instruction time (minutes
per day and in the relevant subject) and per-pupil expenditures to equation (2.12) in lieu of the
five survey measures. These variables are often thought to be part of the education production
function. 26 As it turns out, however, these traditional inputs are unrelated to variation in charter
2 5 Dobbie and Fryer's expectations variable combines questions measuring "very high expectations for student
behavior and discipline" and "a relentless focus on academic goals and having students meet them."
2 6 Motivated in part by the long days at successful charter schools, the Massachusetts legislature recently authorized
a pilot program to extend the school day by two hours in some traditional public schools (Pennington 2007). Per-
pupil expenditure is of longstanding interest to researchers and policy-makers; increasing per-pupil expenditure is
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school treatment effects and accounting for these measures of practice does little to account for the
No Excuses advantage.
Our results suggest that No Excuses practices are a key driver of charter school effectiveness, and
that discipline may be an especially important component of No Excuses. We might therefore expect
to see a marked impact on disciplinary outcomes in urban charter schools. We used a 2SLS analysis
paralleling our achievement analysis to investigate the effects of charter attendance on suspensions,
truancy, and total days attended. This analysis revealed large effects of urban charters on discipline
and attendance. Specifically, urban charter attendance is estimated to increase suspensions by 0.7
days in middle school and more than a full day in high school, effects that exceed mean suspension
rates in the lottery sample (the full set of discipline results is reported in Appendix Table A6).
Estimates for both middle and high school show significant increases in out-of-school suspensions,
and smaller (but still substantial) increases in in-school suspensions. In contrast, estimates for
non-urban charter schools show little effect on discipline.27 These results sharpen the distinction
between urban and non-urban charters. Attendance at urban No Excuses charter schools produces
large effects on discipline as well as achievement; attendance at other charter schools has little effect
in either domain.
2.6 Conclusion
Massachusetts' urban charter schools generate impressive achievement gains, while non-urban
charters are largely ineffective and appear to reduce achievement for some. Candidate explanations
for this constellation of findings include the fact that urban charter schools serve larger shares of
minority students in districts where the surrounding achievement level is generally low, keep their
students in school longer, spend more money per-pupil, and are much more likely to identify with
the No Excuses instructional approach than are non-urban schools. Our analysis examines the
contribution of these student- and school-level factors to the urban charter advantage.
Massachusetts' urban charter schools, including the over-subscribed schools at the heart of
our lottery analysis, serve a typical urban population characterized by low test scores and high
poverty rates. On average, urban charters push their students well beyond the achievement levels
characteristic of urban public school districts, while non-urban charter schools leave their students'
sometimes seen as an alternative to structural reforms (Hanushek 1997).27Both urban and non-urban charters appear to increase total days attended, though estimates here are smaller
for non-urban charters.
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achievement unchanged or diminished from a higher starting point. Urban charter schools are
most effective for minorities, poor students, and low baseline achievers, so part of the urban charter
advantage can be explained by student demographics. On the other hand, non-urban charter schools
fail to show clear gains for any group; the urban advantage would likely remain were non-urban
students more like those found in cities. Our analysis also reveals important heterogeneity within
the set of urban schools. Over-subscribed schools with well-documented admissions processes are
more effective than other urban charters.
Our analysis of the relationship between school characteristics and treatment effects suggests
that adherence to the No Excuses paradigm can account for both the urban and lottery-sample
charter advantages. To get inside the black box of No Excuses, we present results from a survey of
school practices. No Excuses schools are more likely to use strict discipline and require uniforms, to
cold-call in the classroom, and to hire alumni of the Teach for America program. Consistent with
a No Excuses explanation of the urban charter advantage, the large achievement gains generated
by urban charter schools are mirrored by substantial effects on disciplinary outcomes in the urban
sample. It's also worth noting that these findings align closely with those reported by Dobbie and
Fryer (2011b), who show that an index capturing high expectations, teacher feedback, high-dosage
tutoring, increased instructional time, and data-driven instruction explains effectiveness in a sample
of New York charters. These practices are highly correlated with No Excuses status in our sample.
Our negative estimates for non-urban charter middle schools raise the question of why, despite
their unimpressive achievement effects, many of these schools are over-subscribed. One possibility
is that parents misjudge the consequences of non-urban charter attendance. In a study of school
choice, Rothstein (2006) argues that parental choice is driven primarily by levels of peer achievement
rather than school effectiveness. Of course, non-urban charter schools may generate gains on
dimensions that non-urban families value more than the skills measured by the MCAS, especially
in view of the fact that most non-urban students do reasonably well in any case. Still, it seems
unlikely that most non-urban parents would welcome a deterioration in basic skills. In ongoing
work, we're studying other outcomes in an effort to determine whether the heterogeneous findings
for achievement reported here have longer-term consequences. Preliminary results show positive
effects of urban charter high schools on SAT scores, suggesting that the effects of urban charter
attendance may persist in an important way.
Finally, it's worth noting that the charter school effect heterogeneity documented here is relevant
to the ongoing debate over charter expansion in Massachusetts and elsewhere. Many states cap
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the number of charter schools, and the U.S. Department of Education is pressing states to lift
these caps. The 2010 law relaxing Massachusetts' cap gives priority to "proven providers" who
have previously operated schools deemed to be successful (Candal 2010). Our methods show how a
distinction between effective and ineffective charters can be grounded in rigorous empirical analysis,
while our results suggest that charter expansion policies favoring operators and pedagogical models
with documented effectiveness increases the likelihood that charters will reduce achievement gaps.
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Table 1: School Participation
Middle (entry in 4-7)
and high (entry in 9) Charters eligible for Charters included
school charters* lottery study in lottery study
School level Urban status Boston status (1) (2) (3)
Middle Urban 22 17 9
Boston 12 9 7
Non-Boston 10 8 2
Nonurban 12 11 8
Total (Urban and Nonurban) 34 28 17
High Urban 12 6 4
Boston 8 5 4
Non-Boston 4 1 0
Nonurban 4 2 2
Total (Urban and Nonurban) 16 8 6
Notes: This table reports the number of middle and high charter schools in Massachusetts and their participation in the observational and
lottery studies. The numbered notes below describe the schools included in each column. "Urban" towns are defined by the Massachusetts
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education as the towns where the district superintendents participate in the Massachusetts Urban
Superintendents Network. These towns include: Boston, Brockton, Cambridge, Chelsea, Chicopee, Everett, Fall River, Fitchburg,
Framingham, Haverhill, Holyoke, Lawrence, Leominster, Lowell, Lynn, Malden, New Bedford, Pittsfield, Quincy, Revere, Somerville,
Springfield, Taunton, and Worcester.
1. Middle and high charter schools in Massachusetts with the designated entry grades (in 4-7 and 9)*, including schools opened in 2010 and
2. Middle and high charter schools in Massachusetts with the designated entry grades (in 4-7 and 9)*, excluding closed schools, alternative
3. Middle and high charter schools that are included in column (3), excluding schools that are undersubscribed or have insufficient lottery
* There is an exception to the 9th grade entry criteria for high school. Two schools with lotteries at the middle school entry point which also
enroll students in the high school grades are included in the high school sample.
Table 2: Characteristics of Charter and Public Schools
All charters Urban charters Non-urban charters Traditional public schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Charter School Characteristics
Years open 10.1 8.6 12.4 -
Days per year 186 189 183 -
Average minutes per day 463 471 440 -
Have Saturday school 0.14 0.19 0.00 -
Avg. math instruction (min) 91 97 70 -
Avg. reading instruction (min) 84 91 52 -
No Excuses 0.41 0.67 0.00 -
Panel B. Conparison with Traditional Public Schools
Proportion of teachers 32 and younger 0.56 0.70 0.33 0.20
Proportion of teachers 49 and older 0.17 0.08 0.31 0.42
Proportion of teachers licensed to teach assign 0.64 0.62 0.67 0.98
Proportion of core classes taught by highly qu; 0.94 0.92 0.98 0.98
Student/teacher ratio 12.0 12.6 11.1 15.2
Avg. per-pupil expenditure $12,618 $13,668 $11,091 $13,047
Title I eligible 0.86 1.00 0.64 0.50
N (schools) 27 18 9 1810
Notes: This table reports characteristics of Massachusetts charter and traditional schools. Charter school characteristics are obtained froma survey of school
administrators. Panel B compares charter schools to traditional public schools using data obtained from http:\\www.doe.mass.edu. Column (1) reports results
from the statewide sample of charter schools with entry in middle (4th-7th) or high school (9th) grades. The charter sample also excludes schools closed prior to
Spring 2011, schools that opened after Spring 2010, and schools serving non-traditional student populations. Columns (2) and (3) show results for the uban
and non-urban charter subsamples. Column (4) reports teacher characteristics for all traditional public schools in Massachusetts. Highly qualified teachers are
teachers that possess a Massachusetts teaching license and demonstrate subject matter competency, either by passing a subject test or meeting one of several
other criteria.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Students
Regular Public Schools Charter schools (eligible) Charter applicants (lottery)
Urban Non-urban Urban Non-urban Urban Non-urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Middle Schools (5th-8th grade)
Female
Black
Hispanic
Special education
Subsidized lunch
Limited English proficiency
Baseline math score
Baseline ELA score
Years in charter
0.486
0.183
0.319
0.191
0.687
0.160
-0.427
-0.466
0.00
0.488
0.027
0.038
0.165
0.146
0.017
0.210
0.232
0.00
N (students) 171703 415794
N (schools) 262 400
Panel B. High
Female 0.499 0.494
Black 0.189 0.028
Hispanic 0.275 0.034
Special education 0.172 0.156
Subsidized lunch 0.612 0.126
Limited English proficiency 0.094 0.009
Baseline math score
Baseline ELA score
Years in charter
-0.420
-0.392
0.00
N (students) 132774
N (schools) 104
0.268
0.278
0.00
357733
316
0.501
0.381
0.246
0.167
0.642
0.082
-0.322
-0.312
2.09
8388
17
Schools (1
0.557
0.527
0.183
0.166
0.608
0.024
-0.371
-0.318
1.77
2676
6
0.478
0.035
0.039
0.158
0.211
0.022
0.259
0.275
1.97
9070
11
0th grade)
0.545
0.021
0.010
0.109
0.146
0.004
0.321
0.412
1.81
909
2
0.496
0.479
0.233
0.176
0.686
0.085
-0.356
-0.375
1.59
4155
9
0.548
0.614
0.257
0.178
0.717
0.035
-0.320
-0.315
0.64
3029
4
0.509
0.022
0.025
0.185
0.103
0.008
0.305
0.391
1.25
1701
8
0.538
0.028
0.017
0.114
0.123
0.003
0.440
0.552
1.30
351
2
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of public school students (columns 1 and 2), the sample of students in
eligible charter schools (columns 3 and 4), and the sample of charter applicants (columns 5 and 6) from 2002-2011. The sample is
restricted to students in Massachusetts public schools at baseline with at least one followup test score. The number of schools in
columns (1) and (2) is counted in 6th grade for middle school and 10th grade for high school. Years in charter school is measured as
time spent in eligible charter schools through 8th grade for middle school and 10th grade for high school.
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Table 4: Lottery Results
All charter schools Urban charter schools Non-urban charter schools
First Stage 2SLS First Stage 2SLS First Stage 2SLS
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Middle School
Math 1.02*** 0.213*** 1.03*** 0.321*** 1.01*** -0.123***
(0.040) (0.028) (0.051) (0.031) (0.074) (0.047)
N 16543 11941 4602
ELA 1.02*** 0.075*** 1.04*** 0.146*** 1.00*** -0.144***
(0.040) (0.025) (0.051) (0.028) (0.074) (0.039)
N 16285 11649 4636
Panel B. High School
Math 0.565*** 0.273*** 0.508*** 0.339*** 1.13*** -0.020
(0.085) (0.071) (0.090) (0.077) (0.197) (0.071)
N 4050 . 3519 . 531
ELA 0.565*** 0.206*** 0.508*** 0.264*** 1.14*** -0.046
(0.086) (0.060) (0.090) (0.067) (0.196) (0.059)
N 4103 . 3567 . 536
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of time spent in charter schools on test scores. The endogenous variable is years
spent in charter schools, and the instrument is a lottery offer dummy. Columns (1)-(2) show estimates for all schools, columns (3)-(4)
show estimates for urban charter schools, and columns (5)-(6) show estimates for non-urban schools. The urban and non-urban
estimates for a given subject come from a single regression with two endogenous variables, using urban and non-urban offers as
instruments. All models control for race, sex, special education, limited English proficiency, subsidized lunch status, and a female by
minority dummy. Year of birth, year of test, and risk set dummies are also included. Middle school regressions pool post-lottery
outcomes from 4th through 8th grade and cluster by student identifier as well as school-grade-year. High school regressions include
only scores for 10th grade and cluster by school-grade-year.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Table 5: Lottery Results for Subgroups
Sex Race Subsidized Lowest baseline
Female Male Black/Hispanic White lunch quartile
School level Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Urban Schools
Middle Math 0.379*** 0.276*** 0.421*** 0.133** 0.348*** 0.388***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.054) (0.036) (0.055)
N 5994 5947 8415 2583 8182 2869
ELA 0.124*** 0.173*** 0.211*** 0.034 0.182*** 0.279***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.047) (0.033) (0.057)
N 5852 5797 8176 2537 7992 2840
High Math 0.368*** 0.319*** 0.378*** 0.168 0.348*** 0.444***
(0.087) (0.105) (0.074) (0.235) (0.080) (0.104)
N 1928 1591 3018 310 2521 811
ELA 0.236*** 0.279*** 0.325*** -0.063 0.275*** 0.251**
(0.077) (0.095) (0.067) (0.221) (0.071) (0.123)
N 1955 1612 3061 311 2557 768
Panel B. Non-urban Schools
Middle Math -0.159*** -0.084 -0.230 -0.115** -0.128 -0.159**
(0.060) (0.070) (0.285) (0.045) (0.127) (0.071)
N 2332 2270 236 4135 456 1072
ELA -0.169*** -0.114* -0.241 -0.150*** -0.119 -0.188**
(0.049) (0.060) (0.251) (0.040) (0.099) (0.076)
N 2348 2288 237 4169 466 1134
High Math 0.005 0.052 - 0.039 0.427 -0.097
[0.959] [0.670] [0.6271 [0.389] [0.438]
N 281 250 494 68 119
ELA 0.034 -0.062 - -0.028 -0.392 0.054
[0.717] [0.382] [0.559] [0.368] [0.709]
N 281 255 496 71 123
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of time spent in charter schools for subgroups of students. All regressions include year
dummies, grade dummies, risk set dummies, and demographic controls. Middle school standard errors are clustered on student identifier as well as
school-grade-year. High school standard errors are clustered by school-grade-year for urban schools. For non-urban high schools, numbers in brackets
show p-values from 1,000 replications of a wild bootstrap percentile-t procedure clustered on school-grade-year.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Table 6: Potential Outcome Gaps in Urban and Non-urban Areas
Urban Non-urban
Treatment effect E.[YoID=O] )" Treatment effect EJ[YOID=0] k" k"
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Middle School
Math 0.483*** -0.399*** 0.077 0.560*** -0.177** 0.236*** 0.010 -0.143***
(0.074) (0.011) (0.049) (0.054) (0.074) (0.007) (0.061) (0.042)
N 160394 2239 370813
ELA 0.188*** -0.422*** 0.118** 0.306*** -0.148*** 0.260*** 0.102** -0.086***
(0.064) (0.012) (0.054) (0.049) (0.048) (0.007) (0.050) (0.030)
N 4551 117601 2323 316953
Panel B. High School
Math 0.557*** -0.371*** 0.074 0.602*** 0.065 0.241*** 0.207 0.271***
(0.164) (0.021) (0.099) (0.151) (0.146) (0.008) (0.145) (0.041)
N 3743 141468 432 360278
ELA 0.417*** -0.369*** -0.004 0.410*** 0.064 0.250*** 0.237 0.301***
(0.140) (0.018) (0.096) (0.119) (0.151) (0.008) (0.152) (0.051)
N 4858 143583 435 362206
Notes: This table compares potential outcomes for compliers and traditional public school students. For lottery applicants, outcomes are test scores in the year after the lottery
for middle school and in 10th grade for high school. For non-applicants, outcomes are 6th grade scores in middle school, and 10th grade scores in high school. The treatment is
a dummy for charter attendance. Columns (1) and (5) show 2SLS estimates of the effect of charter attendance on test scores in urban and non-urban areas, with the lottery offer
dummy interacted with risk sets as instruments and risk sets as maintained controls. Columns (2) and (6) shows average test scores for non-charter students, including non-
applicants. Columns (3) and (7) show differences between the average non-charter scores of compliers and non-charter students. Columns (4) and (8) show differences between
the treated outcomes of compliers and the scores of non-charter students.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Table 7: Decomposing Differences in Impact for Middle School
Decomposition 1 (urban loading) Decomposition 2 (non-urban loading)
Urban vs. non-urban Due to diffs in Due to diffs in cov- Due to diffs in Due to diffs in cov-
difference in TE cov. levels specific TE cov. levels specific TE
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Math 0.633*** 0.322*** 0.312*** 0.250 0.383*
(0.079) (0.075) (0.094) (0.163) (0.200)
N 5731
ELA 0.389*** 0.184** 0.205** 0.197 0.192
(0.073) (0.077) (0.095) (0.146) (0.180)
N 5734
Notes: This table decomposes the difference between urban and non-urban charter treatment effects. Outcomes are test scores the year
after the lottery. The treatment is a dummy for charter attendance. Column (1) shows the difference in urban vs. non-urban treatment
effects, computed as described in the text. Columns (2) and (3) report the components of the urban/non-urban difference due to
differences in covariate levels and differences in covariate-specific effects, weighting the difference in covariate means by the urban
treatment effects. Columns (4) and (5) report a decomposition that weights the difference in means by the non-urban treatment effects.
The covariates used in the decompositions are race (white vs. non-white), sex, special education, free/reduced price lunch, and baseline
score categories (advanced, proficient, needs improvement, warning) in math and ELA.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Table 8: Observational Models for
Math
Charter School Effects
ELA
Urban
Lottery
No Excuses
Discipline and comportment
Uniforms
Cold-calling
Strict adherence to school-wide standards
TFA alumni
Minutes per day/60
Minutes in subject/60
PPE/1000
N
(1)
0.212***
(0.049)
0.152**
(0.070)
33
(2)
0.078
(0.063)
0.041
(0.055)
0.211***
(0.076)
33 33
Notes: This table shows estimates from regressions of school-specific treatment effects on school characteristics. Regressions weight by the inverse of the estimated
variance. All models include a high school dummy and a dummy for middle schools with high school grades. Schools are included in the sample if they answered at
least one survey question and have available data for at least one traditional input (minutes per day, minutes in subject, or PPE). Some schools have missing data for
one or more survey questions or traditional inputs; these missing values are coded as zeros, and dummies indicating missing values are included in each regression.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
00
(3)
-0.057
(0.039)
-0.041
(0.032)
-0.019
(0.051)
0.293***
(0.062)
0.071**
(0.034)
0.130***
(0.049)
0.037
(0.027)
0.018
(0.047)
(4)
-0.008
(0.058)
0.116**
(0.053)
0.207***
(0.060)
0.027
(0.045)
0.131
(0.097)
-0.009
(0.006)
33
(5)
0.123***
(0.032)
0.105**
(0.043)
33
(6)
0.034
(0.026)
0.060*
(0.033)
0.150***
(0.037)
33
(7)
-0.025
(0.033)
0.024
(0.045)
0.038
(0.038)
0.107***
(0.041)
0.054*
(0.028)
0.080
(0.050)
-0.014
(0.033)
0.021
(0.055)
33
(8)
0.028
(0.033)
0.069
(0.046)
0.171***
(0.051)
-0.003
(0.022)
0.008
(0.051)
-0.009
(0.009)
33
Table 9: Correlates of No Excuses Identification and Charter School Effectiveness
No Excuses Math effect ELA effect
Mean Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. School Philosophy
No Excuses
Discipline and comportment
Strict adherence to school-wide standards
College preparation
Traditional reading and math skills
Measureable results (achievement gains)
Common core values
Individually-tailored instruction
STEM
Speech and writing development
Qualitative achievement
Leadership
Cultural awareness
Social and physical well-being
Uniforms
Cold calling
Math drills
Extended math instruction
Reward system
Informal tests to gauge understanding
College icons in the classroom
Emphasis on MCAS
Tutoring for all students
Days in school year>median
Minutes in school day>median
Student contract
DEAR or SSR
Parent contract
Extended reading instruction
Response to Intervention for math
Reading aloud
Response to Intervention for reading
Teacher autonomy
Group projects
TFA alumni
Lessons videotaped
MATCH teacher residency
At-will hiring
TFA novices
Observations on new teachers per month
Observations on veteran teachers per month
Recent college graduates
N
0.364
0.391
0.565
0.783
0.565
0.522
0.500
0.261
0.682
0.478
0.348
0.087
0.304
0.565
0.708
0.273
0.391
0.273
0.682
0.696
0.522
0.591
0.348
0.435
0.348
0.696
0.391
0.696
0.190
0.182
0.217
0.227
0.524
0.435
0.261
0.565
0.143
0.304
0.174
1.717
1.293
0.136
0.660
0.569
0.545
0.386
0.159
0.114
0.016
-0.166
-0.200
-0.279
-0.429
-0.473
-0.474
0.644
0.654
0.549
0.537
0.510
0.473
0.439
0.432
0.385
0.346
0.346
0.348
0.294
0.268
0.299
0.244
0.204
0.097
-0.194
-0.490
0.691
0.490
0.545
0.349
0.352
0.122
0.077
-0.323
4.126
3.218
2.219
1.929
0.718
0.513
0.067
-0.710
-0.961
-1.248
-1.150
-2.310
-2.480
3.643
3.590
3.014
2.639
2.492
2.310
2.309
2.120
1.858
1.703
1.581
1.577
1.417
1.203
1.120
0.860
0.799
0.370
-0.887
-2.663
3.062
2.663
1.877
1.606
1.309
1.022
0.586
-1.017
27
0.247
0.297
0.236
0.272
0.182
0.192
-0.047
0.005
0.028
-0.018
-0.019
-0.077
-0.123
-0.127
4.810
5.944
3.672
3.180
2.516
2.600
-0.531
0.059
0.341
-0.222
-0.214
-0.527
-1.463
-1.611
Panel B. School Practices
0.225 3.227
0.218 2.701
0.252 4.048
0.257 3.377
0.164 1.968
0.189 2.446
0.225 3.494
0.244 3.634
0.201 2.762
0.094 1.170
0.192 2.469
0.132 1.554
-0.003 -0.033
0.107 1.255
0.280 3.033
0.213 2.132
0.014 0.142
0.199 2.210
-0.149 -1.868
-0.211 -3.146
Panel C. Teacher Profile
0.202 2.145
0.201 2.940
0.244 2.383
0.056 0.647
0.068 0.643
0.053 1.169
0.041 0.815
-0.127 -1.036
27
0.145
0.175
0.096
0.129
0.039
0.075
-0.103
-0.017
0.047
-0.010
-0.034
-0.173
-0.137
-0.103
0.091
0.121
0.106
0.121
0.048
0.037
0.070
0.144
0.096
0.055
0.040
0.014
-0.034
0.047
0.139
0.142
-0.005
0.115
-0.093
-0.121
0.118
0.113
0.138
0.040
0.020
0.029
0.002
-0.131
3.692
4.097
1.790
1.927
0.679
1.304
-1.812
-0.261
0.799
-0.175
-0.554
-1.826
-2.560
-1.935
1.623
2.023
1.973
2.009
0.831
0.612
1.282
2.802
1.719
0.972
0.658
0.219
-0.590
0.776
1.952
2.012
-0.065
1.757
-1.675
-2.400
1.736
2.201
1.821
0.654
0.262
0.908
0.066
-1.607
27
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Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions of a No Excuses dummy (columns 2-3) or school-specific observational estimates of
treatment effects (columns 4-7) on a high school dummy and each school characteristic. Within each panel, characteristics are sorted by the
strength of their relationship with No Excuses identification. Some characteristics were measured on a one-to-five or one-to-four scale in the
survey; we converted these characteristics to dummies for answering the maximum. The survey questions are detailed in the Survey Appendix.
2.8 Appendix A: Data
The data used for this study come from charter school lottery records, student demographic
and school attendance information in the Massachusetts Student Information Management Sys-
tem (SIMS), and test scores from the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS)
database. This appendix describes each data source and details the procedures used to clean and
match them. The steps used here are an updated version of the methods described in the data
appendix to Angrist et al. (2010).
Data Sets
Charter School Entrance Lotteries
Data description and sample restrictions
Our sample of applicants is obtained from records of lotteries held at 20 Massachusetts charter
schools between 2002 and 2010. The participating schools and lottery years are listed in Table
Al, along with schools eligible for the lottery study that did not contribute records. A total of
100 school-specific entry cohorts are included in the analysis. Lotteries at three schools contribute
observations to both the middle and high school samples.
The raw lottery records typically include applicants' names, dates of birth, contact informa-
tion, and other information used to define lottery groups, such as sibling and out-of-area status.
The first five rows in each panel of Table A7 show the sample restrictions we impose on the raw
lottery records, separately by lottery cohort and school level. We exclude duplicate applicants and
applicants listed as applying to the wrong entry grade. We also drop late applicants, out-of-area
applicants, and sibling applicants, as these groups are typically not included in the standard lot-
tery process. Imposing these restrictions reduces the number of middle school lottery records from
13,038 to 11,220 and reduces the number of high school records from 9,506 to 9,009.
Lottery offers
In addition to the data described above, the lottery records also include information regarding
offered seats. We used this information to reconstruct indicator variables for whether lottery
participants received randomized offers. For most schools and years, we code the offer variable as one
for applicants who received offered seats at any time after the lottery, including offers to waitlisted
students. This definition corresponds to the "ever offer" instrument used by Abdulkadiroglu et al.
(2011). For a few schools, information on waitlist offers was unavailable, but records were sufficient
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to determine the students who received offers on the day of the lottery. The offer variables for these
schools are coded as one for the initially offered students and zero otherwise. The instrument Zi
used in our analyses is one for any student who received an offer from any school included in our
lottery sample. Offer rates were 67 percent and 64 percent in our middle and high school samples,
respectively.
Student Information Management System Data
Data description
Our study uses SIMS data from the 2001-2002 school year through the 2010-2011 school year.
Each year of data includes an October file and an end-of-year file. The SIMS records information on
demographics and schools attended for all students in Massachusetts' public schools. An observation
in the SIMS refers to a student in a school in a year, though there are some student-school-year
duplicates for students that switch grades or programs within a school and year.
Coding of demographics and attendance
The SIMS variables used in our analysis include grade, year, name, town of residence, date
of birth, sex, race, special education and limited English proficiency status, free or reduced price
lunch, and school attended. We constructed a wide-format data set that captures demographic and
attendance information for every student in each year in which he or she is present in Massachusetts'
public schools. This file uses information from the longest-attended school in the first calendar
year spent in each grade. Attendance ties were broken at random; this affects only 0.007 percent
of records. Students classified as SPED, LEP, or free/reduced price lunch in any record within a
school-year-grade retain that designation for the entire school-year-grade.
We measure charter school attendance in calendar years. A student is coded as attending a
charter school in a particular year when there is any SIMS record reporting charter attendance in
that year. Students who attend more than one charter school within a year are assigned to the
charter they attended longest.
Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System Data
Data description and sample restrictions
We use MCAS data from the 2001-2002 school year through the 2010-2011 school year. Each
observation in the MCAS database corresponds to a student's test results in a particular grade and
year. We use math and English Language Arts (ELA) tests in grades 3 through 8 and 10, as well
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as Writing Topic and Writing Composition scores in grades 4, 7, and 10. The test score variables
are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one within a subject-grade-year in
Massachusetts. Repetitions of the same test subject and grade are dropped. In cases with multiple
records within a year and grade, ties are broken at random; this affected 0.10 percent of MCAS
records.
In the lottery-based middle school analysis, all post-lottery test scores through 8th grade are
used as outcomes. High school outcomes are from 10th grade. The most recent pre-lottery score in
a subject defines a student's baseline score. For the observational analysis, outcome grades are 5th
through 8th for middle school 10th for high school; baseline scores are from 4th grade for middle
school and 7th or 8th grade for high school.
Matching Data Sets
Match from the MCAS to the SIMS
The processed SIMS and MCAS files were merged by grade, year, and a state student identifier
known as the SASID. Scores that could not be matched to the SIMS were dropped. This restricted
eliminated 0.7 percent of MCAS scores statewide.
Match from the Lottery Records to the State Database
Match procedure
Lottery records were matched to the state SIMS/MCAS database by name, application year,
and application grade. In some cases, this procedure did not produce a unique match. We accepted
some matches based on fewer criteria where the information on grade, year, and town of residence
seemed to make sense.
Match success rate
Our matching procedure successfully located most applicants in the SIMS database. Table A8
reports cohort-specific match rates from the lottery records to the combined SIMS/MCAS file,
separately for middle and high school. The overall match rates for middle and high school were
92.1 percent and 93.7 percent, respectively. Table A8 also reports separate match rates for offered
and non-offered students. In middle school, offered students were slightly more likely to be matched
(94.0 percent compared to 89.4 percent). Offered and non-offered applicants to charter high schools
were matched to the SIMS at almost similar rates (94.0 percent compared to 93.3 percent).
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Construction of the Outcome Data Sets
Lottery Sample
Further sample restrictions
Once matched to the SIMS, each student is associated with a unique SASID; at this point, we
can therefore determine which students applied to multiple schools in our lottery sample. Following
the match, we reshape the lottery data set to contain a single record for each student. If students
applied in more than one year to lotteries at a particular school level (middle or high), we keep only
the records associated with their first year of application. In our basic lottery analyses, we also
exclude students without baseline demographics in the SIMS; in effect, this rule limits the sample
to students in Massachusetts' public schools at baseline. Rows 6-9 in each panel of Table A7 report
the impact of these restrictions on sample sizes for middle and high school. The set of matched
first-time applicants with baseline demographics includes 7,530 middle school students and 5,260
high school students.
Final set of outcomes and students
To generate the middle school analysis file, the matched lottery/SIMS/MCAS file is reshaped
to long format, with each observation referring to a test score outcome for a student in a particular
year. The high school analysis file uses only 10th. grade outcomes, so it includes a single observation
for each student. Table A9 summarizes the analysis files for middle and high school. Columns (1)
and (2) list the application and outcome grades for each cohort, and column (3) lists the number
of applicants satisfying the sample restrictions from Table A7. In middle school, 7,307 of 7,530
students contribute at least one test score to the analysis. In high school, 4,025 of 5,260 students
have at least one score. Middle school applicants contribute different numbers of scores to the
analysis depending on their years and grades of application; math and ELA tests were not given in
every middle school grade until 2006, and some cohorts are not observed through 8th grade. Table
A10 lists the grades and years in which math and ELA subjects were administered. As shown in
columns (5) through (8) of Table A9, we find 16,543 out of 18,798 expected scores for middle school
math, 16,285 of 18,515 for middle school ELA, 4,047 of 5,260 for high school math, and 4,100 of
5,260 for high school ELA. These outcomes are used to produce the 2SLS estimates reported in
Tables 4 and 5.
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Observational Sample
To produce the analysis file used for the observational analysis, we begin with the matched
SIMS/MCAS state database. As described in Section 2.5, we define cells based on baseline school,
baseline year, race, and sex, separately for middle school and high school. We then count the
number of students in each cell who go on to spend time in eligible charter schools and regular
public schools in the relevant range of grades (5th through 8th for middle school and 10th for
high school). Observations in cells that do not include at least one student who attends eligible
charter schools and one student who attends regular public schools are dropped. We then produce
a long format data file containing the full set of test score outcomes for the remaining sample of
matched students at the relevant school level, as well as variables counting years of attendance at
each eligible charter school. This file is used to produce the observational estimates. Our matching
procedure excludes 23 percent of students who attend eligible charter schools in middle or high
school.
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2.9 Appendix B: Survey Questions
This appendix describes the information collected in our survey of school administrators. The
survey responses were used to construct the variables used in tables 2, 8, and A6. The survey
was organized in six sections: general school structure, school philosophy and curriculum, areas of
emphasis, classroom setting and practices, school day and policies, and teacher profile. We next
describe the format and content of each section of the survey.
General School Structure
Survey respondents were asked to answer the following questions about school structure [possible
responses in brackets]:
" How did your charter school originate? Check all that apply. [Founded as charter, Charter
restart of a traditional public school, Another conversion model of an existing public school
or a previously operating charter, Other]
" Who founded your school? Check all that apply [Parents, Teachers, Business leaders, Philan-
thropist, Managment company, Nonprofit organization, Community members, Other]
" Since the initial approval of your charter, has this group changed? If yes, please explain
briefly. [Yes, No]
" Please indicate sources of funding. Check all that apply. [Federal, State, Foundations, Indi-
viduals, Corporations, Other]
School Philosophy and Curriculum
Survey respondents were asked to rate their schools' adherence to a variety of instructional
approaches, with the prompt: "Please indicate the degree to which the educational experience at
your school reflects the following approaches to teaching and learning." For each area, respondents
checked boxes corresponding to numbers from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating "not at all," 3 indicating
"somewhat," and 5 indicating "strongly." An additional box corresponded to "don't know." The
approaches were as follows: Common core values (unique to your school, NOT Common Core
Standards), No Excuses, traditional reading and math skills, college preparation, preparation for
specific careers, STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics), Leadership. In addition,
the prompt for "preparation for specific careers" included a request to "pleast list relevant careers,
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if any." A final prompt asked respondents to list any philosophy or curricular focus not mentioned
on the survey.
Areas of Emphasis
Survey respondents were asked to rate the emphasis placed on a variety of areas, with the
prompt: "Please indicate the extent to which the educational program at your school emphasizes
the following principles." For each area, respondents checked boxes corresponding to numbers from
1 to 5, with 1 indicating "not at all," 3 indicating "somewhat," and 5 indicating "strongly." An
additional box corresponded to "don't know." The areas were as follows: Cultural awareness,
strict adherence to a set of school-wide standards and practices, social and physical well-being,
individually-tailored instruction, discipline and comportment, speech and writing development,
measureable results (for example, gains on state achievement tests), qualitative achievement (for
example, leadership, creativity, and community involvement).
Classroom Setting and Practices
Survey respondents were asked to rate their schools' use of a variety of classroom practices, with
the prompt: "Please indicate the extent to which the following settings and practices are present in
classrooms at your school." For each practice, respondents checked boxes corresponding to numbers
from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating "not at all," 3 indicating "somewhat," and 5 indicating "strongly."
An additional box corresponded to "don't know." The practices were as follows: Group projects,
cold calling, checks for understanding (informal tests to gauge understanding during the lesson),
DEAR or SSR (Drop Everything and Read/Sustained Silent Reading), reading aloud, math drills,
college icons in the classroom (e.g. banner with name of teacher's college, past students' graduation
years and college outcomes), teacher autonomy.
School Day and Policies
Survey respondents were asked to answer the following questions about other school practices
[possible responses in brackets when provided]:
e What time do instructional activities begin each day for the typical student?
o When do instructional activities end each day for the typical student?
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" Do certain students have longer or shorter school days (i.e. extended days for struggling
students)? [Yes, No]. If Yes, please explain.
" How many days are in your school year for a typical student (excluding optional Saturdays)?
" Are students required to wear uniforms or follow a dress code? [Yes, No]
" Do parents sign a commitment contract? [Yes, No]
" Do students sign a commitment contract? [Yes, No]
" Which of the following disciplinary actions are used at your school? Please check all that ap-
ply. [Detention, Positive behavior support, In school suspension, Counseling session, Behavior
improvement plan, Saturday school, Merit/demerit System, Timeout/quiet room, Other]
" Are your students eligible for rewards for achievement or good behavior (e.g. small payments
or redeemable points)? [Yes, No] If yes, please describe briefly.
" Who attends Saturday school? Check all that apply. [All students, Students in certain grades,
Students who need academic help, Students being disciplined, None]
" How often does the typical Saturday school student have school on Saturday? [Monthly or
less, Bi-weekly, Weekly]
" What is the average length of a period of math instruction, and the number of periods per
week?
" What is the average length of a period of reading instruction, and the number of periods per
week?
" Is reading instruction based on an RTI (Response to Intervention) model? [Yes, No]
" Is math instruction based on an RTI (Response to Intervention) model? [Yes, No]
" To what extent is MCAS preparation a part of your curriculum (check all that apply) [Special
classes before exams, Regular weekly classes/study sessions, After-school instruction for all
students, After-school instruction for struggling students, Classes or meetings for parents on
nights/weekends]
" Which students receive tutoring during the school day? Check all that apply. [All students,
Students who struggle with class work, Students who struggle with MCAS, None, Other]
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" Which students receive after school tutoring? Check all that apply. [All students, Students
who struggle with class work, Students who struggle with MCAS, None, Other]
" If your school offers tutoring, which of the following describe the tutors? Check all that
apply. [Recruited from Teach for America or AmeriCorps, Community members, Parents,
Teachers/staff, Local college students]
" (High Schools only) Does your school offer extra preparation for the SAT and AP exams?
[Yes, No, Not applicable]
" Please estimate the hours per week teachers typically spend on (in classroom) instructional
activities.
" Please estimate the hours per week teachers typically spend on instructional activities outside
of the classroom (preparing lesson plans, tracking student performance).
Teacher Profile
Survey respondents were asked to rate the frequency with which their schools hire various
types of teachers. Possible responses were "frequently," "occasionally," and "rarely or never." The
teacher types were as follows: Teach for America novices, Teach for America alumni, MATCH
Teacher Residency, recent college graduates.
Survey respondents were also asked to answer the following questions about their schools' teach-
ers [possible responses in brackets when provided]:
" How are teachers hired? Check all that apply (please respond for full-time, year-round teach-
ers). [On a contract of specific length, At-will]
" Please estimate your hiring acceptance rate (i.e. 50 accepted/200 applicants).
" Has there ever been a teacher's union active at your school? [Yes, No]
" Please indicate the performance incentives available at your school (check all that apply).
[Merit pay, Higher salaries for hard-to-fill subjects, Yearly bonus, Within-school promotion,
Recognition/non-monetary rewards, Other]
" How often do administrators and supervisors observe new teachers in the classroom to review
their performance (periods/month)?
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* How often do administrators and supervisors observe veteran teachers in the classroom to
review their performance (periods/month)?
* Are lessons ever videotaped and filmed as part of the teacher feedback process? [Yes, No]
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2.10 Appendix C: Additional Figures and Tables
Table Al: Massachusetts Charter Schools Eligible for the Lottery Study
Eligible Eligible
School Town Urban Grades middle high Years in lottery study
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Academy of the Pacific Rim Charter School
Advanced Math and Science Academy Charter School
Barnstable Horace Mann Charter School
Berkshire Arts and Technology Charter Public School
Boston Collegiate Charter School
Boston Preparatory Charter Public School
Cape Cod Lighthouse Charter School
Christa McAuliffe Regional Charter Public School
City on a Hill Charter Public School
Codman Academy Charter Public School
Community Charter School of Cambridge
Dorchester Collegiate Academy Charter School
Edward Brooke Charter School
Excel Academy Charter School
Four Rivers Charter Public School
Francis W Parker Charter Essential School
Global Learning Charter Public School
Hampden Charter School of Science
Health Careers Academy Charter School
Innovation Academy Charter School
KIPP Academy Lynn
Marblehead Community Charter Public School
MATCH Charter Public School
New Leadership Charter School
North Central Charter Essential School
Phoenix Charter Academy
Pioneer Charter School of Science
Pioneer Valley Performing Arts Charter Public School
Rising Tide Charter Public School
Roxbury Preparatory Charter School
Salem Academy Charter School
Smith Leadership Academy
Sturgis Charter Public School
Boston Yes 5-12 Yes 2005-2010
Marlborough
Marstons Mills
Adams
Boston
Boston
Orleans
Framingham
Boston
Boston
Cambridge
Boston
Boston
Boston
Greenfield
Devins
New Bedford
Chicopee
Boston
Tyngsboro
Lynn
Marblehead
Boston
Springfield
Fitchburg
Chelsea
Everett
South Hadley
Plymouth
Boston
Salem
Boston
Hyannis
Notes: This table lists all charter schools in Massachusetts eligible for the lottery study.
student population restrictions required for inclusion in column (3) of Table 1.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
6-12
4-5
6-12
5-12
6-11
6-8
6-8
9-12
9-12
7-12
4-5
K-8
5-8
7-12
7-12
5-12
6-10
9-12
5-11
5-8
4-8
6-12
6-12
7-12
9-12
7-11
7-12
5-8
6-8
6-12
6-8
9-12
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes 2002-2010
2005-2010
2007-2010
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
2002, 2004-2009
2004, 2008-2009
2006-2009
2008-2010
Yes 2003-2010
2006-2010
2006-2007, 2009
Yes
2007-2010
2005-2009
2005-2007, 2010
Yes 2002-2010
Yes
2006-2010
2009
2002-2010
2010
Yes 2004, 2006, 2008-2009
To be counted as eligible, a school must be open in the relevant years and meet the entry grade and
Table A2: Covariate Balance
Middle school High school
Non-urban Non-urban
All charters Urban charters charters All charters Urban charters charters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hispanic 0.023** 0.031** 0.007 0.000 -0.001 0.003
(0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011)
Black -0.011 -0.020 0.009 0.010 0.012 -0.016
(0.011) (0.016) (0.008) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016)
White -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001
(0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.032)
Asian 0.003 0.002 0.007 -0.002 -0.003 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.017)
Female 0.010 0.003 0.024 0.010 0.015 -0.038
(0.014) (0.017) (0.025) (0.018) (0.019) (0.062)
Subsidized Lunch 0.007 0.013 -0.007 0.023 0.021 0.043
(0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.040)
Special Education -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 0.006 -0.080*
(0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.047)
Limited English Proficiency 0.001 0.005 -0.007 0.009 0.009 0.000
(0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000)
Baseline math score -0.015 -0.023 0.003 -0.012 -0.023 0.107
(0.026) (0.033) (0.043) (0.034) (0.035) (0.101)
Baseline ELA score -0.006 0.001 -0.020 -0.041 -0.038 -0.077
(0.027) (0.035) (0.039) (0.032) (0.034) (0.081)
p-value, from F-test 0.452 0.694 0.386 0.741 0.824 0.275
N 7060 4852 2208 4671 4104 567
Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions of the variable in each row on an indicator variable equal to one if the student won the lottery. Regressions
include risk set dummies and baseline grade dummies and exclude students with sibling priority and late applicants. Samples are restricted to students who have
baseline demographics and test scores. F-tests are for the null hypothesis that the coefficients on winning the lottery in all regressions are all equal to zero.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table A3: Attrition
All charters Urban charters Non-urban charters
Proportion of non- Proportion of non- Proportion of non-
offered with MCAS Differential offered with MCAS Differential offered with MCAS Differential
School level Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Middle Math 0.907 0.019*** 0.925 0.012 0.866 0.032***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
N 2933 7530 2055 5169 878 2361
ELA 0.903 0.024*** 0.918 0.018** 0.868 0.033***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
N 2933 7530 2055 5169 878 2361
High Math 0.753 0.009 0.750 0.004 0.800 0.059
(0.015) (0.016) (0.046)
N 1829 5261 1704 4631 125 630
ELA 0.766 0.004 0.762 0.000 0.816 0.038
(0.015) (0.016) (0.046)
N 1829 5261 1704 4631 125 630
Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions of an indicator variable equal to one if a student has a follow-up test score on an indicator variable equal to one if the student won
the lottery. Column (1) shows the fraction of non-offered students with follow-up scores, while column (2) shows the differential by offer status. Columns (3) and (4) show corresponding
results for urban applicants, while columns (5) and (6) show results for non-urban applicants. Regressions include risk set dummies as well as demographic variables, year of birth
dummies, year of baseline dummies, and baseline grade dummies. The sample is restricted to students who participated in an effective lottery from cohorts where we should observe
follow-up scores.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table A4: Lottery Results for High School Graduation
All charter schools Urban charter schools Non-urban charter schools
Mean First Stage 2SLS Mean First Stage 2SLS Mean First Stage 2SLS
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Graduate on-time 0.673 0.300*** -0.098 0.663 0.289*** -0.031 0.790 0.933*** 0.053
(0.050) (0.072) (0.051) (0.023) (0.047) (0.094)
N 2863 2649 214
Graduate within two 0.751 0.304*** -0.024 0.747 0.288*** -0.025 0.801 0.970*** -0.006
years (0.060) (0.081) (0.062) (0.087) (0.033) (0.087)
N 2118 1937 181
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of charter school attendance on high school graduation. The endogenous variable is a
dummy for attending a charter school in the year after the lottery, and the instrument is a lottery offer dummy. Columns (1)-(2) show estimates for
all charter high schools, columns (3)-(4) show estimates for urban charter high schools, and columns (5)-(6) show estimates for non-urban high
schools. The "graduate on-time" outcome is a dummy for graduating in or before a student's projected graduation year assuming normal academic
progress from baseline. The "graduate within two years" outcome is a dummy for graduating in or before the year after a student's projected
graduation year. The urban and non-urban estimates for a given subject come from a single regression with two endogenous variables, using urban
and non-urban offers as instruments. All models control for race, sex, special education, limited English proficiency, subsidized lunch status, and a
female by minority dummy. Year of birth and risk set dummies are also included. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Table A5: Comparison of Lottery and Observational Estimates for Eligible Charters
Urban Non-urban
Observational estimates Observational estimates
Non-lottery Non-lottery
Lottery estimate Lottery sample sample Lottery estimate Lottery sample sample
School level Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Middle Math 0.321*** 0.249*** -0.024* -0.123*** -0.015** -0.008
(0.031) (0.013) (0.014) (0.047) (0.007) (0.012)
N 11941 136046 4602 248711
ELA 0.146*** 0.158*** -0.035*** -0.144*** -0.009 -0.013
(0.028) (0.010) (0.012) (0.039) (0.007) (0.011)
N 11649 131136 4636 239288
High Math 0.339*** 0.322*** -0.009 -0.020 0.047*** -
(0.077) (0.034) (0.018) (0.071) (0.017)
N 3519 8018 531 14881
ELA 0.264*** 0.260*** 0.100*** -0.046 0.081*** -
(0.067) (0.018) (0.019) (0.059) (0.017)
N 3567 8208 536 14967
Notes: This table reports estimates of the effects of years in charter schools on test scores. Eligible charters are schools with entry grades 4-7 (middle) or 9 (high), and
that meet the other restrictions from Table 1. The sample is produced by matching charter students to students in traditional public schools on cells defined by sending
school, baseline year, and baseline demographics (race, sex, limited English proficiency, special education status, and free lunch status). All models control for cell fixed
effects, year effects, grade effects, and baseline test scores. Middle school regressions pool outcomes from 5th through 8th grade and cluster by student identifier as well
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Table A6: Effects on Discipline and Attendance
Urban Non-urban
Mean 2SLS Mean 2SLS
School level Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Middle Total days suspended 0.537 0.710*** 0.080 -0.016
N
Days of in-school
suspension
N
Days of out-of-school
suspension
N
Days truant
N
Total days attended
N
Total days suspended
Days of in-school
suspension
Days of out-of-school
suspension
N
N
N
Days truant
N
Total days attended
N
0.073
(0.040)
2641
0.464
0.594
173
High 0.465
(0.080)
5123
0.172***
(0.034)
5123
0.538***
(0.067)
5123
0.128
(0.208)
5123
7.28***
(1.19)
5175
1.27***
(0.194)
3582
0.277***
(0.076)
3582
0.993***
(0.162)
3582
-11.5
(7.58)
3582
15.9***
(4.22)
3647
0.020
0.060
0.235
171
0.126
0.036
0.090
0.305
168
0.086
-0.002
(0.016)
2641
-0.014
(0.032)
2641
-0.111
(0.214)
2641
5.52***
(1.59)
2605
-0.100
(0.080)
533
-0.024
(0.023)
533
-0.075
(0.073)
533
-0.370
(1.36)
533
9.41*
(5.47)
530
0.379
5.69
163
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of charter school attendance on disciplinary outcomes and attendance in
the year after the lottery. Standard errors are clustered by school-grade-year.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Table A7: Sample Restrictions for the Lottery Analysis
Lottery cohort
2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 All lotteries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A. Middle School
Total number of entry grade records 313 394 391 990 1578 2124 2132 2877 2239 13038
Excluding disqualified applicants 313 394 391 990 1577 2106 2115 2873 2225 12984
Excluding late applicants 313 391 390 972 1551 2046 2054 2829 2222 12768
Excluding applicants from outside of area 313 387 388 963 1540 2028 2041 2741 2202 12603
Excluding siblings 295 358 343 890 1378 1787 1801 2395 1973 11220
Excluding records not matched to the SIMS 267 311 305 838 1311 1710 1669 2095 1825 10331
Reshaping to one record per student 267 311 304 741 1115 1505 1424 1757 1568 8992
Excluding repeat applications 267 308 302 728 1093 1470 1360 1705 1497 8730
In Massachusetts public schools at baseline 201 228 223 603 924 1291 1195 1578 1287 7530
Excluding students without a test score 187 208 210 569 883 1219 1129 1475 1080 6960
Panel B. High School
Total number of entry grade records 775 717 1313 1219 1148 1411 1392 1531 - 9506
Excluding disqualified applicants 775 717 1309 1218 1146 1408 1391 1520 - 9484
Excluding late applicants 765 710 1280 1215 1138 1408 1372 1517 - 9405
Excluding applicants from outside of area 765 706 1278 1206 1134 1403 1372 1504 - 9368
Excluding siblings 732 677 1218 1165 1120 1362 1334 1401 - 9009
Excluding students not matched to the SIMS 645 614 1121 1074 1091 1306 1255 1321 - 8427
Reshaping to one record per student 573 614 895 852 834 936 863 937 - 6504
Excluding repeat applications 573 612 891 846 812 919 830 895 - 6378
In Massachusetts public schools at baseline 406 462 732 690 692 821 715 742 - 5260
Excluding students without a test score 328 358 583 519 567 659 574 537 - 4125
Notes: This table summarizes the sample restrictions imposed for the lottery analysis. Disqualified applications are defined as duplicate records and applications to the wrong grade.
Table A8: Match from Lottery Records to SIMS
Number of Fraction with SIMS match
records Total Offered Not offered
Lottery cohort (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Middle School
2002-2003 295 0.908 0.934 0.859
2003-2004 358 0.869 0.882 0.817
2004-2005 343 0.889 0.924 0.849
2005-2006 890 0.942 0.967 0.886
2006-2007 1378 0.951 0.962 0.933
2007-2008 1787 0.957 0.978 0.917
2008-2009 1801 0.927 0.958 0.881
2009-2010 2395 0.875 0.865 0.884
2010-2011 1973 0.925 0.950 0.901
All 11220 0.950 0.940 0.894
Panel B. High School
2002-2003 732 0.898 0.911 0.831
2003-2004 677 0.907 0.879 0.932
2004-2005 1218 0.922 0.934 0.893
2005-2006 1165 0.922 0.937 0.901
2006-2007 1120 0.974 0.977 0.971
2007-2008 1362 0.959 0.965 0.955
2008-2009 1334 0.941 0.939 0.951
2009-2010 1401 0.939 0.956 0.932
All 9009 0.937 0.940 0.933
Notes: This table summarizes the match from the lottery records to the SIMS data.
The sample excludes disqualified applicants, late applicants, out-of-area applicants,
and siblings.
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Table A9: Outcome Data for the Lottery Analysis
Application Outcome Number of Number with a Number of math Number of ELA Number of math Number of ELA
grades grades applicants test score scores expected scores expected scores observed scores observed
Lottery cohort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PanelA. Middle School
2002-2003 5-6 6-8 201 187 402 290 351 253
2003-2004 5-7 6-8 228 208 510 418 433 356
2004-2005 5-7 6-8 223 210 619 547 542 472
2005-2006 4-7 4-8 603 569 2115 2115 1894 1894
2006-2007 4-7 4-8 924 883 3037 3037 2693 2700
2007-2008 4-7 4-8 1291 1219 4287 4280 3724 3701
2008-2009 5-7 5-8 1195 1129 3385 3385 2950 2956
2009-2010 5-7 5-8 1578 1475 3156 3156 2856 2850
2010-2011 4-7 4-8 1287 1427 1287 1287 1100 1103
All 4-7 4-8 7530 7307 18798 18515 16543 16285
Panel B. High School
2002-2003 5,9 10 406 328 406 406 327 328
2003-2004 5,7,9 10 462 258 462 462 352 356
2004-2005 7,9 10 732 583 732 732 569 579
2005-2006 7,9 10 690 519 690 690 507 514
2006-2007 9 10 692 567 692 692 561 562
2007-2008 9 10 821 659 821 821 637 657
2008-2009 9 10 715 574 715 715 564 570
2009-2010 9 10 742 537 742 742 530 534
All 5,7,9 10 5260 4025 5260 5260 4047 4100
Notes: This table summarizes observed test score outcomes for charter school lottery applicants. The sample is restricted to randomized applicants matched to
baseline SIMS demographics. Expected test scores are post-lottery scores in grades 4-8 for middle school and grade 10 for high school that would be taken in Spring
2010 or earlier given normal academic progress after the lottery. Table Al lists the schools participating in each cohort and their entry grades. Table A7 lists the
availability of math and ELA tests by year.
00
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20
20
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2005-2006 t
Table AlO: Availability of MCAS Math and ELA Tests by Year
4th grade 5th grade 6th grade 7th grade
iool year (1) (2) (3) (4)
01-2002 Yes Yes
02-2003 Yes Yes
03-2004 Yes Yes
04-2005 Yes Yes
hrough 2010-2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes
8th grade 10th grade
(5) (6)
Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
ELA 2001-2002 Yes Yes Yes
2002-2003 Yes Yes Yes
2003-2004 Yes Yes Yes
2004-2005 Yes Yes Yes
2005-2006 through 2010-2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the years and grades in which MCAS math and ELA tests were administered between 2002 and 2011.
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Chapter 3
Inputs in Early-childhood Human
Capital Production: Evidence from
Head Start
3.1 Introduction
Studies of small-scale "model" early-childhood education programs show that preschool atten-
dance can boost outcomes in the short- and long-run. In the High/Scope Perry Preschool Project,
58 disadvantaged African-American children were randomly assigned to participate in an intensive
preschool program between 1962 and 1967, while 65 children were assigned to a control group with-
out access to the program. Subsequent analyses showed that participation in the Perry program
increased average IQ at age 5 by a full standard deviation (henceforth, a) and had lasting impacts
on educational attainment, criminal behavior, drug use, employment, and earnings (Anderson 2008,
Berruta-Clement et al. 1984, Heckman et al. 2010a, 2010c, Schweinhart et al. 2005). Heckman
et al. (2010b) estimate the annual social rate of return to the Perry Project at between 7 and
10 percent. The Abecedarian Project, another small-scale intervention, also improved cognitive
skills during childhood, educational outcomes during adolescence, and economic outcomes during
adulthood (Anderson 2008, Campbell and Ramey 1994, 1995). The impressive cognitive effects
of these programs faded by adolescence on some measures, suggesting that non-cognitive "soft"
skills are a possible channel for long-run gains (Heckman et al. 2010a)1 . The striking success of
'Anderson (2008) reports that the Perry program had insignificant effects on IQ at age 10, though Heckman et
al. (2010a) show that it had large effects on achievement test scores at age 14.
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model early-childhood programs has led some analysts to argue that the returns to educational
intervention are at their highest early in life (Heckman 2011).
In contrast, evidence on the effects of large-scale early childhood programs is more mixed.
Studies of some larger-scale programs, including the Chicago Child-Parent Centers and a few state
pre-kindergarten programs, show promising effects (Reynolds 1998, Gormley and Gayer 2005, Wong
et al. 2008). Results for Head Start, the largest early-childhood program in the United States, are
less impressive. Estimates based on comparisons of siblings with differing exposure to Head Start
suggest that Head Start attendance increased cognitive skills by 7 percentile points at age 5 for
cohorts attending in the late 1980s (Currie and Thomas 1995). These gains subsequently faded
out for black children, but persisted for whites. Garces, Thomas and Currie (2002) and Deming
(2009) use similar methods to show that Head Start attendance increased educational attainment
and other outcomes in young adulthood. Deming notes that the long-run effects of the program
are larger for minorities and more disadvantaged children, despite faster fadeout of cognitive effects
for these groups. This phenomenon suggests that non-cognitive skills may be an important channel
for longer-run effects in Head Start. 2
More recently, results from the Head Start Impact Study (HSIS), the first randomized evalu-
ation of Head Start, show smaller, less persistent gains. The HSIS experiment involved random
assignment of more than 4,000 children to Head Start or a control group at a large number of
sites throughout the US. The HSIS treatment group outscored the control group by roughly 0.1-
on measures of cognitive skill during preschool, but these gains did not persist into kindergarten.
Moreover, the HSIS experiment showed no evidence of effects for a wide range of non-cognitive
outcomes (US Department of Health and Human Services 2010; Biter et al., 2012). The HSIS
results suggest that the short-run benefits of Head Start attendance are small for recent cohorts.
Children in the HSIS sample are not yet old enough to study longer-run outcomes.
This chapter uses data from the HSIS to study cross-center heterogeneity in the short-run
effects of Head Start, with an eye towards reconciling estimates for small-scale model programs
with the less dramatic effects of Head Start. Specifically, I first use site-specific impact estimates
to quantify variation in treatment effects across Head Start centers. I then use information on the
inputs, practices, and demographics of Head Start centers to ask whether centers that are more
similar to model programs produce larger effects on cognitive and non-cognitive skills. I emphasize
2 Ludwig and Miller (2007) use a discontinuity in the rules for Head Start grant-writing assistance to show that
Head Start participation reduced mortality in the early years of the program.
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inputs that have been cited as integral to the success of the Perry Preschool Project, including
teacher education and certification, teacher/student ratios, instructional time, and home visiting
(Schweinhart et al. 2005, Schweinhart 2007). Of particular interest is the High/Scope curriculum,
which was designed to be the centerpiece of the Perry experiment and is used by roughly one-third
of centers in the HSIS sample.
My results show that while there is quantitatively important variation in effectiveness across
Head Start centers, centers that use more of the key Perry inputs do not produce larger gains
in the short-run. Centers using the High/Scope curriculum have similar cognitive effects to other
centers during preschool. High/Scope centers do seem to produce slightly larger non-cognitive gains
during preschool, but there is no evidence that they produce cognitive or non-cognitive effects that
persist into elementary school. Similarly, teacher education, certification, teacher/student ratios,
instructional time, and home visiting are not associated with larger gains in Head Start. Samples
of students and programs selected to more closely match the features of the Perry experiment do
not yield evidence of larger gains. These results suggest that replicating the success of small-scale
model early childhood programs is not straightforward, as the effectiveness of such programs may
be due to idiosyncratic, unmeasured inputs.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the HSIS data.
Section 3.3 summarizes the average impact of Head Start attendance on cognitive and non-cognitive
outcomes through 1st grade. Section 3.4 describes differences in practices across Head Start centers,
documents heterogeneity in treatment effects, and analyzes the relationship between Head Start
effectiveness and center-level characteristics. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Head Start and the Head Start Impact Study
Head Start is the largest early-childhood program in the United States, enrolling roughly one
million 3- and 4-year-old children at a cost of more than $8 billion annually. Head Start awards
grants to public, private non-profit, and for-profit organizations that provide childcare services
to children below 130 percent of the Federal Poverty Line, though up to 35 percent of children
attending a Head Start childcare center can be from households above this income threshold.
Grantees are required to match at least 20% of federal Head Start funding. Head Start is based
on a "whole child" model of school readiness that emphasizes non-cognitive social and emotional
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development in addition to cognitive skills. The grant-based nature of the program allows for a
wide variety of childcare settings and practices, though all grantee agencies must meet a set of
program-wide performance standards (US Department of Health and Human Services 2011, US
Office of Head Start 2012).
The data used in my analysis come from the Head Start Impact Study (HSIS), a randomized
evaluation of the Head Start program. The 1998 Head Start Reauthorization Act included a
congressional mandate to determine the program's effects. As a result, the US Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) conducted a nationally representative randomized controlled
trial (DHHS 2010). The HSIS data includes information on 84 regional Head Start programs, 353
Head Start centers, and 4,442 children, each of whom applied to a sample Head Start center in
the Fall of 2002. Sixty percent of applicants were randomly assigned the opportunity to attend
Head Start ("treatment"), while the remaining applicants were denied this opportunity ("control").
Randomization took place at the Head Start center level. Some centers conducted multiple rounds
of random assignment with differing admission probabilities. The HSIS data includes weights
reflecting the probability of assignment for each child, which are used to adjust for these differences
below. The HSIS sample includes two age groups, with 55 percent of students entering at age 3
and 45 percent entering at age 4. Three-year-old applicants could attend Head Start for up to two
years before entering kindergarten, and three-year-olds assigned to the control group could re-apply
to Head Start centers as four-year-olds the next year. Four-year-old applicants could attend for a
maximum of one year. The data used here follow the treatment and control groups through 1st
grade. DHHS (2010) provides a complete description of the HSIS experimental design and data
collection procedures.
Head Start applicants typically come from families with low socioeconomic status. This can be
seen in the first column of Table 1, which presents mean demographic characteristics for the HSIS
sample. The demographic variables come from a baseline survey of parents conducted in the Fall of
2002; parents of 3,577 HSIS applicants (81 percent) responded to this survey. Seventy-three percent
of Head Start applicants are non-white, half are born to teen mothers, and 55 percent come from
families receiving public assistance. Column (2) shows coefficients from regressions of characteristics
on assignment to Head Start, weighting by the HSIS baseline child weights to adjust for differences
in the probability of admission across centers and assignment rounds. 3 The treatment/control
3 In this and all subsequent analyses, I use the HSIS overall child base weights; estimates using other weighting
schemes were similar.
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differences in means are statistically insignificant for all baseline variables tested, suggesting that
random assignment to Head Start was successful. The last row of Table 2 shows that 53 percent of
applicants attended Head Start; applicants assigned to Head Start were 70 percentage points more
likely to attend than applicants from the control group in the first year after random assignment. 4
3.2.2 Outcomes
In addition to baseline survey information, the HSIS data includes a large number of outcomes,
collected for up to 4 years after random assignment. I organize the outcome data into three groups:
Cognitive outcomes, non-cognitive outcomes reported by parents, and non-cognitive outcomes re-
ported by teachers. Table 2 lists the outcomes included in each group. Cognitive outcomes include
scores on the Peabody Picture and Vocabulary Test (PPVT) and several Woodcock Johnson III
(WJIII) measures of cognitive ability. Parent-reported non-cognitive outcomes include measures
of social skills (making friends, hitting and fighting) and attention-span (concentration, restless-
ness). I exclude parent-reported non-cognitive outcomes in the HSIS data for which more than 90%
of respondents gave the same answer. Teacher-reported non-cognitive outcomes include a variety
of scores on the Adjustment Scales for Pre-school Intervention (ASPI), which measure emotional
and behavioral adjustment in early childhood programs (Bulotsky-Shearer and Fantuzzo 2004),
as well as three measures developed by Pianta (2001) measuring closeness, conflict, and positive
relationships with teachers. I use teacher-reported outcomes in kindergarten and 1st grade, after
all students in the sample have entered elementary school; these outcomes are unavailable at age 3
and age 4 for students who do not attend preschool, and so are missing for many students in the
control group.
Following Kling et al. (2007) and Deming (2009), I construct an index to summarize the impact
of Head Start attendance across the outcomes listed in Table 2. Specifically, I define the summary
index
JE 1
j=1
where yij is outcome j for student i, and py and -j are the sample mean and standard deviation
of outcome j. 5 Each outcome is constructed so that a positive sign means better performance. I
4 Weighted Head Start attendance rates in the first year of the experiment were 87 percent in the treatment group
and 18 percent in the control group. Some students from the control group attended Head Start by applying to
centers outside the HSIS sample.
5 Anderson (2008) defines an alternative summary index that uses the covariance matrix of outcomes. Results
using this method were very similar to those presented below.
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standardize outcomes separately by grade and outcome group.6
Table 3 reports correlations between the summary indices of cognitive and non-cognitive skills
separately by grade. The correlations are typically around 0.25, and are all statistically different
from zero at the 1-percent level. The correlation between cognitive skills and parent-reported non-
cognitive skills increases steadily from age 3 through 1st grade, which may indicate that the HSIS
outcomes measure skills more reliably at older ages. The strong correlations between the summary
indices suggest that these outcomes may capture important elements of human capital.
3.3 Average Impacts of Head Start Attendance
I next summarize the average impact of Head Start attendance on indices of cognitive and non-
cognitive skills. DHHS (2010a) reports effects of assignment to treatment on individual outcomes,
while Bitler et al. (2012) report estimates of quantile treatment effects for a subset of the outcomes
used here. Gelber and Isen (2011) use similar methods to study the effects of Head Start on
outcomes related to parents' involvement with their children.
I estimate the average effect of Head Start attendance using a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
procedure with second-stage equation
Y = a + #D + Xiy + 'E, (3.1)
where Y is a summary index of cognitive or non-cognitive skills, Di is an indicator for attending
Head Start, and Xi is a vector of baseline characteristics included to increase precision. The
first-stage equation is
Di =y+r rZi + XA + (3.2)
The dummy variable Zi indicates assignment to the treatment group. Three-year-old and four-year-
old applicants are pooled, and observations are weighted by the HSIS child base weights. The vector
Xi includes monthly household income, and dummies for sex, race, mother's education (dropout
6 Table Al shows attrition rates for the HSIS sample by grade and outcome group. Even with successful random
assignment, non-random attrition has the potential to bias the experimental results. In preschool, outcomes are
observed for roughly 78% of children in the control group; the follow-up rate falls slightly in elementary school. At all
grade levels, cognitive outcomes and non-cognitive outcomes reported by parents are observed slightly more frequently
for children in the treatment group; the difference ranges from 1 percentage point for non-cognitive skills at age 3 to
4 percentage points for cognitive skills at age 4, and the differential is statistically significant for most grades. These
small differences in follow-up rates seem unlikely to significantly bias the results reported below. Follow-up rates are
lower for non-cognitive skills reported by teachers, but there is no difference between treated and control students
for this outcome.
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or college graduate), father's education, teen mother, presence of both parents in the household,
urban status, and baseline measures of cognitive and non-cognitive skills.7 I set missing values for
components of Xi to zero and include dummy variables indicating missing values for each control
variable.
3.3.1 Cognitive Impacts
Head Start attendance causes small increases in cognitive outcomes during preschool, which
fade out by the time applicants reach kindergarten. The left-hand panel of Table 4 shows estimates
of equations (3.1) and (3.2) for cognitive outcomes, separately by grade. Column (1) shows that
at age 3, applicants assigned to treatment are 68 percentage points more likely to attend Head
Start than applicants in the control group. The corresponding second-stage estimate, reported in
column (2), shows that Head Start attendance increases cognitive skills by 0.150r at age 3, and
this estimate is statistically significant at the 1-percent level. At age 4, the first-stage coefficient
falls to 0.51 because some three-year-old applicants assigned to the control group attend Head
Start at age 4. Head Start attendance is estimated to increase cognitive skills at age 4 by a
statistically significant 0.12a-. In kindergarten and 1st grade, the 2SLS estimates of # are small and
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the cognitive gains experienced by Head Start attenders
during preschool do not persist into elementary school.
3.3.2 Non-cognitive Impacts
The 2SLS estimates suggest that Head Start attendance has little effect on non-cognitive skills.
This can be seen in columns (3) through (6) of Table 4, which report effects on summary indices of
non-cognitive skills reported by parents and teachers. The 2SLS estimate of the effect of Head Start
attendance on parent-reported non-cognitive skills at age 3 is 0.06c-, and this estimate is marginally
statistically significant. However, the estimates for parent-reported non-cognitive skills are small,
statistically insignificant, and precisely estimated at the other three grade levels. This includes
age 4, when treated applicants are still enrolled in Head Start. The point estimates for effects on
7DHHS (2010) notes that the tests used to construct baseline cognitive and non-cognitive skills were conducted
in the Fall of 2002 after some children had already entered Head Start. These variables may therefore have been
affected by the HSIS experiment. However, Table 2 shows that baseline cognitive and non-cognitive skills are similar
for the treatment and control groups, which suggests that the small treatment effects observed in preschool had not
yet developed by the time these skills were measured. I therefore include these measures to increase the precision
of the estimates. Versions of the analysis that omit baseline cognitive and non-cognitive skills produced very similar
results.
147
indices of teacher-reported non-cognitive skills in kindergarten and first grade are negative, though
these are less precisely estimated than the corresponding results for parent-reported skills.
Taken as a whole, the HSIS experiment provides little evidence that Head Start attendance
affects non-cognitive skills on average. Numerous studies have argued that the long-run effects
of successful early-childhood programs are mediated by effects on non-cognitive skills (Chetty et
al. 2011, Heckman 2010a, Deming 2009). To the extent that the HSIS non-cognitive outcomes
accurately measure these skills in the short run, the estimates reported here suggest that the
average long-run effects of Head Start attendance are likely to be small for current cohorts.
3.4 Relationships Between Practices and Impacts
3.4.1 Practices in Head Start and the Perry Project
The estimates reported above show that the effects of Head Start attendance are smaller and
less persistent than the effects of small-scale model programs like the Perry Preschool Project. In
the remainder of the chapter, I ask whether Head Start centers that use inputs that are more similar
to the key practices of the Perry Project are more successful at boosting student outcomes in the
short run. I focus on inputs that have been argued as important in explaining the success of the
Perry program.
Schweinhart (2007) gives one view of the inputs that drove the success of the Perry Project:
"The external validity or generalizability of the study findings extends to those
programs that are reasonably similar to the High/Scope Perry Preschool Program. A
reasonably similar program is a preschool education program run by teachers with
bachelor's degrees and certification in education, each serving up to 8 children living
in low-income families. The program runs 2 school years for children who are 3 and
4 years of age with daily classes of 2.5 hours or more, uses the High/Scope model or
a similar participatory education approach, and has teachers visiting families at least
every two weeks or scheduling regular parent events."
This account of the Perry program's effects emphasizes teacher education, teacher certifica-
tion, teacher/student ratios, instruction time, the High/Scope curriculum, and home visiting.
High/Scope is a participatory curriculum that emphasizes childrens' hands-on choices and ex-
periences rather than adult-driven instruction. Central components of the curriculum include a
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predictable daily routine, and a "plan-do-review" sequence in which children help to plan their
activities, carry out their plans, and then review their experiences in relation to the plan (Ep-
stein 2007). In the High/Scope Preschool Curriculum Comparison Study, a follow-up to the Perry
Project, 68 students were randomly assigned to High/Scope, a nursery school model, or a direct
instruction group. The results showed that compared to the direct instruction group, children as-
signed to High/Scope and nursery school were less likely to enroll in special education or commit
felonies by age 23 (Schweinhart and Weikart 1997). Based on this evidence, Schweinhart (2007)
places particular weight on High/Scope in the success of the Perry Project, arguing that the follow-
up results "[suggest] that the curriculum had a lot to do with the findings."
No Head Start program exactly matches the combination of inputs used in the Perry Preschool
Project, but there is substantial variation in each of the key Perry inputs within Head Start. Table
5 compares the inputs and practices used by Head Start centers in the HSIS sample to the inputs
used in the Perry experiment. The practices used by Head Start centers are highly heterogeneous.
Centers differ in their curricula, staff characteristics, and services provided. One-third of Head
Start centers use the High/Scope curriculum. Only 15 percent of Head Start staff members have
bachelor's degrees, and 13 percent hold teaching licenses, but the fractions with these credentials
range from zero to 100 percent across centers. All teachers in the Perry experiment were college
graduates with teaching licenses. The average Head Start center has 9.7 children for every staff
member, compared to 6.3 in the Perry Project. Some, but not all, Head Start centers provide full-
day service or frequent home visiting. The average center in the HSIS sample has 13 randomized
applicants; randomized sample sizes range from a minimum of 2 children to a maximum of 79. The
distribution of observed inputs for High/Scope Head Start centers is similar to the distribution for
the overall program. The rest of this chapter explores whether differences in these inputs explain
differences in effectiveness across Head Start centers. In particular, I ask whether centers using
practices more similar to the Perry Project produce larger gains.
3.4.2 Heterogeneity in Impacts Across Head Start Centers
Before analyzing the relationship between practices and causal effects, I begin the analysis of
cross-center heterogeneity by quantifying the variation in impacts across Head Start centers. This
allows me to ask whether there are meaningful differences in effectiveness across Head Start centers
that might be explained by differences in practices. To quantify cross-center heterogeneity in Head
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Start effects, I estimate 2SLS systems of the form
Yic = ac + #cDic + Eic (3.3)
Dic = Ke + ircZie + 7lic (3.4)
where c indexes Head Start centers. This model allows the effect of Head Start attendance to differ
across centers. The coefficient #c captures the effect of attendance at center c.
Two-stage Least Squares estimation of equations (3.3) and (3.4) produces an estimate 1c for
each center. These estimates are noisy measures of the center-specific effects 3 ; due to estimation
error, variation in &c across centers overstates heterogeneity in Head Start impacts. To quantify
the underlying variation in effects, I specify a normal random-coefficients instrumental variables
model for the first- and second-stage parameters. The model is given by
Yic = ac + #Dic + Eic (3.5)
Dic = 1{sc + icZie + 77c > 0} (3.6)
(ac, 0c, nc, log wc)' |Xc, Ze ~ N ((a*, #*, x*, log 7r*)', 0) (3.7)
(Eic,qic)' lXic, Zie ~ N ((0, 0)' E) (3.8)
where Xc = (XIc... X' Nc is the number of applicants at center c, and Ze is defined similarly.
The variance of iic is normalized to one. Morris (1983) and Raudenbush and Bryk (1985) discuss
the use of single-equation random coefficients models to summarize variation in treatment effects
across sites. I adapt these methods to a setting with a binary endogenous regressor.
The random coefficients model requires more assumptions to yield valid causal estimates than
the weighted 2SLS estimates reported in Table 4. Specifically, equation (3.5) implies that differences
in the probability of assignment to Head Start across centers are uncorrelated with differences in
mean outcomes or treatment effects. This assumption implies that use of the HSIS student weights
is unnecessary. Estimates treating ac and Kc as fixed effects were similar to the random effects
estimates, which suggests that this assumption is reasonable; in addition, in unweighted versions of
Table 1, baseline characteristics are still uncorrelated with assignment to Head Start. I therefore
use the more parsimonious random coefficients model to analyze variation in Head Start impacts.
The Appendix discusses the Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) procedure used to estimate
the model described by equations (3.5) through (3.8).
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Figures 1 and 2 summarize cross-center heterogeneity in the effects of Head Start attendance.
The full set of random coefficients parameter estimates is reported in Appendix Table A2. Figure
1 shows estimates for preschool, while Figure 2 shows results for elementary school. In each figure,
blue curves show kernel densities of the 2SLS estimates -re and #c, while red curves show the
distributions of &c and 7re implied by the random coefficients model. The kernel densities use
a normal kernel and Silverman's (1986) rule-of-thumb bandwidth. The first stage figures report
distributions of the quantity
oc = b (rc + 7rc) - (D (rc)
which is the effect of assignment to Head Start on the probability of Head Start attendance at center
c in the first stage probit model (3.6). To plot the distribution of 6c, I draw 1,000 realizations of the
vector (Kc, log 7rc)' from the joint normal distribution implied by the random coefficient estimates.
There is substantial heterogeneity in the cognitive effect of Head Start across centers. The
estimates of the standard deviations of #c for cognitive skills at ages 3 and 4 are 0.68or and 0.14or.
These estimates are larger than typical estimates of the variation in effectiveness across teachers; for
example, Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2011) estimate the standard deviation of teacher quality
in elementary school to be 0.12or in math and 0.08a in reading. Though Head Start attendance
has small average effects on cognitive skills in elementary school, Figure 2 shows that there re-
mains substantial variation in effects across centers: the estimated standard deviations of #c in
kindergarten and first grade are 0.13a and 0.12o, respectively. The first stage estimates reported
in Figure 1 show that the effects of assignment to Head Start are also heterogeneous: the standard
deviations of oc at ages 3 and 4 are 0.23 and 0.15.
Figures 1 and 2 also reveal that there is less variation across Head Start centers in effects
on non-cognitive skills than on cognitive skills. The standard deviations for the parent-reported
measure are 0.08c and 0.10o, at ages 3 and 4. The estimates for parent-reported non-cognitive
skills in elementary school are comparable (0.10a and 0.07a). In addition, the estimated standard
deviations for teacher-reported non-cognitive skills in elementary school are quite similar to those
for parent-reported skills (0.11cr and 0.06a). Together, the results in figures 1 and 2 show that
there is substantial variation in effectiveness across Head Start centers with respect to cognitive
skills, and that while there appears to be less impact variation for non-cognitive skills, there are
still wide differences across Head Start centers on this dimension as well. In the next section, I ask
whether the effect variation documented in these figures can be explained by differences in inputs
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and practices across centers.
3.4.3 Estimating the Relationship Between Impacts and Practices
To analyze the relationship between practices and the effects of Head Start, I estimate 2SLS
systems of the form
Y = a + SoDi + Di P'l 1 + P#+ X y + ei (3.9)
Di = p + iroZz + Zi -Pri + Pjr + XA + ri, (3.10)
where P is a vector of practices for the Head Start center to which student i applied. There are
similar first-stage equations for the interaction terms between Di and Pi. The coefficient vector
#1 captures the relationship between the causal effect of Head Start attendance and the practices
used by Head Start centers. To increase precision, I estimate these equations in samples that group
observations into preschool (ages 3 and 4) or elementary school (kindergarten and first grade),
and add grade dummies to Xi. Appendix Table A3 reports estimates for individual grades and
estimates that include the inputs in P one at a time rather than jointly.
Estimates of equation (3.9) reveal little evidence of a relationship between practices and the
effect of Head Start attendance. This can be seen in Table 6, which reports estimates of #1 from
2SLS models that include the six key inputs discussed above in Pi. The first row of Table 6 shows
that Head Start centers using the High/Scope curriculum do not boost cognitive skills more than
other centers. The estimate of the High/Scope coefficient #1 for cognitive skills in preschool is
-0.03a, with a standard error of 0.14. The 95-percent confidence interval associated with this
estimate is a reasonably tight [-0.28c, 0.22a]; the hypothesis that High/Scope centers increase
cognitive skills by more than 0.22a relative to other Head Start centers can be rejected at the
5-percent level. In contrast, the short-run cognitive effect of the Perry Project was roughly 0.7a
larger than the effect of Head Start. The corresponding estimate for parent-reported non-cognitive
skills in preschool, shown in the first row of column (2), is 0.11a, and this estimate is marginally
significant. This suggests that the short-run impact of High/Scope centers on non-cognitive skills
may be slightly larger than effects for other centers. The High/Scope estimates for elementary
school are statistically insignificant, and inconsistent; the estimate for parent-reported cognitive
skills is positive, but the estimate for teacher-reported skills is negative. These results suggests that
the High/Scope curriculum is not sufficient to produce dramatic short-run gains of the magnitude
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observed in the Perry Project.
The remaining rows of Table 6 show that the other key inputs are unrelated to effectiveness in
Head Start. Specifically, the estimates of #1 associated with the fraction of staff holding bachelor's
degrees, the fraction of staff with teaching licenses, student/staff ratios, full day service, and home
visiting more than three times per year are statistically insignificant for all outcomes in both
preschool and elementary school. Though some of the estimates are imprecise, none of the input
coefficients shows a consistent pattern across grades or outcomes. For example, the estimates of
#1 associated with bachelor's degrees are positive and insignificant for cognitive skills, but slightly
negative for non-cognitive skills. These estimates suggest that differences in effects across Head
Start centers cannot be explained by differences in the key Perry inputs described by Schweinhart
(2007). The lack of a relationship between Head Start inputs and causal effects mirrors results
from studies of teacher quality, which typically find no relationship between teacher effectiveness
and observed characteristics despite large differences in quality across teachers (Kane, Rockoff and
Staiger 2007).
3.4.4 Predicted Changes in Treatment Effects
To summarize the relationship between inputs and effectiveness in Head Start, I next use the
estimates of equation (3.9) to predict how the average effect of Head Start would change if the
average Head Start center used the same inputs as the Perry Preschool project. The linear model
in equation (3.9) implies that the average effect of Head Start is given by
#3s = #0 + PkS#1
where Phs is the average vector of practices in Head Start. It is important to note that inputs are
not randomly assigned to Head Start centers, so estimates of #1 may not accurately capture the
changes in effectivness that would result from changing inputs in isolation. Under the tentative
assumption that these estimates are causal, they can be used to predict the effects of adopting
Perry-like practices in Head Start. Specifically, if the average Head Start center used the Perry
inputs, the average Head Start effect would become
)p = 0 + P;#i
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where P, are the practices used in the Perry Project, described in column (9) of Table 5. The
resulting change in effectiveness is given by
A 4 3 p - /3 hsl
The quantity A can be interpreted as the predicted change in average treatment effects that would
occur if Head Start centers adopted the practices used in the Perry experiment.
Table 7 reports estimates of A for preschool and elementary school, separately by outcome
group. The results suggest that adoption of Perry-like practices in Head Start would do little
to boost effectiveness. The first row of column (1) shows that the treatment effect evaluated at
the average Head Start inputs, Ohs, is 0.16a for cognitive skills in elementary school. As shown in
column (2), the corresponding predicted treatment effect evaluated at the Perry inputs, 3,, is 0. 15,.
As a result, the predicted change in treatment effects from adopting the Perry practices is -0.011o.
This estimate is imprecise (standard error 0.338), but it provides no evidence that adopting Perry-
like practices in Head Start would increase effectiveness. Similarly, predicted treatment effects are
close to zero at both the Head Start and Perry inputs for cognitive skills in elementary school, as well
as for parent-reported non-cognitive skills in preschool and elementary school; the corresponding
estimates of A are close to zero and statistically insignificant. The estimate for teacher-reported
non-cognitive skills implies that adoption of the Perry practices would decrease effectiveness in
Head Start, though this estimate is very imprecise.
Thes estimates reported in Table 7 should be interpreted with caution since inputs and practices
are not randomly assigned to Head Start centers. If the inputs analyzed here are correlated with
unobserved center-level factors that influence effectiveness, estimates of A will provide a misleading
picture of the effect of changing inputs. Moreover, there may be important complementarities
between inputs, which are ruled out by the linear model for treatment effects implied by equation
(3.9). Nonetheless, this analysis provides no evidence that adoption of Perry-like practices in
Head Start, such as increased use of the High/Scope curriculum or more educated teachers, would
substantially increase the program's effectiveness.
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3.4.5 Analysis in Perry-like Subsamples
The analysis above suggests that differences in practices do not explain the difference in short-
run effectiveness between Head Start and small-scale programs like the Perry Project. I next ask
whether the unique demographics of the Perry experiment can explain this difference. The Perry
sample consisted entirely of African-american children selected on the basis of low IQ (Anderson
2008). Such children may benefit atypically from the High/Scope curriculum, or early childhood
programs more generally. In Table 8, I present estimates of equation (3.1) in samples selected to
increasingly match the demographic profile of the Perry project.
The first two rows of Table 8 compare the overall effects of Head Start to effects for High/Scope
centers. These estimates show the same pattern as the interaction models in Table 6: High/Scope
centers have cognitive effects comparable to the average impacts of Head Start, and may pro-
duce slightly larger effects on parent-reported non-cognitive skills in the short run. In preschool,
High/Scope centers increase cognitive skills by 0.17c. This estimate is statistically significant, and
is similar to the average effect for all Head Start programs (0.13a). Similar to the pattern for overall
effects, the cognitive estimate for High/Scope programs falls to 0.083o and becomes statistically
insignificant in elementary school. The estimate for parent-reported cognitive skills in preschool
is a marginally significant 0.097a, which is somewhat larger than the pooled Head Start effect
(0.026c). The corresponding estimate for elementary school is similar (0.103a), but this estimate is
stastically insignificant due to reduced precision. Moreover, the estimates for teacher-reported non-
cognitive skills are negative and insignificant for both the full set of applicants and for applicants to
High/Scope centers. These results suggest that High/Scope centers may have slightly larger effects
on parent-reported non-cognitive skills than other centers in the short run, these centers do not
produce lasting gains on cognitive or non-cognitive dimensions.
The third row of Table 8 restricts the sample to African-american applicants to High/Scope
Head Start centers. The preschool estimates for cognitive and non-cognitive skills are positive, but
statistically insignificant. This lack of significance is mostly driven by reduced sample size; I cannot
rule out effect sizes similar to the average effects of High/Scope centers. Nonetheless, the point
estimates are small and provide no evidence of the dramatic short-run gains experienced by African-
american children in the Perry sample. The elementary school estimates for the African-american
subgroup are also positive, but very imprecise.
The final row of Table 8 further restricts the sample to African-american children with baseline
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cognitive skills below the sample median. The estimates suggest that attending a High/Scope Head
Start center has little effect for these children. The preschool estimates for both cognitive and non-
cognitive skills are statistically insignificant and very close to zero. Similarly, the elementary school
estimates are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, but they are also much less precise.
Though standard errors for this subgroup are large, the samples here are roughly twice the size of
the Perry experimental sample, and the standard errors for preschool are small enough to detect
effects of around 0.25o-, an effect size that is much smaller than the short-run impact of the Perry
project. These estimates show that the difference between the effects of High/Scope in Head Start
and in the Perry experiment are not due to the demographics of the Perry sample; in fact, African-
american children with low cognitive skills seem to benefit less from attending High/Scope Head
Start centers than do other children.
3.5 Conclusion
Studies of small-scale early-childhood programs, including the Perry Preschool Project, show
that early intervention can dramatically boost outcomes in the short- and long-run. Randomized
evidence from the Head Start Impact Study (HSIS) suggests that Head Start attendance produces
smaller, less-persistent gains. This chapter uses data from the HSIS to ask whether differences in
practices across Head Start centers can explain difference in effectiveness within Head Start, as well
as the difference between Head Start programs and the Perry Project. There is substantial variation
in effectiveness across Head Start centers, particularly with respect to cognitive skills. However,
my results suggest that inputs typically cited as important to the success of small-scale programs,
including the High/Scope curriciulum, teacher education and certification, teacher/student ra-
tios, instruction time, and home visiting, do not explain this variation. Samples of applicants to
High/Scope centers selected to closely match the demographics of the Perry experiment also show
little evidence of large or persistent gains.
This analysis raises the further question of how the success small-scale model programs can be
replicated. This question is of immediate policy importance given recent calls to expand public
preschool access to all children (see, e.g., Obama 2013). Moreover, the 2008 Head Start reautho-
rization law included requirements to increase the fraction of Head Start teachers with bachelor's
degrees to 50 percent by September 2013 (DHHS 2008). My results suggest that this strategy alone
may not raise the program's effectiveness. The results reported here are similar to findings from
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the literature on teacher quality, which typically show no relationship between observed teacher
characteristics and effectiveness. This has led some analysts to argue in favor of policies that base
personnel decisions on measures of value-added rather than observed characteristics (Hanushek
2009). My results suggest that similar output-based measures of Head Start program quality may
be more useful than measures focused on inputs. In future work, I hope to explore the relationship
between short-run Head Start effectiveness and longer-run gains.
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3.6 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Cross-Center Heterogeneity in the Effect of Head Start Attendance During Preschool
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Notes: This figure shows variation in the effects of Head Start attendance across Head Start centers during preschool. Effects are in standard deviation units. In each figure, the blue curve shows a kernel density of center-specific
2SLS estimates, while the red curve shows the distribution of effects implied by the random coefficients model. The kernel densities are estimated using a normal kernel and Silverman's rule-of-thumb bandwidth. The reported means
and standard deviations are the random coefficients estimates.
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Figure 2: Cross-Center Heterogeneity in the Effect of Head Start Attendance During Elenentary School
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Notes: This figure shows variation in the effects of Head Start attendance across Head Start centers during elementary school. Effects are in standard deviation units. In each figure, the blue curve shows a kemel density of center-
specific 2SLS estimates, while the red curve shows the distribution of effects implied by the random coefficients model. The kernel densities are estimated using a normal kernel and Silverman's rule-of-thumb bandwidth. The
reported means and standard deviations are the random coefficients estimates. The first stage distributions for elementary school are similar to the 4-year-old estimates reported in Figure 1.
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Table 1: Characteristics of Head Start Applicar
Mean
iable (1)
0.503
White
Black
Hispanic
Mother high school dropout
Mother college graduate
Father high school dropout
Father college graduate
Teen mother
Both parents in household
Monthly household income
Urban
Baseline cognitive skills
Baseline parent-reported non-cognitive
skills
Assigned to Head Start
Attended Head Start in 1st year
0.270
0.316
0.380
0.329
0.170
0.326
0.191
0.494
0.456
1491.636
0.843
-0.001
0.001
0.596
0.531
ts
Treatment vs. control
(2)
-0.016
(0.024)
0.017
(0.021)
0.008
(0.021)
-0.014
(0.024)
-0.023
(0.022)
-0.014
(0.018)
0.001
(0.024)
0.000
(0.018)
-0.033
(0.024)
-0.030
(0.024)
-16.343
(72.850)
0.004
(0.017)
0.001
(0.026)
0.016
(0.021)
1.00
0.706***
(0.019)
N (total) 4,442
N (with demographics) 3,577
Joint p-value for baseline characteristics 0.782
Notes: Column (1) shows means of baseline characteristics for Head Start applicants. Column
(2) shows coefficients on regressions of each characteristic on assignment to Head Start,
weighting with baseline student weights. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The p- value
is from a test of the hypothesis that coefficients for all baseline characteristics are zero.
***significant at 1%; significant at 5%; *significant at 1%
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Table 2: Outcomes
Non-cognitive
Cognitive Parent-reported Teacher-reported
(1) (2) (3)
PPVT adapted Takes care of personal things Aggressive adjustment problems (ASPI)
Color Identification Asks for assistance with tasks Inattentive/hyperactive adjustment problems (ASPI)
TVIP Helps with simple household tasks Withdrawn/low energy adjustment problems (ASPI)
CTOPPP Elision Makes friends easily Oppositional adjustment problems (ASPI)
WJIII Oral Comprehension Enjoys learning Problems with peer interactions (ASPI)
WJIII Word Attack Has temper tantrums Socially reticent adjustment problems (ASPI)
WJIII Letter-Word Cannot concentrate/pay attention for long Problems with structured learning (ASPI)
WJIII Passage Comprehension Is very restless/fidgets a lot Problems with teacher interactions (ASPI)
WJIII Spelling Likes to try new things Closeness with teacher (Pianta scale)
WJIII Writing Samples Shows imagination in work and play Conflict with teacher (Pianta scale)
WJIII Applied Problems Hits and fights with others Positive relationship with teacher (Pianta scale)
WJIII Quantitative Concepts Accepts friends' ideas in playing
WJIII Calculation
WM Identificacion de letras y palabras
WM Dictado
WM Problemas Aplicados
McCarthy Draw-A-Design
Letter naming
Counting Bears
Leiter AS4
Leiter AS7
Story and print concepts
Writing name task
Notes: This table lists the cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes used in the analysis. Binary outcomes where more than 90% of responses take one value are
excluded from the analysis.
Table 3: Correlations Between Summary Indices of Cognitive and Non-cognitive Skills
Cognitive, Cognitive, Non-cognitive (parent),
non-cognitive (parent) non-cognitive (teacher) non-cognitive (teacher)
Outcome grade (1) (2) (3)
Preschool (age 3) 0.192*** - .
(0.022)
N 2016
Preschool (age 4) 0.233***
(0.016)
N 3580
Kindergarten 0.242*** 0.238*** 0.260***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
N 3439 2710 2725
1st grade 0.271*** 0.255*** 0.282***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
N 3390 2883 2900
Notes: This table reports correlations between summary indices of cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
Indices are averages of standardized versions of the measures listed in Table 2.
***significant at 1%; significant at 5%; *significant at 1%
Outcome grade
Preschool (age 3)
N
Table 4: Effects of Head Start on Cognitive and Non-cognitive Skills
Cognitive skills Non-cognitive skills (parent)
First stage 2SLS First stage 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.681*** 0.151*** 0.683*** 0.064*
(0.031) (0.042) (0.030) (0.035)
2070
Non-cognitive skills (teacher)
First stage 2SLS
(5) (6)
2062
Preschool (age 4)
Kindergarten
N
N
1st grade
0.507***
(0.026)
0.518***
(0.026)
0.502***
(0.026)
3618
3372
0.116***
(0.043)
-0.007
(0.044)
0.049
(0.064)
0.511***
(0.025)
0.522***
(0.025)
0.507***
(0.026)
3661
3441
-0.002
(0.035)
0.011
(0.043)
-0.012
(0.040)
0.498***
(0.029)
0.491***
(0.027)
2777
-0.090
(0.074)
-0.017
(0.068)
N 3300 3418 2960
Notes: This table reports estimates of the effect of Head Start attendance on cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Outcomes for each category are
averages of the measures listed in Table 3. Estimates come from 2SLS models that instrument Head Start attendance with assignment to Head Start.
Covariates include sex, race, teen birth, mother's education, father's education, presence of both parents in the household, family income, urban status,
and baseline cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Missing covariates are set to zero, and dummies for missing values are included. Models weight by the
HSIS baseline student weights, and standard errors are clustered at the Head Start center level.
***significant at 1%; significant at 5%; *significant at 1%
Table 5: Inputs in HSIS Head Start Centers and the Perry Preschool Project
HSIS Head Start centers High/Scope HSIS centers
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Perry Project
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
High/Scope curriculum 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Fraction of staff with bachelor's degree 0.15 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.75 1.00
Fraction of staff with teaching license 0.13 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.23 0.00 1.00 1.00
Student/staff ratio 9.73 4.01 1.54 35.00 9.84 3.73 4.13 25.50 6.25
Full day service 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00
Three or more home visits per year 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00
Number of randomized applicants 13.76 10.65 2.00 79.00 12.85 10.73 2.00 79.00 113.00
Fraction of applicants assigned to treatment 0.60 0.06 0.25 0.83 0.61 0.06 0.50 0.83 0.51
N (centers) 288 94 1
Notes: This table summarizes characteristics of Head Start center in the HSIS data (columns 1-4), HSIS centers that use the High/Scope curriculum (columns 5-8), and the
Perry Preschool Project (column 9). The HSIS sample excludes centers where the center director did not answer the HSIS survey, and centers where the fraction of students
assigned to treatment was zero or one.
Table 6: Relationship Between Head Start Effects and Inputs
Elementary school
Variable
High/Scope curriculum
Cognitive
(1)
-0.033
(0.127)
Parent-reported
non-cognitive
(2)
0.113*
(0.065)
Cognitive
(3)
0.087
(0.102)
Parent-reported non-
cognitive
(4)
0.110
(0.087)
Teacher-reported
non-cognitive
(5)
-0.188
(0.175)
Fraction of staff with bachelor's degree
Fraction of staff with teaching license
Student/staff ratio
Full day service
Three or more home visits per year
N
-0.031
(0.178)
0.113
(0.197)
0.028
(0.046)
0.207
(0.131)
-0.055
(0.095)
4511
-0.207
(0.128)
-0.001
(0.125)
-0.003
(0.013)
0.065
(0.069)
0.076
(0.065)
4532
-0.309
(0.207)
0.075
(0.192)
-0.006
(0.018)
0.083
(0.104)
0.013
(0.121)
5353
0.035
(0.139)
-0.027
(0.125)
0.018
(0.013)
0.016
(0.074)
-0.038
(0.078)
5503
-0.348
(0.265)
-0.053
(0.321)
0.087
(0.066)
0.125
(0.168)
-0.150
(0.157)
4668
Notes: This table reports coefficients from 2SLS regressions that interact Head Start attendance with center-level characteristics, and
instrument interaction terms with interactions of these characteristics with assignment to Head Start. Columns (1) and (2) pool observations
from preschool (ages 3 and 4), while columns (3)-(5) pool observations from elementary school (kindergarten and 1st grade). Each column
includes all interaction terms in a single regression. Covariates include main effects of center-level characteristics, as well as grade dummies,
sex, race, teen birth, mother's education, father's education, presence of both parents in the household, family income, urban status, and
baseline cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Missing covariates are set to zero, and dummies for missing values are included. Models weight
by the HSIS baseline student weights, and standard errors are clustered at the Head Start center level.
Preschool
C-Il
Outcome
Cognitive skills
N
Table 7: Predicted Effects in Head Start and the Perry Project
Preschool
HS inputs Perry inputs Difference HS inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.157*** 0.146 -0.011 0.035
(0.046) (0.317) (0.338) (0.045)
4511
Elementary school
Perry inputs
(5)
-0.040
(0.348)
5353
Non-cognitive skills
(parent-reported)
Non-cognitive skills
(teacher-reported)
0.028
(0.030)
N
0.011
(0.187)
4532
-0.017
(0.186)
N
0.053
(0.038)
-0.016
(0.063)
0.043
(0.141)
5503
-0.831*
(0.490)
Notes: This table reports differences in predicted effects of Head Start attendance as a function of inputs. Estimates come from 2SLS
models that interact Head Start attendance with the inputs listed in Table 5, and use assignment to Head Start and its interactions with these
inputs as instruments. Columns (1)-(3) pool observations for preschool (ages 3 and 4), while columns (4)-(6) pool observations for
elementary school (kindergarten and 1st grade). Predicted effects in columns (1) and (4) evaluate treatment effects at averages of inputs in
Head Start. Effects in columns (2) and (5) evaluate effects at the inputs for the Perry Project. Columns (3) and (6) show differences between
these predictions. Models also include grade dummies, sex, race, teen birth, mother's education, father's education, presence of both parents
in the household, family income, urban status, and baseline cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Missing covariates are set to zero, and
dummies for missing values are included. Models weight by the HSIS baseline student weights, and standard errors are clustered at the Head
Start center level.
***significant at 1%; significant at 5%; *significant at 1%
-0.010
(0.148)
-0.815
(0.510)
Difference
(6)
-0.075
(0.343)
Subsample
All Head Start applica
Table 8: Effects of High/Scope Head Start Centers on Perry-like
Preschool
Cognitive NC (parent) Cognitive
(1) (2) (4)
nts 0.130*** 0.026 0.021
(0.037) (0.029) (0.050)
5688 5723 6672
Subgroups
Elementary school
NC (parent)
(5)
0.000
(0.035)
6859
NC (teacher)
(6)
-0.053
(0.059)
5737
High/Scope applicants
African-american
High/Scope applicants
0.170***
(0.058)
N 1507
0.072
(0.079)
N 374
African-american, low-cognitive -0.053 0.012 0.134 -0.089 -0.069
High/Scope applicants (0.113) (0.100) (0.292) (0.303) (0.407)
N 208 209 218 221 169
Notes: This table reports estimates of the effect of Head Start attendance on cognitive and non-cognitive skills for subgroups of
Head Start applicants. Low-cognitive applicants are children with cognitive skills below the sample median at baseline. Estimates
come from 2SLS models that instrument Head Start attendance with assignment to Head Start. Preschool regressions pool
observations at ages 3 and 4, while elementary school regressions pool observations in kindergarten and 1st grade. Covariates
include grade dummies, sex, race, teen birth, mother's education, father's education, presence of both parents in the household,
family income, urban status, and baseline cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Missing covariates are set to zero, and dummies for
missing values are included. Models weight by the HSIS baseline student weights, and standard errors are clustered at the Head
Start center level.
***significant at 1%; significant at 5%; *significant at 1%
0.097*
(0.051)
1522
0.137
(0.114)
378
0.083
(0.076)
1800
0.216
(0.148)
390
0.103
(0.074)
1855
0.283*
(0.154)
401
-0.081
(0.103)
1535
0.146
(0.258)
311
3.7 Appendix A: Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimation
This Appendix outlines the Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) procedure used to estimate
the random coefficients model in Section 3.4.2. The log-likelihood for the sample can be written
logC (0) = [log f (Y, De|1)
C
where
6 = (a*, n*, #*, log 7r*, E, 0)
is the vector of parameters to be estimated and f (Y, DeIO) is the joint likelihood of the observations
at center c. This expression can be re-written
log, (6) = log (1 f (Yic, Dic96, ac, #c, ne, log irc) dF(ac, , ie, log 7rc)). (3.11)
The conditional likelihood for an observation is given by
- Dic 1-Dic
1 isc #ic - E ic 7lic - 7,-Ei
f (Yic,1 Dicl10, ac, #c, re, log -7rc) =e 4 -# -- 12-
where o-e is the standard deviation of ec, p,, is the correlation between 6ic and ric, and
=i Yic - ac-& i
=i -- - ircZic.
I evaluate the integral in equation (3.11) by simulation. The MSL estimator is defined by
9 MSL = arg max E log HE (Yc, Dicf6, a, #c, , log rer
Here R is the number of simulation draws and (ac, n c, log ire) is a draw of (ac, #c, "c, log irc) from
the distribution implied by 0. I use 200 simulation draws to produce the MSL estimates reported
in Table A2.
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3.8 Appendix B: Additional Figures and Tables
Outcome grade
Preschool (age 3)
N
Cognitive skills
Follow-up rate Differential
(1) (2)
0.783 0.039***
(0.013)
2449
able Al: Attrition
Non-cognitive skills (parent)
Follow-up rate Differential
(3) (4)
0.796 0.012
(0.013)
2449
Non-cognitive skills (teacher)
Follow-up rate Differential
(5) (6)
Preschool (age 4)
Kindergarten
0.776
N
0.731
N
0.028**
(0.011)
4442
0.022**
(0.011)
4442
0.776
0.752
0.018*
(0.009)
4442
0.020*
(0.011)
4442
0.614 0.008
(0.012)
4442
1st grade 0.720 0.021** 0.747 0.024** 0.668 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
N 4442 4442 4442
Notes: This table reports attrition rates for cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes in the HSIS data. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the fractions of
control children with observed outcomes. Columns (2), (4) and (6) report coefficients from regressions of a dummy for presence of an observed
outcome on assignment to treatment and covariates. Covariates include sex, race, teen birth, mother's education, father's education, presence of both
parents in the household, family income, urban status, and baseline cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Missing covariates are set to zero, and
dummies for missing values are included. Standard errors are clustered at the Head Start center level.
***significant at 1%; significant at 5%; *significant at 1%
Table A2: Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimates of Random Coefficients Models
Cognitive skills Non-cognitive skills (parent) Non-cognitive skills (teacher)
Age 3 Age 4 Kindergarten 1st grade Age 3 Age 4 Kindergarten 1st grade Kindergarten 1st grade
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
C -0.033 -0.050* 0.025 -0.004 -0.025 0.001 -0.003 -0.018 0.029 0.043
(0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.038) (0.018) (0.020)
0.068* 0.104*** -0.038 0.028 0.041 0.000
(0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.048) (0.026) (0.028)
(0.022) (0.021)
0.012 0.030
(0.029) (0.027)
K -1.521*** -0.521*** -0.505*** -0.488*** -1.528*** -0.500*** -0.513*** -0.488***
(0.126) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.122) (0.043) (0.048) (0.046)
logn' 1.002*** 0.500*** 0.508*** 0.491*** 1.008*** 0.480*** 0.510*** 0.488***
(0.065) (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.063) (0.042) (0.046) (0.044)
a 0.264*** 0.271*** 0.266*** 0.288*** 0.100*** 0.078*** 0.092*** 0.076***
(0.034) (0.022) (0.027) (0.035) (0.028) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016)
-0.510*** -0.492***
(0.048) (0.047)
0.514*** 0.478***
(0.045) (0.044)
0.112** 0.117***
(0.050) (0.030)
A 0.158*** 0.142*** 0.128*** 0.115***
(0.054) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
0.075* 0.097*** 0.101*** 0.070***
(0.043) (0.021) (0.029) (0.026)
aK 0.849*** 0.394*** 0.413*** 0.373*** 0.809*** 0.384*** 0.382*** 0.340***
(0.127) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.126) (0.063) (0.065) (0.071)
On 0.613*** 0.371*** 0.368*** 0.347*** 0.588*** 0.401*** 0.368*** 0.353***
(0.087) (0.058) (0.068) (0.059) (0.091) (0.062) (0.064) (0.061)
Poo -0.835*** -0.581*** -0.462*** -0.819*** -0.609*** -0.461*** -0.525*** -0.260***
(0.013) (0.026) (0.059) (0.044) (0.087) (0.068) (0.065) (0.091)
PaM  0.268*** 0.068
(0.076) (0.076)
pan -0.230*** -0.039
(0.048) (0.076)
-0.125 -0.435*** -0.198*** 0.759*** 0.247** 0.654***
(0.084) (0.064) (0.064) (0.160) (0.124) (0.177)
0.068 0.445*** 0.195*** -0.653*** -0.089 -0.508***
(0.106) (0.114) (0.074) (0.062) (0.072) (0.071)
pox -0.621*** -0.372*** -0.602*** -0.080
(0.037) (0.086) (0.130) (0.170)
-0.055 -0.589*** -0.238*** -0.736***
(0.097) (0,084) (0.062) (0.097)
0.396*** 0.410***
(0.079) (0.073)
0.390*** 0.368***
(0.078) (0.071)
-0.807*** -0.745***
(0.064) (0.057)
0.431*** 0.418***
(0.152) (0.136)
-0.209
(0.149)
-0.391***
(0.072)
-0.418*** -0.548***
(0.120) (0.130)
psn 0.490*** 0.333*
(0.087) (0.189)
0.811*** 0.015 -0.161** 0.457*** -0.128** 0.421**
(0.272) (0.182) (0.070) (0.155) (S.060) (0.213)
PM -0.947*** -0.782*** -0.810*** -0.846*** -0.939*** -0.849*** -0.790*** -0.812***
(0.008) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.008) (0.023) (0.022) (0.036)
-0.849*** -0.808***
(0.027) (0.026)
Notes: This table reports Maximum Simulated Likelihood estimates of the distribution of first- and second-stage paramters across Head Start centers. The estimates comes from
the random coefficients model described in the text. The simulated likelihood is evaluated using 200 draws from the joint disribution of the random coefficients.
***significant at 1%; significant at 5%; *significant at 1%
170
01
(0.041)
-0.041
(0.057)
(0.035)
-0.061
(0.048)
0.112
(0.068)
0.061
(0.037)
-0.001
(0.228)
0.641***
(0.204)
Table A3: Relationship Between Head Start Effects and Inputs by Grade
Variable
High/Scope curriculum
Fraction of staff with bachelor's degree
Fraction of staff with teaching license
Student/staff ratio
Full day service
Three or more home visits per year
High/Scope curriculum
Fraction of staff with bachelor's degree
Fraction of staff with teaching license
Student/staff ratio
Full day service
Three or more home visits per year
Preschool (age 3)
Cognitive NC (parent)
(1) (2)
-0.057 0.042
(0.112) (0.075)
-0.157
(0.229)
-0.212
(0.224)
0.029
(0.049)
0.038
(0.117)
-0.139
(0.123)
-0.181
(0.186)
0.138
(0.315)
-0.250
(0.353)
0.044
(0.065)
0.142
(0.232)
-0.202
(0.170)
-0.133
(0.160)
-0.011
(0.177)
-0.020
(0.022)
0.035
(0.079)
0.000
(0.088)
0.063
(0.100)
-0.352*
(0.206)
0.058
(0.218)
-0.026
(0.029)
-0.037
(0.127)
0.024
(0.100)
Preschool (age 4)
Cognitive
(3)
0.072
(0.116)
0.394**
(0.189)
0.365**
(0.178)
-0.001
(0.026)
0. 164*
(0.099)
0.059
(0.126)
0.075
(0.131)
0.262
(0.226)
0.277
(0.201)
-0.005
(0.030)
0.068
(0.119)
0.067
(0.122)
NC (parent)
(4)
0.085
(0.081)
0.006
(0.131)
0.031
(0.138)
0.003
(0.013)
0.034
(0.073)
0.075
(0.083)
0.091
(0.095)
-0.073
(0.168)
-0.016
(0.169)
0.000
(0.014)
0.010
(0.080)
0.076
(0.087)
Cognitive
(3)
-0.033
(0.108)
0.240
(0.206)
0.168
(0.186)
-0.002
(0.020)
0.124
(0.101)
0.036 -0.055 0.000
(0.122) (0.087) (0.171)
Panel A. Separate model for each input
-0.032 0.158 -0.199
(0.122) (0.099) (0.168)
0.130
(0.250)
0.098
(0.203)
0.000
(0.024)
0.103
(0.122)
0.029
(0.121)
1852 1840
Kindergarten
NC (parent)
(4)
(31I -(3) (8) 1) ~ .U) -.0.118
(0.104)
0.082
(0.139)
0.053
(0.148)
0.023
(0.015)
0.041
(0.087)
NC (teacher)
(5)
-0.171)
(0.147)
-0.308
(0.205)
-0.044
(0.248)
0.036
(0.043)
0.070
(0.139)
Cognitive
(6)
(0.146)
0.079
(0.263)
0.231
(0.256)
-0.001
(0.024)
-0.015
(0.136)
0.021
(0.171)
0.138
(0.164)
-0.146
(0.306)
0.285
(0.267)
-0.009
(0.028)
-0.058
(0.155)
0.005
(0.161)
Ist grae
NC (parent)
(7)
0.050)
(0.100)
0.197
(0.137)
0.040
(0.131)
0.000
(0.014)
-0.006
(0.090)
-0.007
(0.113)
0.054
(0.119)
0.215
(0.193)
0.004
(0.156)
-0.002
(0.016)
-0.079
(0.099)
-0.015
(0.109)
NC (teacher)
(8)
(0.130)
-0.452
(0.329)
-0.139
(0.301)
0.103
(0.085)
-0.096
(0.127)
-0.215
(0.144)
-0.211
(0.256)
-0.318
(0.399)
-0.295
(0.562)
0.128
(0.114)
0.102
(0.274)
-0.297
(0.199)
N
0.017
(0.177)
-0.027
(0.187)
0.021
(0.017)
-0.003
(0.088)
-0.085
(0.084)
-0.191
(0.323)
0.144
(0.329)
0.043
(0.047)
0.067
(0.152)
0.000
(0.185)
3262 3293 3030 3097 2518
Panel B. Single model for all inputs
Notes: This table reports coefficients from 2SLS regressions that interact Head Start attendance with center-level characteristics, and instrument interaction terms with interactions of these characteristics with assignment to
Head Start. In Panel A, inputs are included in the model one at a time. In Panel B, inputs are included in a single 2SLS regression for each column. Covariates include main effects of center-level characteristics, as well as sex,
race, teen birth, mother's education, father's education, presence of both parents in the household, family income, urban status, and baseline cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Missing covariates are set to zero, and dummies
for missing values are included. Models weight by the HSIS baseline student weights, and standard errors are clustered at the Head Start center level.
***significant at 1%; significant at 5%; *significant at 1%
2977 3084 2654
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